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验证：
体验盒子Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=528
The attached testcase was found by fuzzing packed PE files, I suspect it was packed using "Yoda's protector". This vulnerability is obviously exploitable for remote code execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on all systems using Kaspersky Antivirus.
(bb8.ff0): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=b5118b71 ebx=0000f8f0 ecx=0515f124 edx=b5118b71 esi=0bfe0e38 edi=0bfe005c
eip=71db9229 esp=0515f0f0 ebp=0515f0f4 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023ss=002bds=002bes=002bfs=0053gs=002b efl=00010202
kavbase_kdl!KLAV_Engine_Create+0x78227:
71db9229 8b4230mov eax,dword ptr [edx+30h] ds:002b:b5118ba1=????????
What does it do with that value once it's loaded?
0:029> u
kavbase_kdl!KLAV_Engine_Create+0x78227:
71db9229 8b4230mov eax,dword ptr [edx+30h] <-- dereference bad pointer
71db922c 57pushedi
71db922d 8b38mov edi,dword ptr [eax] <-- dereference again
71db922f 51pushecx
71db9230 8b0amov ecx,dword ptr [edx]
71db9232 8b5730mov edx,dword ptr [edi+30h] <-- dererence again
71db9235 56pushesi
71db9236 51pushecx
0:029> u
kavbase_kdl!KLAV_Engine_Create+0x78235:
71db9237 50pusheax
71db9238 ffd2calledx <-- attacker gets control of execution and parameters
71db923a 83c410add esp,10h
71db923d 5fpop edi
71db923e 5epop esi
71db923f 5dpop ebp
71db9240 c3ret
Where does that pointer come from?
3C 03 6C 9E 8C 7D A5 C5 F9 22 6E F9 71 8B 11 B5<--- *
B0 4D 5B 5C A8 19 09 FE 36 1A B6 92 3A 92 96 78
95 BD 55 64 76 C5 87 7C 00 C4 C7 36 6E 24 87 9F
5F 12 AB 96 75 ED 11 CC D1 B1 0C 4C B8 88 9A 5D
07 A5 C0 C7 5E 19 04 44 FC 4C 0F 69 20 2E 70 7A
Directly from the input file, so this is obviously exploitable for remote code execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/38288.zip
体验盒子
