Wireshark – getRate Stack Out-of-Bounds Read

• Exploit Database
• 10 阅读

• 作者： Google Security Research
  日期： 2015-12-16
• 类别：

  • dos
  平台：

  • multiple
• 来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39006/

• Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=641
  
  The following crash due to a stack-based out-of-bounds memory read can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):
  
  --- cut ---
  ==2067==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffe26462c20 at pc 0x0000009cf704 bp 0x7ffe26462b70 sp 0x7ffe26462b68
  READ of size 4 at 0x7ffe26462c20 thread T0
  #0 0x9cf703 in getRate wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:2276:20
  #1 0x9c74f7 in vwr_read_s2_s3_W_rec wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:1533:25
  #2 0x9bc02a in vwr_process_rec_data wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:2336:20
  #3 0x9babf2 in vwr_read wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:653:10
  #4 0x9d64c2 in wtap_read wireshark/wiretap/wtap.c:1314:7
  #5 0x535c1a in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3479:12
  #6 0x52c1df in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13
  
  Address 0x7ffe26462c20 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 160 in frame
  #0 0x9cf32f in getRate wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:2261
  
  This frame has 6 object(s):
  [32, 80) 'canonical_rate_legacy'
  [112, 144) 'canonical_ndbps_20_ht'
  [176, 208) 'canonical_ndbps_40_ht' <== Memory access at offset 160 underflows this variable
  [240, 276) 'canonical_ndbps_20_vht'
  [320, 360) 'canonical_ndbps_40_vht'
  [400, 440) 'canonical_ndbps_80_vht'
  HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism or swapcontext
  (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:2276:20 in getRate
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x100044c84530: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100044c84540: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100044c84550: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100044c84560: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100044c84570: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00
  =>0x100044c84580: 00 00 f2 f2[f2]f2 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00
  0x100044c84590: 00 00 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2
  0x100044c845a0: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
  0x100044c845b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100044c845c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100044c845d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable: 00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone: fa
  Heap right redzone:fb
  Freed heap region: fd
  Stack left redzone:f1
  Stack mid redzone: f2
  Stack right redzone: f3
  Stack partial redzone: f4
  Stack after return:f5
  Stack use after scope: f8
  Global redzone:f9
  Global init order: f6
  Poisoned by user:f7
  Container overflow:fc
  Array cookie:ac
  Intra object redzone:bb
  ASan internal: fe
  Left alloca redzone: ca
  Right alloca redzone:cb
  ==2067==ABORTING
  --- cut ---
  
  The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11789. Attached are three files which trigger the crash.
  
  
  Proof of Concept:
  https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39006.zip