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验证：
体验盒子Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=806
The following crashes due to a static out-of-bounds memory read can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):
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==666==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fa5e68bd620 at pc 0x7fa5dc525eab bp 0x7ffd5938ec40 sp 0x7ffd5938ec38
READ of size 4 at 0x7fa5e68bd620 thread T0
#0 0x7fa5dc525eaa in dissect_zcl_pwr_prof_pwrprofnotif wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:10832:25
#1 0x7fa5dc512afc in dissect_zbee_zcl_pwr_prof wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:10549:21
#2 0x7fa5d9d89911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#3 0x7fa5d9d7b57a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#4 0x7fa5d9d85a1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#5 0x7fa5d9d768ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#6 0x7fa5dc4f777c in dissect_zbee_zcl wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-zcl.c:881:13
#7 0x7fa5d9d89911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#8 0x7fa5d9d7b57a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#9 0x7fa5d9d85a1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#10 0x7fa5d9d768ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#11 0x7fa5dc4d0d60 in dissect_zbee_apf wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-aps.c:1705:9
#12 0x7fa5d9d89911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#13 0x7fa5d9d7b57a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#14 0x7fa5d9d85a1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#15 0x7fa5d9d768ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#16 0x7fa5dc4d04fa in dissect_zbee_aps wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-aps.c:1055:13
#17 0x7fa5d9d89911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#18 0x7fa5d9d7b57a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#19 0x7fa5d9d85a1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#20 0x7fa5d9d768ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#21 0x7fa5dc4da910 in dissect_zbee_nwk_full wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-nwk.c:732:9
#22 0x7fa5dc4d419a in dissect_zbee_nwk wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-nwk.c:762:9
#23 0x7fa5dc4d5fb7 in dissect_zbee_nwk_heur wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-nwk.c:409:5
#24 0x7fa5d9d83bbb in dissector_try_heuristic wireshark/epan/packet.c:2390:7
#25 0x7fa5daf6591b in dissect_ieee802154_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.c:1524:21
#26 0x7fa5daf5756a in dissect_ieee802154_nofcs wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.c:751:5
#27 0x7fa5d9d89911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#28 0x7fa5d9d7b57a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#29 0x7fa5d9d7ad4d in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1190:9
#30 0x7fa5dab8c105 in dissect_frame wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:492:11
#31 0x7fa5d9d89911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#32 0x7fa5d9d7b57a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#33 0x7fa5d9d85a1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#34 0x7fa5d9d768ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#35 0x7fa5d9d75cd4 in dissect_record wireshark/epan/packet.c:539:3
#36 0x7fa5d9d28db9 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps wireshark/epan/epan.c:376:2
#37 0x52ef3f in process_packet wireshark/tshark.c:3727:5
#38 0x52830c in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3483:11
#39 0x51e67c in main wireshark/tshark.c:2192:13
0x7fa5e68bd620 is located 32 bytes to the left of global variable 'ett_zbee_zcl_appl_ctrl_func' defined in 'packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:11520:13' (0x7fa5e68bd640) of size 128
0x7fa5e68bd620 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable 'ett_zbee_zcl_pwr_prof_enphases' defined in 'packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:10389:13' (0x7fa5e68bd5e0) of size 64
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:10832:25 in dissect_zcl_pwr_prof_pwrprofnotif
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0ff53cd0fa70: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
0x0ff53cd0fa80: 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ff53cd0fa90: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ff53cd0faa0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9
0x0ff53cd0fab0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
=>0x0ff53cd0fac0: 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ff53cd0fad0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9
0x0ff53cd0fae0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ff53cd0faf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ff53cd0fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ff53cd0fb10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone:fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone:f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return:f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone:f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user:f7
Container overflow:fc
Array cookie:ac
Intra object redzone:bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone:cb
==666==ABORTING
--- cut ---
--- cut ---
==695==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x7feb11013620 at pc 0x7feb06c7b825 bp 0x7ffd6fe96b00 sp 0x7ffd6fe96af8
READ of size 4 at 0x7feb11013620 thread T0
#0 0x7feb06c7b824 in dissect_zcl_pwr_prof_enphsschednotif wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:10745:25
#1 0x7feb06c68ba8 in dissect_zbee_zcl_pwr_prof wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:10563:21
#2 0x7feb044df911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#3 0x7feb044d157a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#4 0x7feb044dba1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#5 0x7feb044cc8ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#6 0x7feb06c4d77c in dissect_zbee_zcl wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-zcl.c:881:13
#7 0x7feb044df911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#8 0x7feb044d157a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#9 0x7feb044dba1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#10 0x7feb044cc8ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#11 0x7feb06c26d60 in dissect_zbee_apf wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-aps.c:1705:9
#12 0x7feb044df911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#13 0x7feb044d157a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#14 0x7feb044dba1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#15 0x7feb044cc8ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#16 0x7feb06c264fa in dissect_zbee_aps wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-aps.c:1055:13
#17 0x7feb044df911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#18 0x7feb044d157a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#19 0x7feb044dba1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#20 0x7feb044cc8ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#21 0x7feb06c30910 in dissect_zbee_nwk_full wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-nwk.c:732:9
#22 0x7feb06c2a19a in dissect_zbee_nwk wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-nwk.c:762:9
#23 0x7feb06c2bfb7 in dissect_zbee_nwk_heur wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-nwk.c:409:5
#24 0x7feb044d9bbb in dissector_try_heuristic wireshark/epan/packet.c:2390:7
#25 0x7feb056bb91b in dissect_ieee802154_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.c:1524:21
#26 0x7feb056ad56a in dissect_ieee802154_nofcs wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee802154.c:751:5
#27 0x7feb044df911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#28 0x7feb044d157a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#29 0x7feb044d0d4d in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1190:9
#30 0x7feb052e2105 in dissect_frame wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:492:11
#31 0x7feb044df911 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:656:8
#32 0x7feb044d157a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:731:9
#33 0x7feb044dba1e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2764:8
#34 0x7feb044cc8ff in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2777:8
#35 0x7feb044cbcd4 in dissect_record wireshark/epan/packet.c:539:3
#36 0x7feb0447edb9 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps wireshark/epan/epan.c:376:2
#37 0x52ef3f in process_packet wireshark/tshark.c:3727:5
#38 0x52830c in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3483:11
#39 0x51e67c in main wireshark/tshark.c:2192:13
0x7feb11013620 is located 32 bytes to the left of global variable 'ett_zbee_zcl_appl_ctrl_func' defined in 'packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:11520:13' (0x7feb11013640) of size 128
0x7feb11013620 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable 'ett_zbee_zcl_pwr_prof_enphases' defined in 'packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:10389:13' (0x7feb110135e0) of size 64
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-zbee-zcl-general.c:10745:25 in dissect_zcl_pwr_prof_enphsschednotif
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0ffde21fa670: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
0x0ffde21fa680: 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffde21fa690: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffde21fa6a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9
0x0ffde21fa6b0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
=>0x0ffde21fa6c0: 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffde21fa6d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9
0x0ffde21fa6e0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffde21fa6f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffde21fa700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffde21fa710: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone:fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone:f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return:f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone:f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user:f7
Container overflow:fc
Array cookie:ac
Intra object redzone:bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone:cb
==695==ABORTING
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The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=12358. Attached are two files which trigger the crash.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39750.zip
体验盒子
