NVIDIA Driver – UVMLiteController ioctl Handling Unchecked Input/Output Lengths Privilege Escalation

• Exploit Database
• 13 阅读

• 作者： Google Security Research
  日期： 2016-10-31
• 类别：

  • local
  平台：

  • windows
• 来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40655/

• /*
  Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=880
  
  The \\.\UVMLiteController device is created by the nvlddmkm.sys driver, and can be opened by any user. The driver handles various control codes for this device, but there is no validation for the input/output buffer and their sizes.
  
  In addition to potential overreads on the input, the driver writes output directly to Irp->UserBuffer, which is the output pointer passed to DeviceIoControl() by the user. The IO control codes handled specify METHOD_BUFFERED, but the kernel does no validation that the output pointer is accessible by the user process if the user passes an output buffer size of 0.
  
  This means that a user mode program can cause a write of (at least) the 32-bit values 0 or 31, or the 8-bit value 0 to any address given to the driver.
  
  A PoC is attached that causes a bsod when the kernel tries to write to 0x4141414141414141+0x30.
  
  
  Proof of Concept:
  https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40655.zip