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体验盒子[+] Credits: John Page AKA hyp3rlinx
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source: http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/PHPSHELL-v2.4-SESSION-FIXATION.txt
[+] ISR: ApparitionSec
Vendor:
==================================
sourceforge.net/projects/phpshell/
phpshell.sourceforge.net/
Product:
==============
PHPShell v2.4
Vulnerability Type:
===================
Session Fixation
CVE Reference:
==============
N/A
Security Issue:
================
PHPShell does not regenerate the Session ID upon authentication, this can
potentially allow remote attackers to access parts of the application
using only a valid PHPSESSID if PHP.INI setting for
session.use_only_cookies=0.
Since an existing XSS vulnerability exists in PHPShell "
http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/PHPSHELL-v2.4-CROSS-SITE-SCRIPTING.txt"
the risk is
increased if an authenticated user clicks an attacker supplied link and the
attacker finds way to access or set the victims Cookie.
In 'phpshell.php' line 153 we see call to PHP function session_start();
After user authentication no call to "session_regenerate_id()" is made
leaving the authenticated session id same as pre-auth session id.
However, "session.use_only_cookies=1" is default since PHP 4.3.0, so to
exploit it would require that PHP.INI is set to session.use_only_cookies=0
on the victims system.
When accessing the application using the session fixation flaw and
attempting to run system command the application luckily redirects to login
form.
However, if a victim is actively changing directorys, reading files etc...
attackers may still be able to read current directory and files open
in the victims PHPShell console window.
Exploit/POC:
=============
1) Login to PHPShell run commands to CD to Windows directory and run DIR
command etc, then find and copy the PHPSESSID Cookie
2) Open a second browser (InternetExplorer) and access the application
cleanly for first time using the PHPSESSID in URL.
e.g.
http://VICTIM-IP/phpshell-2.4/phpshell.php?PHPSESSID=<STOLEN-SESSION-ID>
You should see what the authenticated victim now sees...
e.g.
Current Working Directory:
Change to subdirectory:
07/13/200908:51 PM24,576 Microsoft.MediaCenter.iTv.Hosting.dll
11/20/201010:24 PM 147,968 Microsoft.MediaCenter.iTV.Media.dll
07/13/200908:52 PM45,056 Microsoft.MediaCenter.ITVVM.dll
11/20/201010:24 PM56,320 Microsoft.MediaCenter.Mheg.dll
11/20/201010:24 PM 114,688 Microsoft.MediaCenter.Playback.dll
11/20/201010:24 PM 1,572,864 Microsoft.MediaCenter.Shell.dll
11/20/201010:24 PM 241,664 Microsoft.MediaCenter.Sports.dll
11/20/201010:24 PM 327,168
Microsoft.MediaCenter.TV.Tuners.Interop.dll
11/20/201010:24 PM 2,596,864 Microsoft.MediaCenter.UI.dll
10/29/201112:23 AM 465,920 mstvcapn.dll
11/20/201010:24 PM88,576 NetBridge.dll
07/13/200908:51 PM 106,496 RegisterMCEApp.exe
06/10/200904:04 PM 129,528 segmcr.ttf
etc...
Network Access:
===============
Remote
Severity:
=========
Medium
Disclosure Timeline:
=============================
Vendor Notification:No reply
Also, the INSTALL file "Bugs?Comments? Tracker System link" is HTTP 404
http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?group_id=156638
February 18, 2017 : Public Disclosure
[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory,
provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in
vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the
information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author
prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c) HYP3RLINX -
ApparitionSec
体验盒子
