dnaLIMS DNA Sequencing – Directory Traversal / Session Hijacking / Cross-Site Scripting

  • 作者: Shorebreak Security
    日期: 2017-03-10
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41578/
  • Title: Multiple vulnerabilities discovered in dnaLIMS DNA sequencing
    web-application
    Advisory URL: https://www.shorebreaksecurity.com/blog/product-security-advisory-psa0002-dnalims/
    Date published: Mar 08, 2017
    Vendor: dnaTools, Inc.
    CVE IDs: [2017-6526, 2017-6527, 2017-6528, 2017-6529]
    USCERT VU: 929263
    
    Vulnerability Summaries
    1) Improperly protected web shell [CVE-2017-6526]
    dnaLIMS requires authentication to view cgi-bin/dna/sysAdmin.cgi, which is
    a web shell included with the software running as the web user.However,
    sending a POST request to that page bypasses authentication checks,
    including the UID parameter within the POST request.
    
    2) Unauthenticated Directory Traversal [CVE-2017-6527]
    The viewAppletFsa.cgi seqID parameter is vulnerable to a null terminated
    directory traversal attack. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to
    retrieve files on the operating system accessible by the permissions of the
    web server. This page also does not require authentication, allowing any
    person on the Internet to exploit this vulnerability.
    
    3) Insecure Password Storage[CVE-2017-6528]
    An option, which is most likely the default, allows the password file
    (/home/dna/spool/.pfile) to store clear text passwords.When combined with
    the unauthenticated directory traversal vulnerability, it is possible to
    gain the username and password for all users of the software and gain
    complete control of the software.
    
    4) Session Hijacking [CVE-2017-6529]
    Each user of the dnaLIMS software is assigned a unique four-digit user
    identification number(UID) upon account creation.These numbers appear to
    be assigned sequentially. Multiple pages of the dnaLIMS application require
    that this UID be passed as a URL parameter in order to view the content of
    the page.
    Consider the following example:
    The URL ahttp://<SERVER NAME
    REDACTED>/cgi-bin/dna/seqreq2N.cgi?username=61685578,2410a is a valid URL
    to view the page for sequencing requests for the user with the UID of 2410. The
    username parameter of the URL is the mechanism for authentication to the
    system. The first eight-digit number of the username parameter appears to
    be a session identifier as it changes every time the user logs in from the
    password.cgi page, however this value is not checked by the seqreq2N.cgi
    page. This allows an attacker to guess the four-digit UID of valid user
    accounts that have an active session. The user with the UID of 2419
    currently has an active session, so we can simply hijack this useras
    session by requesting this page and specifying the UID 2419.
    
    5) Cross-site Scripting
    The seqID parameter of the viewAppletFsa.cgi page is vulnerable to a
    reflected cross site scripting attack via GET request as seen in the
    following URL:
    http://<SERVER NAME REDACTED>/cgi-bin/dna/viewAppletFsa.cgi?seqID=7415-7<SCRIPT
    Alert("XSS") </SCRIPT>
    
    6) Cross-site Scripting
    The navUserName parameter of the seqTable*.cgi page is vulnerable to a
    reflected cross site scripting attack via POST request as seen in the
    example below. The * reflects a short name for a client, (ie Shorebreak
    Security may be seqTableSS.cgi or seqTableshorebreak.cgi) and may not be
    vulnerable for all dnaLIMS installs.
    
    7) Improperly Protected Content
    
    Many of the pages within the admin interface are not properly protected
    from viewing by authenticated users.This can give an attacker additional
    system information about the system, or change system/software
    configuration.
    
    Software was conducted on a live production system, therefore the pages
    themselves were tested, forms within these pages were not.
    
    This is also not an exhaustive list of improperly protected pages:
    
    cgi-bin/dna/configuration.cgi
    
    cgi-bin/dna/createCoInfo.cgi
    
    cgi-bin/dna/configSystem.cgi
    
    cgi-bin/dna/combineAcctsN.cgi
    
    Disclosure Timeline
    
    Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 4:25 PM: Reached out to vendor requesting PGP key to
    securely exchange details of vulnerabilities identified
    
    Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 4:55 PM: Vendor requests report be physically mailed
    to PO box via Postal Service
    
    Wed, Nov 16, 2016, at 11:14 AM: Report mailed to vendor via USPS Certified
    Mail
    
    Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 10:43 AM: Request Vendor acknowledge receipt of the
    report
    
    Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 12:53 PM: Vendor acknowledges receiptI3/4 suggests
    placing the software behind a firewall as a solution to the vulnerabilities.
    
    Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 1:54 PM: Reply that the offered solution mitigates
    some risk, but does not address the vulnerabilitiesI3/4 inquire if there is a
    plan to address the vulnerabilities
    
    Thu, Dec 8, 2016, at 3:13 PM: Vendor replies aa|Yes, we have a plan. Please
    gather a DNA sequence, PO Number, or Fund Number and go to your local
    grocery store and see what it will buy you.a
    
    Tue, Feb 28, 2017, at 1:15 PM: Vulnerabilities disclosed to US-CERT
    
    Tue, Mar 7, 2017, at 8:19 AM: Vulnerabilities submitted to MITRE for CVE
    assignment
    
    Wed, Mar 8, 2017, at 12:00 PM: Vulnerabilities disclosed publicly