ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers – Authorization Bypass

  • 作者: SEC Consult
    日期: 2018-07-05
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44982/
  • SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180704-1 >
    =======================================================================
    title: Authorization Bypass
    product: All ADB Broadband Gateways / Routers
    (based on Epicentro platform)
    vulnerable version: Hardware: ADB P.RG AV4202N, DV2210, VV2220, VV5522, etc.
    fixed version: see "Solution" section below
    CVE number: CVE-2018-13109
    impact: critical
    homepage: http://www.adbglobal.com
    found: 2016-06-28
    by: Johannes Greil (Office Vienna)
    SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
    
    An integrated part of SEC Consult
    Europe | Asia | North America
    
    https://www.sec-consult.com
    =======================================================================
    
    Vendor description:
    -------------------
    "ADB creates and delivers the right solutions that enable our customers to
    reduce integration and service delivery challenges to increase ARPU and reduce
    churn. We combine ADB know-how and products with those from a number of third
    party industry leaders to deliver complete solutions that benefit from
    collaborative thinking and best in class technologies."
    
    Source: https://www.adbglobal.com/about-adb/
    
    "Founded in 1995, ADB initially focused on developing and marketing software
    for digital TV processors and expanded its business to the design and
    manufacture of digital TV equipment in 1997. The company sold its first set-top
    box in 1997 and since then has been delivering a number of set-top boxes, and
    Gateway devices, together with advanced software platforms. ADB has sold over
    60 million devices worldwide to cable, satellite, IPTV and broadband operators.
    ADB employs over 500 people, of which 70% are in engineering functions."
    
    Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Digital_Broadcast
    
    Business recommendation:
    ------------------------
    By exploiting the authorization bypass vulnerability on affected and unpatched
    devices an attacker is able to gain access to settings that are otherwise
    forbidden for the user, e.g. through strict settings set by the ISP. It is also
    possible to manipulate settings to e.g. enable the telnet server for remote
    access if it had been previously disabled by the ISP. The attacker needs some
    user account, regardless of the permissions, for login, e.g. the default one
    provided by the ISP or printed on the device can be used.
    
    It is highly recommended by SEC Consult to perform a thorough security review
    by security professionals for this platform. It is assumed that further critical
    vulnerabilities exist within the firmware of this device.
    
    Vulnerability overview/description:
    -----------------------------------
    1) Authorization bypass vulnerability (CVE-2018-13109)
    Depending on the firmware version/feature-set of the ISP deploying the ADB
    device, a standard user account may not have all settings enabled within
    the web GUI.
    
    An authenticated attacker is able to bypass those restrictions by adding a
    second slash in front of the forbidden entry of the path in the URL.
    It is possible to access forbidden entries within the first layer of the web
    GUI, any further subsequent layers/paths (sub menus) were not possible to access
    during testing but further exploitation can't be ruled out entirely.
    
    Proof of concept:
    -----------------
    1) Authorization bypass vulnerability (CVE-2018-13109)
    Assume the following URL is blocked/forbidden within the web GUI settings:
    http://$IP/ui/dboard/settings/management/telnetserver
    
    Adding a second slash in front of the blocked entry "telnetserver" will enable
    full access including write permissions to change settings:
    http://$IP/ui/dboard/settings/management//telnetserver
    
    This works for many other settings within the web GUI!
    
    In our tests it was not possible to access subsequent layers, e.g.:
    Assume that both the proxy menu and submenu "rtsp" settings are blocked,
    a second slash will _not_ enable access to the RTSP settings:
    http://$IP/ui/dboard/settings/proxy//rtsp
    
    Nevertheless, it can't be ruled out that sub menus can be accessed too when
    further deeper tests are being performed.
    
    Vulnerable / tested versions:
    -----------------------------
    The following devices & firmware have been tested which were the most recent
    versions at the time of discovery:
    
    The firmware versions depend on the ISP / customer of ADB and may vary!
    
    ADB P.RG AV4202N - E_3.3.0, latest firmware version, depending on ISP
    ADB DV 2210 - E_5.3.0, latest firmware version, depending on ISP
    ADB VV 5522 - E_8.3.0, latest firmware version, depending on ISP
    ADB VV 2220 - E_9.0.6, latest firmware version, depending on ISP
    etc.
    
    It has been confirmed by ADB that _all_ their ADB modems / gateways / routers
    based on the Epicentro platform are affected by this vulnerability in all
    firmware versions for all their customers (ISPs) at the time of identification
    of the vulnerability _except_ those devices which have a custom UI developed
    for the ISP.
    
    Vendor contact timeline:
    ------------------------
    2016-07-01: Contacting vendor ADB, sending encrypted advisory, asking about
    affected devices
    2016-07-08: Receiving information about affected devices
    2016-07 - 2017-04: Further coordination, waiting for firmware release,
    implementation & rollout phases for their customers
    2018-07-04: Embargo lifted, public release of security advisory
    
    Solution:
    ---------
    The firmware versions depend on the ISP / customer of ADB and may vary!
    
    Patch version:
    
    ADB P.RG AV4202N >= E_3.3.2, firmware version depending on ISP
    ADB DV2210 >= E_5.3.2, firmware version depending on ISP
    ADB VV5522 >= E_8.3.2, firmware version depending on ISP
    ADB VV2220 >= E_9.3.2, firmware version depending on ISP
    etc.
    
    Workaround:
    -----------
    Restrict access to the web interface and only allow trusted users.
    Change any default/weak passwords to strong credentials.
    Don't allow remote access to the web GUI via Internet.
    
    Advisory URL:
    -------------
    https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html
    
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    
    SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
    
    SEC Consult
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    EOF J. Greil / @2018