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体验盒子Qualys Security Advisory
The Return of the WIZard: RCE in Exim (CVE-2019-10149)
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Contents
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Summary
Local exploitation
Remote exploitation
- Non-default configurations
- Default configuration
Acknowledgments
Timeline
Boromir: "What is this new devilry?"
Gandalf: "A Balrog. A demon of the Ancient World."
-- The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring
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Summary
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During a code review of the latest changes in the Exim mail server
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exim), we discovered an RCE vulnerability
in versions 4.87 to 4.91 (inclusive). In this particular case, RCE means
Remote *Command* Execution, not Remote Code Execution: an attacker can
execute arbitrary commands with execv(), as root; no memory corruption
or ROP (Return-Oriented Programming) is involved.
This vulnerability is exploitable instantly by a local attacker (and by
a remote attacker in certain non-default configurations). To remotely
exploit this vulnerability in the default configuration, an attacker
must keep a connection to the vulnerable server open for 7 days (by
transmitting one byte every few minutes). However, because of the
extreme complexity of Exim's code, we cannot guarantee that this
exploitation method is unique; faster methods may exist.
Exim is vulnerable by default since version 4.87 (released on April 6,
2016), when #ifdef EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT became #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT; and
older versions may also be vulnerable if EXPERIMENTAL_EVENT was enabled
manually. Surprisingly, this vulnerability was fixed in version 4.92
(released on February 10, 2019):
https://github.com/Exim/exim/commit/7ea1237c783e380d7bdb8...
https://bugs.exim.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2310
but was not identified as a security vulnerability, and most operating
systems are therefore affected. For example, we exploit an up-to-date
Debian distribution (9.9) in this advisory.
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Local exploitation
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The vulnerable code is located in deliver_message():
6122 #ifndef DISABLE_EVENT
6123 if (process_recipients != RECIP_ACCEPT)
6124 {
6125 uschar * save_local =deliver_localpart;
6126 const uschar * save_domain = deliver_domain;
6127
6128 deliver_localpart = expand_string(
6129 string_sprintf("${local_part:%s}", new->address));
6130 deliver_domain =expand_string(
6131 string_sprintf("${domain:%s}", new->address));
6132
6133 (void) event_raise(event_action,
6134 US"msg:fail:internal", new->message);
6135
6136 deliver_localpart = save_local;
6137 deliver_domain =save_domain;
6138 }
6139 #endif
Because expand_string() recognizes the "${run{<command> <args>}}"
expansion item, and because new->address is the recipient of the mail
that is being delivered, a local attacker can simply send a mail to
"${run{...}}@localhost" (where "localhost" is one of Exim's
local_domains) and execute arbitrary commands, as root
(deliver_drop_privilege is false, by default):
[...]
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Remote exploitation
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Our local-exploitation method does not work remotely, because the
"verify = recipient" ACL (Access-Control List) in Exim's default
configuration requires the local part of the recipient's address (the
part that precedes the @ sign) to be the name of a local user:
[...]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-default configurations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
We eventually devised an elaborate method for exploiting Exim remotely
in its default configuration, but we first identified various
non-default configurations that are easy to exploit remotely:
- If the "verify = recipient" ACL was removed manually by an
administrator (maybe to prevent username enumeration via RCPT TO),
then our local-exploitation method also works remotely.
- If Exim was configured to recognize tags in the local part of the
recipient's address (via "local_part_suffix = +* : -*" for example),
then a remote attacker can simply reuse our local-exploitation method
with an RCPT TO "balrog+${run{...}}@localhost" (where "balrog" is the
name of a local user).
- If Exim was configured to relay mail to a remote domain, as a
secondary MX (Mail eXchange), then a remote attacker can simply reuse
our local-exploitation method with an RCPT TO "${run{...}}@khazad.dum"
(where "khazad.dum" is one of Exim's relay_to_domains). Indeed, the
"verify = recipient" ACL can only check the domain part of a remote
address (the part that follows the @ sign), not the local part.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Default configuration
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[...]
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Acknowledgments
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We thank Exim's developers, Solar Designer, and the members of
distros@openwall.
"The Return of the WIZard" is a reference to Sendmail's ancient WIZ and
DEBUG vulnerabilities:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-1999-0145
https://seclists.org/bugtraq/1995/Feb/56
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-1999-0095
http://www.cheswick.com/ches/papers/berferd.pdf
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Timeline
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2019-05-27: Advisory sent to security@exim.
2019-05-28: Advisory sent to distros@openwall.
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