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Cisco Security Advisory: Default Credentials for Root Account on
Tandberg E, EX and C Series Endpoints
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20110202-tandberg
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2011 February 2 1600 UTC (GMT)
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
Tandberg C Series Endpoints and E/EX Personal Video units that are
running software versions prior to TC4.0.0 ship with a root
administrator account that is enabled by default with no password. An
attacker could use this account in order to modify the application
configuration or operating system settings.
Resolving this default password issue does not require a software
upgrade and can be changed or disabled by a configuration command for
all affected customers. The workaround detailed in this document
demonstrates how to disable the root account or change the password.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110202-tandberg.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
This vulnerability affects Tandberg C Series Endpoints and E/EX
Personal Video units, including software that is running on the C20,
C40, C60, C90, E20, EX60, and EX90 codecs. The software version of
the Tandberg unit can be determined by logging into the web-based
user interface (UI) or using the "xStatus SystemUnit" command.
Users can determine the Tandberg software version by entering the IP
address of the codec in a web browser, authenticating (if the device
is configured for authentication), and then selecting the "system
info" menu option. The version number is displayed after the
"Software Version" label in the System Info box.
Alternatively the software version can be determined from the
device's application programmer interface using the "xStatus
SystemUnit" command. The software version running on the codec is
displayed after the "SystemUnit Software Version" label. The output
from "xStatus SystemUnit" will display a result similar to the
following:
xStatus SystemUnit
*s SystemUnit ProductType: "Cisco TelePresence Codec"
*s SystemUnit ProductId: "Cisco TelePresence Codec C90"
*s SystemUnit ProductPlatform: "C90"
*s SystemUnit Uptime: 597095
*s SystemUnit Software Application: "Endpoint"
*s SystemUnit Software Version: "TC4.0"
*s SystemUnit Software Name: "s52000"
*s SystemUnit Software ReleaseDate: "2010-11-01"
*s SystemUnit Software MaxVideoCalls: 3
*s SystemUnit Software MaxAudioCalls: 4
*s SystemUnit Software ReleaseKey: "true"
*s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys NaturalPresenter: "true"
*s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys MultiSite: "true"
*s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys PremiumResolution: "true"
*s SystemUnit Hardware Module SerialNumber: "B1AD25A00003"
*s SystemUnit Hardware Module Identifier: "0"
*s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard SerialNumber: "PH0497201"
*s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard Identifier: "101401-3 [04]"
*s SystemUnit Hardware VideoBoard SerialNumber: "PH0497874"
*s SystemUnit Hardware VideoBoard Identifier: "101560-1 [02]"
*s SystemUnit Hardware AudioBoard SerialNumber: "N/A"
*s SystemUnit Hardware AudioBoard Identifier: ""
*s SystemUnit Hardware BootSoftware: "U-Boot 2009.03-65"
*s SystemUnit State System: Initialized
*s SystemUnit State MaxNumberOfCalls: 3
*s SystemUnit State MaxNumberOfActiveCalls: 3
*s SystemUnit State NumberOfActiveCalls: 1
*s SystemUnit State NumberOfSuspendedCalls: 0
*s SystemUnit State NumberOfInProgressCalls: 0
*s SystemUnit State Subsystem Application: Initialized
*s SystemUnit ContactInfo: "helpdesk () company com"
** end
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
Tandberg devices are part of the Cisco TelePresence Systems that
provide Cisco TelePresence endpoints for immersive environments,
conference rooms, individual desktops and home offices. The C Series
Endpoints are typically deployed as Multipurpose Room Systems and the
E/EX Personal Video units are desktop devices.
These devices contain a root user that is enabled for advanced
debugging that is unnecessary during normal operations. The root
account is not the same as the admin and user accounts. The root user
is enabled by default in software versions prior to TC 4.0.0. The
default configuration prior to TC 4.0.0 does not set a password for
the root user.
When a device is upgraded to TC 4.0.0, the root user is disabled.
System software for Tandberg C Series Endpoints and E/EX Personal
Video units is available for download at:
http://www.tandberg.com/support/video-conferencing-software-download.jsp?t=2
For instructions on how to set a root password or disable the root
user on other software versions, see the workaround section of this
advisory.
This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE ID CVE-2011-0354.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* Root account enabled by default with no password
CVSS Base Score - 10
Access Vector -Network
Access Complexity -Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact -Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level -Official-Fix
Report Confidence -Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may allow an
unauthorized user to modify the application configuration and the
operating system settings or gain complete administrative control of
the device.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a
complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Workarounds
===========
The root user is disabled in the default configuration starting in
the TC4.0.0 software version. To disable the root account, an
administrator should log in to the applications programmer interface
and use the command "systemtools rootsettings off" to temporarily
disable the account, or the command "systemtools rootsettings never"
to permanently disable the root user.
The root user is enabled for advanced debugging. If the root user is
needed, the password should be configured when the account is
enabled. This can be done through the command "systemtools
rootsettings on [password]".
Devices running software version TC 4.0.0 or later
The root user is disabled in the default configuration starting in
the TC4.0.0 software version. To disable the root account, an
administrator should log in to the applications programmer interface
and use the command "systemtools rootsettings off" to temporarily
disable the account, or the command "systemtools rootsettings never"
to permanently disable the root user.
The root user is enabled for advanced debugging. If the root user is
needed, the password should be configured when the account is
enabled. This can be done through the command "systemtools
rootsettings on [password]".
The default configuration of devices running TC4.0.0 does not contain
a password for the administrator account. The password for the
administrator account should be set with the command "xCommand
SystemUnit AdminPassword Set Password: [password].
Devices running software versions prior to TC 4.0.0
The root user cannot be disabled on devices running software versions
prior to TC4.0.0. The password for the root account is the same as
the administrator password. The administrator password is set with
the command "xCommand SystemUnit AdminPassword Set Password:
[password]".
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt () cisco com or security-alert () cisco com for
software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac () cisco com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to
a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be
requested through the TAC.
Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
This vulnerability has been discussed in the article "Hacking and
Securing the Tandberg C20" published in Volume 27, Number 3 of the
2600 Magazine.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
This information is Cisco Highly Confidential - Do not redistribute.
THIS IS A DRAFT VERSION OF A SECURITY NOTICE THAT CONTAINS UNRELEASED
INFORMATION ABOUT CISCO PRODUCTS. DISTRIBUTION WITHIN CISCO IS
LIMITED TO PERSONNEL WITH A NEED TO KNOW. THIS DRAFT MAY CONTAIN
ERRORS OR OMIT IMPORTANT INFORMATION.
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110202-tandberg.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce () cisco com
* first-bulletins () lists first org
* bugtraq () securityfocus com
* vulnwatch () vulnwatch org
* cisco () spot colorado edu
* cisco-nsp () puck nether net
* full-disclosure () lists grok org uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco () newsgate cisco com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial|
| 1.0| 2011-Feb-02 | public |
|| | release. |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices.
All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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All contents are Copyright 2011-2007 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Feb 02, 2011 Document ID: 112247
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