Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 / SharePoint / Lync – toStaticHTML HTML Sanitizing Bypass (MS12-037/MS12-039/MS12-050)

  • 作者: Adi Cohen
    日期: 2012-07-12
  • 类别:
    平台:
  • 来源:https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19777/
  • toStaticHTML: The Second Encounter (CVE-2012-1858)
    
    *HTML Sanitizing Bypass -
    *CVE-2012-1858<http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1858>
    
    Original advisory -
    http://blog.watchfire.com/wfblog/2012/07/tostatichtml-the-second-encounter-cve-2012-1858-html-sanitizing-information-disclosure-introduction-t.html
    
    Introduction
    
    The *toStaticHTML* component, which is found in Internet Explorer > 8,
    SharePoint and Lync is used to sanitize HTML fragments from dynamic and
    potentially malicious content.
    
    If an attacker is able to break the filtering mechanism and pass malicious
    code through this function, he/she may be able to perform HTML injection
    based attacks (i.e. XSS).
    
    It has been a year since the first
    encounter<http://blog.watchfire.com/wfblog/2011/07/tostatichtml-html-sanitizing-bypass.html>
    was
    published, we've now returned with a new bypass method.
    
    Vulnerability
    
    An attacker is able to create a specially formed CSS that will overcome *
    toStaticHTML*'s security logic; therefore, after passing the specially
    crafted CSS string through the *toStaticHTML* function, it will contain an
    expression that triggers a JavaScript call.
    
    The following JavaScript code demonstrates the vulnerability:
    
    *<script>document.write(toStaticHTML("<style>
    div{font-family:rgb('0,0,0)'''}foo');color=expression(alert(1));{}
    </style><div>POC</div>"))</script>*
    
    In this case the function's return value would be JavaScript executable:
    
    *<style>
    div{font-family:rgb('0,0,0)''';}foo');color=expression(alert(1));{;}</style>
    <div>POC</div>*
    
    
    
    The reason this code bypasses the filter engine is due to two reasons:
    
     1. The filtering engine allows the string "expression(" to exists in
     "non-dangerous" locations within the CSS.
     2. A bug in Internet Explorer's CSS parsing engine doesn't properly
     terminate strings that are opened inside brackets and closed outside of
     them.
    
    When combining these two factors the attacker is able to "confuse" the
    filtering mechanism into "thinking" that a string is open when in fact it
    is terminated and vice versa. With this ability the attacker can trick the
    filtering mechanism into entering a state of the selector context which is
    considered safer where in fact the code is just a new declaration of the
    same selector, thus breaking the state machine and bypassing the filter.
    
    
    
    Impact
    
    Every application that relies on the *toStaticHTML* component to sanitize
    user supplied data had probably been vulnerable to XSS.
    
    
    
    Remediation
    
    Microsoft has issued several updates to address this vulnerability.
    
    MS12-037 - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-037
    
    MS12-039 - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-039
    
    MS12-050 - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/MS12-050